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Preliminary note 
Former Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
repealing Directive 96/92/EC (“Directive 2003/54/EC”)1 introduced for the first time 
a compulsory regime of energy regulation. Upon former article 23 para. 1 sent. 1 of 
Directive 2003/54/EC, Member States were required to “designate one or more 
competent bodies with the function of regulatory authorities”. These authorities were 
vested, upon article 23 para. 1 sent. 2 of Directive 2003/54/EC, with a minimum set of 
competences (shall “at least be responsible”).  
Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC (“Directive 2009/72/EC”)2 modifies the regulatory regime established 
under Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC. Indeed, under the framework of Directive 
2009/72/EC, the duties of national energy regulators have considerably been 
increased, extending to further areas of monopoly markets as well as to market areas, 
where effective competition exists. For this purpose, they are vested with a minimum 
set of powers (“shall at least have the following powers”), comprising new 
investigation powers, new decision-making as well as new enforcement powers. 
This paper will demonstrate that, although the powers of national energy regulators 
have undoubtedly been increased, their position has not been strengthened, as claimed 
by the European Commission. Based upon a careful selection of legal issues and 
underlined by specific provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC, it will reveal that it is the 
European Commission, which benefits from the increase of powers of the national 
energy regulators. It will prove that the new regulatory regime of Directive 
2009/72/EC leads to a drastic shift of powers in the area of energy regulation.  
                                                 
1 OJEU L 176/37. 
2 OJEU L 211/55. 
 
1
 
 
This paper reflects the legal status as of 28th of February 2011. The dissolution of the 
E-control GmbH, the main Austrian energy regulator, in its present form and its new 
foundation into an institution under public law (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) on 3rd 
of March 2011 could therefore not be considered.3 The elaborations on the E-control 
GmbH4 remain however of relevance, since they deal also in general with the problem 
of outsourcing administrative tasks to entities of private law, including the possibilities 
of control through civil and company law (zivil - und gesellschaftsrechtliche 
Steuerungsmöglichkeiten), which produce similar effects to those of governmental 
instructions.  
The Introductory Part (1) will, in form of a historical overview, outline the 
development that national energy regulators underwent under European energy 
legislation. It will, in particular, show that these authorities attract increased attention 
and that, as a result of it, their regulatory powers are continuously strengthened. In 
order to understand the huge impact that the regime of Directive 2009/72/EC has on 
the regulatory regimes of the Member States, the Introductory Part will, by way of 
example, examine the current powers of national energy regulators under Austrian and 
German law. 
Part Two (2) will analyse whether the powers conferred upon national energy 
regulators under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC have been enhanced in 
comparison to those established under the regime of Directive 2003/54/EC. It will 
examine whether the requirement of article 35 para. 1 and 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
to establish a single national regulatory authority at national level constitutes indeed, as 
the European Commission claims, an effective tool of enhancing the powers of 
                                                 
3 Few details on the establishment of the E-control GmbH as an institution under public law are 
available under website of the E-control GmbH, http://www.e-
control.at/de/econtrol/projekte/zehn-jahre-e-control (26.03.2011). 
4 See section 3.2.2.2.1 as to the structure and legitimacy of the E-control GmbH within the hierarchical 
structure of public administration; section 3.2.2.2.2 concerning the principally existing powers of 
governmental control by virtue of article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG; section 3.2.3.2.1.1 with regard to the 
requirements of European law in the light of the new regime of Directive 2009/72/EC and article 20 
para. 2 sent. 1 no. 5 and 8. of the B-VG and section 3.2.3.2.2 regarding the establishment of adequate 
rights of supervision through civil and company law. 
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national energy regulators.5 Part Two will, in form of an in-depth analysis, assess 
whether art. 35 para. 1 and 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC is compatible with the 
constitutionally guaranteed principle of Federalism as it is prevalent in Germany and 
Austria (2.1). The analysis will conclude with an examination of the duties and powers 
that have been attributed to national energy regulators under the regime of Directive 
2009/72/EC in addition to those of Directive 2003/54/EC (2.2). 
Part Three (3) will demonstrate that the increase of national energy regulators’ powers, 
on one side, leads to a loss of powers of the Member States over their own energy 
regulators, on the other side. While comparing national energy regulators’ status of 
independence under the regime of former Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 
2009/72/EC, it will reveal that the loss of power suffered by the Member States is 
mainly triggered through article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC, 
which requires national energy regulators’ independence in also political terms (3.1). 
Whether the required political independence can be regarded as compatible with 
Austrian and German constitutional law will be dealt with, in form of an in-depth 
analysis, in the last section of Part Three (3.2). 
Part Four (4) will prove that it is the European Commission, which benefits from the 
enhancement of powers and strengthening of independence of national energy 
regulators. The European Commission’s gain of power over national energy regulators 
appears either in form of direct powers of control, such as in form of binding 
guidelines (4.1) or in form of indirect powers of control exercised through its European 
institutions, such as the European Network of Transmission System Operators or the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (4.2). 
Part Five (5) will come to the conclusion that the powers of national energy regulators, 
which have undoubtedly been enhanced under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, 
are of benefit of the European Commission rather than of the Member States. It is 
indeed the European Commission, which, equipped with a powerful set of powers, is 
                                                 
5 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, COM (2007) 528 final at 
2.1. 
 
3
 
 
the real “winner” as to the regulatory powers of the energy markets. Under the regime 
of Directive 2009/72/EC, the energy regulatory powers shift. They shift away from the 
Member States on a national level towards the European Commission on a European 
level. 
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1 Introduction: a historical overview of the powers of national energy 
regulators 
European energy legislations and, based upon them, Austrian and German 
energy laws illustrate well that the powers of the national energy regulators are on a 
constant rise.6 These legislations reveal how national energy regulators made up their 
way from unknown regulatory authorities to the powerful regulatory authorities they 
are today. Whereas under the regime of Electricity Directive 1996/92/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity (“Directive 1996/92/EC”)7, national energy 
regulators were barely noticed (1.1), their existence under the regime of Directive 
2003/54/ECwas well recognized. Having had, however, no clearly defined scope of 
action, they were of little relevance (1.2). Today, under the regime of Directive 
2009/72/EC, national energy regulators are powerful authorities vested with regulatory 
powers, which reach deeply into various monopoly markets and which extend even to 
areas, where effective competition exists (1.3). 
1.1 Under the framework of Electricity Directive 1996/92/EC and Austrian and 
German energy laws 
Under the framework of Directive 1996/92/EC, the regulation of the internal 
electricity market was entirely left within the hands of the Member States. No 
obligation existed, which required Member States to designate a body with the 
regulatory functions of the electricity market. Member States were merely required to 
provide effective regulation, whoever carried out this function. Directive 1996/92/EC8 
                                                 
6 For a historical overview of the liberalisation of the European energy market, see e.g. C. Schalast, 
Das EU-Energiepaket 2007 – Wettbewerb, Binnenmarkt und Umweltschutz, IR 4/ 2007, p. 74 et seq; 
see also O. Philipp, Elektrizitätsbinnenmarkt und Energiecharta, EuZW 17/ 2998, p. 517 et seq. 
7 OJEU L 027, 30/01/1997, p. 0020 – 0029. 
8 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJEU, L 027, 30/01/1997 p. 0020 – 0029. 
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stipulated in this regard that, due to the “structural differences” in the Member States”9 
and the “different systems for regulating the electricity sector”10, the detailed 
implementation of the general principles provided for by European law, “should be left 
to Member States, thus allowing each Member State to choose the regime which 
corresponds best to its particular situation”11. Where a Member State opted for the 
“regulated system of access procedure”12, the role of the national regulator could either 
be assumed through the Member State itself or through any other “competent body”13, 
“competent authority14” or “public body or private body15”. Hence, under the regime of 
Directive 1996/92/EC, the European institutions were in no way involved in the 
regulation of the internal electricity markets of the Member States. 
As a result of the freedom of action given to the Member States on the implementation 
of the internal electricity markets, there was “significant variation in the powers of 
national regulatory authorities”16 within the different Member States. 
                                                 
9 See Recital (10) of Directive 1996/92/EC. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See Recital (11) of Directive 1996/92/EC. 
12 See art. 17 para. 4 of Directive 1996/92/EC; the alternative approach to regulatory network access 
was the “negotiated access to the system”, see art. 17 para. 1 of Directive 1996/92/EC. See also B. 
Holznagel/ M. - S. Göge, Die Befugnisse der REGTP zur Regulierung des Netzzugangs nach dem 
EnWG – KE 2004, ZNER 3/ 2004, p. 218 et seq. 
13 See e.g. art. 6 para. 1 of Directive 96/92/EC regulating the drawing up of an inventory of new means 
of production within the tendering procedure.  
14 See e.g. art. 6 para. 2 of Directive 96/92/EC with regards to the drawing up of an estimate of 
generating and transmission capacity. 
15 See e.g. art. 6 para. 5 of Directive 96/92/EC regulating the organization, monitoring and control of 
the tendering procedure. 
16 See e.g. European Commission Staff Working Paper, First Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 3.12.2001, SEC (2001), 1957 at p. 8 et seq 
and p. 65. 
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Indeed, whereas in Austria, already by 200117, national energy regulators were put in 
place, in Germany no such regulators existed at that time. Whereas in Austria the 
access to electricity networks was regulated through the national energy regulators ex-
ante, giving eligible customers a right of access, in Germany access to electricity 
networks was organized ex-post through negotiated third party access in form of 
voluntary commercial agreements.18 Whereas in Austria the network tariffs and 
network access conditions were established ex-ante through the national energy 
regulators, in Germany they were examined ex-post through the national competition 
authorities. 19 Whereas in Austria the national energy regulators assumed the role of the 
dispute settlement authorities, in Germany, the competition authorities were the 
competent authorities. 20 In both countries, the national energy regulators were closely 
                                                 
17 See Energy Regulatory Authorities Act, Federal Act on regulatory authorities in the electricity and 
natural gas sector and the establishment of Energie-Control GmbH and Energie-Control European 
Commission, (Energieregulierungsbehördengesetz, Bundesgesetz über die Aufgaben der 
Regulierungsbehörden im Elektrizitätsbereich und die Einrichtung der Elektrizität-Control GmbH und 
der Elektrizitäts-Control Kommission), Federal Law Gazette I no. 121/2000 (art. 8 of the Energy 
Market Liberalisation Act). See also P. Tettinger/ J. - C. Pielow, Zum neuen Regulator für den 
Netzzugang in der Energiewirtschaft aus Sicht des öffentlichen Rechts, RdE 12/ 2003, p. 289. 
18 See European Commission Staff Working paper, Second Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 1.10.2002, SEC (2002), 1038 at p. 4. In 
Germany, it was only by beginning of 2004, that the regulation of network access through a regulatory 
authority was envisaged; see e.g. DG TREN Draft Working Paper, Third Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 1.03.2004, p. 4. See also G. Britz, 
Erweiterung des Instrumentariums administrativer Normsetzung zur Realisierung gemeinschaftlicher 
Regulierungsaufträge, EuZW 15/2004, p. 462. 
19 For Germany, see e.g. U. Büdenberger, Das System der Netzentgeltregulierung in der Elektrizitäts- 
und Gaswirtschaft, DVBl 4/ 2006, p. 197 et seq. For a detailed overview on the implementation of the 
internal electricity market by the Member States, see European Commission Staff Working Paper, First 
Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 3.12.2001, 
SEC (2001), 1957 at p. 15 and p. 16; see also European Commission Staff Working Paper, Second 
Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 7.04.2003, 
SEC (2003), 448 at p. 10 and p. 34; see furthermore G. Kühne, in: M. Bartsch/ A. Röhling/ P. Salje/ U. 
Scholz, Stromwirtschaft: Ein Praxishandbuch, 2. Auflage, Köln 2008, p. 263 and p. 277 et seq. 
20 See European Commission Staff Working Paper, Second Benchmarking Report on the 
Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 7.04.2003, SEC (2003), 448 at p. 10; as to 
the revision of the German Energy Industry Act and the development of a new regime, see P. 
Cameron, Legal aspects of EU Energy Regulation, Implementing the new Directives on Electricity and 
Gas across Europe, Oxford 2005, at no. 8.06 et seq. 
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attached to the Federal ministries, which got involved in various areas of energy 
regulation. 21  
The disparities existent within the Member States in the area of energy regulation were 
one of the main points of criticism expressed with regard to Directive 1996/92/EC. It 
was, in particular, the wide scope of discretion left to the Member States through 
Directive 1996/92/EC, which was being criticized as being “co-responsible for the 
slow development of the single European energy market”.22
1.2 Under the framework of Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC and Austrian and 
German energy laws 
In 2003, numerous legislative measures were taken at European level, lying 
down for the first time a compulsory regime of energy regulation under the auspices of 
national regulatory authorities. 
The regulation of the internal electricity markets was mainly set forth in Directive 
2003/54/EC, which repealed Directive 1996/92/EC.23 Directive 2003/54/EC required 
“effective regulation” to be “carried out by one or more national regulatory 
authorities” and emphasised, that it was “important that the regulatory authorities in all 
the Member States share the same minimum set of competences”.24 For this purpose, 
                                                 
21 See European Commission Staff Working Paper, DG TREN Draft Working Paper, Third 
Benchmarking Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity and Gas Market, 1.03.2004, p. 
4 and p. 14. 
22 See H. Lecheler/ J. Gundel, Ein weiterer Schritt zur Vollendung des Energie-Binnenmarktes: Die 
Beschleunigungs-Rechtsakte für den Binnenmarkt für Strom und Gas, EuZW 20/ 2003, p. 621 at p. 
622. 
23 See in detail, U. Ehricke, Die Regulierungsbehörde für Strom und Gas, Eine Abhandlung zu den 
Vorgaben der Vorschläge für die Richtlinien 2003/54/EG (Beschleunigungsrichtlinien Elektrizität und 
Gas) im Hinblick auf die in diesen Richtlinien vorgesehene Regulierungsbehörde (Regulator) und 
deren Umsetzung in das deutsche Recht, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierechts an der 
Universität zu Köln, Band 113, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2004. 
24 See e.g. Recital 15 of Directive 2003/54/EC. For a detailed overview on the terms and definitions of 
art. 23 of Directive 2003/54/EC, see B. Leitl, Regulierungsbehörden im österreichischen Recht, Wien 
2006, p. 133 to p. 135; see also P. Cameron, Legal aspects of EU Energy Regulation, Implementing the 
new Directives on Electricity and Gas across Europe, Oxford 2005, at no. 2.36 et seq. 
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article 23 para. 1 of Directive 2003/54/EC required Member States to “designate one or 
more competent bodies with the function of regulatory authorities” and to provide them 
with a minimum set of competences (“shall at least be responsible”) in the area of 
monopoly networks. In this area, the national regulatory authorities were mainly 
entrusted with monitoring duties aimed at ensuring “non-discrimination, effective 
competition and the efficient functioning of the market”. 25
The regulation of cross-border issues was mainly governed by Regulation (EC) 
1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity 
(“Regulation (EC) 1228/2003”).26 National regulatory authorities were, in particular, 
required to ensure compliance with Regulation (EC) 1228/2003 and the guidelines 
adopted on its basis.27 They were, for instance, responsible for approving schemes for 
the calculation of interconnection capacities28 or for deciding upon exemptions of new 
interconnectors.29
Under the framework of Directive 2003/54/EC, the Member States were the ones, 
which controlled the national energy regulators. Indeed, since article 23 para. 1 sent. 2 
of Directive 2003/54/EC required national energy regulators merely to be “independent 
from the interests of the electricity industry”, Member States were able to secure 
control over their energy regulators through national measures, such as the obligation 
to comply with governmental instructions (Weisungsgebundenheit).  
                                                 
25 See art. 23 para. 1 of Directive 2003/54/EC. For a detailed overview on the powers of regulators, see 
ERGEG, 3rd Legislative Package Input, Paper 5: Powers and Independence of National Regulators, an 
ERGEG public document, Ref: C 07-SER-13-06-5-PD, 5 June 2007, p. 3 et seq. 
26 OJEU, L 176/1; for details on the application of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003, see Communication 
from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Report on the experience 
gained in the application of the Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 “Regulation on Cross-Border 
Exchanges in Electricity”, COM (2007) 250 final, 15.05.2007. 
27 See Recital (20) in connection with art. 9 of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003. 
28 See art. 23 para. 1 of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
29 See art. 7 para. 4 (a) of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003. 
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However, under Directive 2003/54/EC, a first form of control over Member States’ 
national energy regulators appeared, exercised through the European Commission in 
form of cooperation and information duties.30 In addition, the European Commission 
was able to adopt guidelines for compensation mechanisms (article 8 of Regulation 
(EC) 1228/2003), which the national energy regulators had to comply with.31 
Moreover, for the first time, a European body was set up, which interfered with 
Member States’ internal electricity markets. Indeed, by Decision of 11 November 
200332, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (“ERGEG”) was 
established. Although the regulatory activities assumed by the ERGEG had no external 
effects (Außenwirkung), the ERGEG was given the power to “facilitate consultation, 
coordination and cooperation of national regulatory authorities, contributing to a 
consistent application, in all Member States” of the provisions set out in, inter alia, 
Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation (EC) 1228/2003.33 However, although the 
European Union was exercising a certain control, the regulation of the internal 
electricity markets remained still firmly in the hands of the Member States. Although 
Member States were not allowed anymore to assume the regulatory tasks themselves, 
as it had been the case under Directive 1996/92/EC, they remained nevertheless in 
control of their internal electricity market through a control over their national 
regulatory authorities. Indeed, Directive 2003/54/EC confirmed that it was the 
                                                 
30 See e.g. art. 23 para. 12 of Directive 2003/54/EC and art. 10 of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003. 
31 See e.g. G. Britz, Vom Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund zum Regulierungsverbund? – 
Europäische Verwaltungsentwicklung am Beispiel der Netzzugangsregulierung bei der 
Telekommunikation, Energie und Bahn -, EuR 1/ 2006, p. 46 at p. 61. 
32 See art. 1 para. 1 of European Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, OJEU, L 296/34, 14.11.2003, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:296:0034:0034:EN:PDF 
(25.01.2011). 
33 See art. 1 para. 2 sent. 2 and Recital 6 of European Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on 
establishing the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, OJEU, L 296/34, 14.11.2003. See 
also G. Britz, Vom Europäischen Verwaltungsverbund zum Regulierungsverbund? – Europäische 
Verwaltungsentwicklung am Beispiel der Netzzugangsregulierung bei der Telekommunikation, 
Energie und Bahn -, EuR 1/ 2006, p. 46 at p. 61; see also 2007 Annual Report of the European Energy 
Regulators, website European Energy Regulators CEER & ERGEG, publications & press, annual 
reports, p. 3, 
http://www.energyregulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/AN
NUAL%20REPORTS/2007/4732CDA067DEE73DE040A8C03C2F2F45 (25.09.2010). 
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responsibility of the Member States to “specify the functions, competences and 
administrative powers of the regulatory authorities”. 34 The ERGEG played merely an 
advisory role without having any substantive decision-making powers. 35
As a consequence of the power of discretion given to the Member States with regard to 
the regulation of their electricity markets, different regimes were adopted, lead by 
different regulatory authorities, entrusted with different duties and vested with 
different powers.  
In Austria, the electricity market is mainly regulated through the Energy-Control 
Austrian Limited Liability Company for the Regulation of the Austrian Electricity and 
Gas Sector (“E-control GmbH”)36 and the Energy-Control Commission (“E-control 
Kommission”)37.  
The E-control GmbH has been established on the basis of section 5 in connection with 
section 4 of Federal Act on the Tasks of Regulatory Authorities in the Electricity and 
Natural Gas Sector and the Establishment of the Energy-Control GmbH and the 
Energy-Control Kommission (“Energy Regulatory Authorities Act, hence E-RBG”).38 
                                                 
34 See Recital (15) of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC. 
35 See art. 4 of European Commission Decision 2003/796/EC on establishing the European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), OJEU L 296/34 of 14.11.2003 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:296:0034:0034:EN:PDF).  
36 “Energie-Control Österreichische Gesellschaft für die Regulierung in der Elektrizitäts- und 
Gaswirtschaft mit beschränkter Haftung” (Energie-Control GmbH), see section 5, para. 2 sent. 1 of the 
Energy Regulatory Authorities Act. The E-control GmbH was incorporated on February 2001; for 
more details, see E-control website, presentation of the corporation, http://www.e-
control.at/de/econtrol/unternehmen (03.08.2010). 
37 “Energie-Control Kommission”, see section 15 para. 1 of the Energy Regulatory Authorities Act. For 
details as to their activities, see e.g. E-control GmbH, Annual Report 2006, p. 41 - 61, 
http://portalapp.e-
control.at/portal/page/portal/medienbibliothek/publikationen/dokumente/pdfs/jb2006en.pdf 
(25.09.2010).  
38 Bundesgesetz über die Aufgaben der Regulierungsbehörden im Elektrizitäts- und Erdgasbereich und 
die Errichtung der Energie-control GmbH und der Energie-control Kommission, Federal Law Gazette I 
no. 121/2000, repealed by Federal Law Gazette I no. 30/2010. For more details, see B. Leitl, 
Regulierungsbehördenim österreichischen Recht, Wien 2006, p. 151 et seq; see also P. Draxler/ C. 
Regehr, E-Recht: Der österreichische Weg, 1. Auflage, Wien 2007, p. 94 et seq. 
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Other relevant provisions as to the establishment of the E-control GmbH are contained 
in the Law on Limited Liability Companies (Gesetz über die Gesellschaften mit 
beschränkter Haftung, hence, GmbHG)39, in ordinances issued by the Federal Minister 
of Economics and Labour and the E-control GmbH’s memorandum of association and 
rules of procedure. The E-control GmbH consists of a Supervisory Board, which 
includes a representative of the Federal Ministry of Finance (section 5 paragraph 4 E-
RBG)40 and an Electricity Advisory Board, which plays a purely advisory role (section 
26 para. 1 E-RBG).41  
The E-control Kommission has been set up on the basis of section 15 in connection 
with section 4 E-RBG. It is established within and managed by the E-control GmbH, 
whose members are bound by the instructions given by the E-control Kommission 
(section 15 paragraph 2 E-RBG). 42  
Other bodies with regulatory powers are the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Labour as the highest electricity (section 2 of the E-RBG) and highest gas (section of 
the 2a E-RBG) authority as well as the local state authorities.43  
The duties of the Austrian energy regulators are mainly codified in the Energy 
Regulatory Authorities Act as well as in the Federal Act providing new Rules on the 
                                                 
39 RGBl. Nr. 58/1906. 
40 See E-control website, presentation of the corporation, organs, http://www.e-
ontrol.at/de/econtrol/unternehmen/organe-der-e-control (03.08.2010). 
41 The Advisory Board advises the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Labour and the national 
regulators on matters of general electricity policy. It includes representatives of the Ministries of 
Economic Affairs and Labour, Agriculture and Forestry, Environment and Water Management, 
Finance, Justice as well as of the provinces and social partners (section 26 para. 3 of the E-RBG). 
42 See E-control website, presentation of the corporation, organs, http://www.e-
ontrol.at/de/econtrol/unternehmen/organe-der-e-control (03.08.2010); see also B. Leitl, 
Regulierungsbehörden im österreichischen Recht, Wien 2006, p. 173 et seq. 
43 See CEER IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Austria – E-Control 
GmbH, p. 2 and p. 3; see also E-control, Annual Report 2001, Institutional framework, p. 9; see also 
Website of the E-control GmbH, Company, Institutional Framework, http://www.e-
control.at/en/econtrol_en/company/institutional-framework (22.03.2011). 
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Organisation of the Electricity Industry Sector, i.e. the Electricity Industry and 
Organisation Act (Elektrizitätwirtschafts- und organisationsgesetz, hence EIWOG)44  
In Germany, the electricity market is mainly regulated through the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways 
(“Bundesnetzagentur, hence BNetzA”) and the regulatory authorities of the Federal 
States (section 54 para. 1 of the Energy Industry Act (“Energiewirtschaftsgesetz”, 
hence “EnWG”).45  
The BNetzA has been established on the basis of section 1 of the Federal Law on the 
Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railways 
(“Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post 
und Eisenbahnen”, hence “BEGTPG”).46 The BNetzA is the authority, which is 
principally responsible for the regulation of the internal electricity market (section 2 
para. 1 no. 1 of the BEGTPG in connection with section 54 para. 1 and para. 3 of the 
EnWG)47 as well as it is responsible to perform the duties relating to cross-border 
regulation (section 56 of the EnWG).48  
                                                 
44 Bundesgesetz mit dem die Organisation auf dem Gebiet der Elektrizitätswirtschaft neu geregelt wird,  
Federal Law Gazette I no. 143/1998, repealed by Federal Law Gazette I no. 110/2010. For a detailed 
overview on the powers and competences of the Austrian energy regulators, see European Commission 
Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Communication from the European 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Prospects for the internal gas and electricity 
market, Implementation report, SEC (2006) 1709, 10.01.2007, p. 123 – 127. 
45 The BNetzA is, upon section 35 EnWG obliged to monitor the market development of the German 
electricity and gas market; within its monitoring duties, the BNetzA publishes, upon section 63 para. 3 
EnWG, annual monitoring reports; see e.g. Annual Report 2007, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/31280/publicationFile/1105/Jahresb
ericht2007Id13212pdf.pdf (19.09.2010); Annual Report 2008, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/113828/publicationFile/1113/Jahres
bericht08Id15901pdf.pdf (19.09.2010); Annual Report 2009 on the adoption of the third energy 
package of the European Commission, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/152206/publicationFile/6684/Jahres
bericht2009Id18409pdf.pdf, p. 63 - 65. 
46 Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen 
of 7 July 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1970, 2009), last amended through art. 15 para. 12 of law of 5.2.2009 I 160. 
47 Energiewirtschaftsgesetz dated 7 Juli 2005, BGBl. I S. 1970, 3621, last amended through Art. 4 of 
Law of 07.03.2011 (BGBl I, p. 338); For details as to the competences of the BNetzA, see e.g. M. 
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Article 83 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, hence GG)49 in connection with 
section 54 para. 1 and para. 2 of the EnWG provides that, where electricity networks 
serve fewer than 100,000 customers, directly or indirectly, the regulatory authorities of 
the Federal States are responsible.50 Where, however, these networks extend beyond 
the borders of one Federal State, the BNetzA becomes again competent (section 54, 
para. 2, sent. 2 of the EnWG). The Federal States’ regulators, which regulate electricity 
networks outside the competences of the BNetzA, may delegate their competences to 
the BNetzA (Organleihe).51  
Regulatory decisions are principally taken through ruling chambers 
(Beschlusskammern), which comprise one chairman and two assessors (section 59 
para. 1 sent. 1 and para. 2 of the EnWG).52
                                                                                                                                            
Moser, Einwirkungsbefugnisse der Bundesnetzagentur auf die Elektrizitätsversorgung, RdE 12/ 2007, 
p. 343 et seq. 
48 For an excellent overview on the powers and competences of the BNetzA, see European 
Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Communication from the 
European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Prospects for the internal gas and 
electricity market, Implementation report, SEC (2006) 1709, 10.01.2007, p. 29 - 41. 
49 See Grundgesetz für die Bunderepublik Deutschland promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 
23 May 1949, last amended through Art. 1 of Law of 21.07.2010 (BGBl I, p. 944); for more details on 
art. 83 et seq. GG, see e.g. B. Pieroth, in: H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,  Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 83 GG. 
50 See e.g. Annual Report of the BNetzA, 2005, , p. 120 and p. 121, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/31294/publicationFile/1123/Jahresb
ericht2005Id5278pdf.pdf;jsessionid=BA2F2E9545E742EEEF8C22F95E4E143A (03.11.2010); 
Annual Report of the BNetzA, 2006, p. 153 et seq, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/31294/publicationFile/1123/Jahresb
ericht2005Id5278pdf.pdf (03.11.2010). 
51 See e.g. CEER, Regulatory Benchmark, NRA status and resources, C05-IEB-08-03 CEER, 6. 
December 2005, p. 11, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Cross-Sectoral/2005/CEER_REGULATORY%20BENCHMARK_2005-12-
06_PUBLIC.PDF (03.11.20109. The delegation to the BNetzA of regulatory tasks, for which the 
Federal States are principally responsible (section 54 para. 2 EnWG), is laid down in Administrative 
Agreements (Verwaltungsabkommen) between the Federation and the Federal States on the execution 
of regulatory tasks at Federal States’ level; for details, see e.g. C. König/ V. Bache, Die örtliche 
Zuständigkeit der Oberlandesgerichte in Fällen der Organleihe bei der Wahrnehmung der 
Landesregulierungsaufgaben durch die Bundesnetzagentur, IR 1/ 2008, p. 2 et seq. 
52 For further details, see Federal Network Agency, 2007 Report for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway to the European European Commission on the German 
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The BNetzA is assisted through an Advisory Board (Beirat), which consists of 16 
members of the German Bundestag and 16 representatives of the German Bundesrat 
(section 5 para. 1 sent. 1 of the BEGTPG). Its members and deputy members are 
appointed through the Federal Government upon proposal of the German Bundestag 
and the German Bundesrat (section 5 para. 1 sent. 2 of the BEGTPG). The Advisory 
Board has the duty to advise the BNetzA in the preparation of reports on its activities, 
including on monitoring duties as well as on market development (sections 60 and 63 
para. 3 to 5 of the EnWG).53 In order to ensure a uniform regulation at Federal level, a 
Federal States’ Committee (Länderausschuss) has been set up (section 8 of the 
BEGTPG), comprising a representative of each Federal State regulatory authority.54 
Other bodies with regulatory powers are the anti-trust authorities (section 58 of the 
EnWG) and the Ministry of Economics and Labour. 
1.3 Under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC  
Under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC55, a completely different picture 
presents itself with regard to the allocation of regulatory powers within Member States’ 
internal electricity markets.56  
                                                                                                                                            
electricity and gas market, p. 4 – 6, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/33592/publicationFile/279/Monitor
ingReport2007Id12648pdf.pdf (25.09.2010). 
53 See also Annual Report of the BNetzA, 2005, p. 121, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/31294/publicationFile/1123/Jahresb
ericht2005Id5278pdf.pdf;jsessionid=BA2F2E9545E742EEEF8C22F95E4E143A (03.11.2010); 
see also Annual Report of the BNetzA 2006, p. 153 et seq, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/31294/publicationFile/1123/Jahresb
ericht2005Id5278pdf.pdf (03.11.2010). 
54 The Federal States’ Committee is required to meet at least twice a year in closed session (section 9 
para. 5 and 6 of the BEGTPG); its tasks are specified in section 60a of the EnWG. 
55 Directive 2009/72/EG forms part of the so-called „third legislative package“, which consists of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators,  Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, Regulation (EC) 
No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access 
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Indeed, under the regime of Directive 2009/72/EC, it is the European Commission 
which, under the assistance of newly established European institutions, takes control of 
the electricity markets of the Member States. Although, in theory, it is still the Member 
States, which have control over their electricity markets, in reality, it is the European 
Commission, which assumes control. For this purpose, the European Commission 
presented in its “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
                                                                                                                                            
to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, Directive 
2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; see e.g. W. Koster/ C. Filippitsch, Die neue 
Europäische Kommission und Kernelemente ihrer Energiepolitik, e/m/w, 1/10, p. 7 et seq; see also 
CEER, Key Comments on the European European Commission’s Third Package, Ref: C07-GA-36-08, 
Public version, 20 December 2007; see also Neuordnung der Gas- und Strommärkte, Die 27 EU-
Staaten haben sich auf das umstrittene Paket zum europäischen Energie-Binnenmarkt geeinigt. 
Deutschland ist zufrieden, published in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.10.2008. 
56 The propositions that the European Commission made with regard to the allocation of regulatory 
powers over the internal electricity markets disappeared in the light of the fierce discussions on the 
issue of “ownership unbundling”. Indeed, whereas numerous art.s were written on “ownership 
unbundling”, the crucial question as to what institutions shall lead the internal electricity markets of the 
Member States was left aside. For details on ownership unbundling, see e.g. ERGEG, Third Legislative 
Package Input, Paper 1: Unbundling, an ERGEG public document, Ref: C 07-SER-13-06-1-PD, 5 June 
2007; see also J. Kühling/ G. Hermeier, Innovationsoffenheit des Unbundling-Regimes? – Die 
Einführung neuer Strukturen im grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel als Bewährungsprobe, ZNER 1/ 
2006, p. 27 et seq.; see also J. - C. Pielow/ E. Ehlers, The Constitutional Challenge of Ownership 
Unbundling – a European and German Perspective, Jan. 2008, 
http://www.unecom.de/documents/discussionpapers/UNECOM_DP_2008_01.pdf, 6.05.2009; 
see furthermore C. König/ M. Schellberg/ K. Spiekermann, Energierechtliche Entflechtungsvorgaben 
versus gesellschaftsrechtliche Kontrollkompetenzen, RdE 3/ 2007, p. 72 et seq.; see A. Weitbrecht/ J. 
Mühle, Art. 86 EG – Liberalisierung ehemaliger Monopole, EuZW 18/ 2008, p. 556 et seq.; see S. 
Storr, Die Vorschläge der EU-Kommission zur Verschärfung der Unbundling – Vorschriften im 
Energiesektor, EuZW 8/ 2007, p. 232 et seq.; see, furthermore, M. Pießkalla, Die 
Kommissionsvorschläge zum “full ownership unbundling” des Strom- und Gasversorgungssektors im 
Lichte der Eigentumsneutralität des EG-Vertrags (Art. 285 EG), EuZW 7/ 2008, p. 199 et seq.; see C. 
Kahle, Die Eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung (Ownership Unbundling) der Energieversorgungsnetze 
aus europarechtlicher und verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, RdE 10 – 11/ 2007, p. 293 et seq. On 
ownership unbundling in the German energy market, see e.g. T, Mayen/ U. Karpenstein, 
Eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung der Energieversorgungsnetze, RdE 2/ 2008, p. 33 et seq. On 
ownership unbundling in the Austrian energy market, see Wiener Zeitung, 10.10.2008, EU Minister 
sollen Zerschlagung der Konzerne endgültig abwenden: Österreich bringt Schäfchen ins Trockene, Der 
Dritte Weg des Energiebinnenmarkts, p. 27; see also W. Bolz, Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des Energierechts 
aus Sicht der österreichischen Regulierungsbehörde, in: Berichte und Dokumente, Aktuelle 
Herausforderungen des Energierechts aus deutscher und internationaler Sicht, RdE 1/ 2008, p. 31 et 
seq.; see also K. Blanck - Putz, Die Liberalisierung der Energiemärkte – Revolution oder Strohfeuer, 
EuZW 4/ 2007, p. 101 et seq; see A. Niebler, Brennpunkt Energieversorgung – Quo vadis Europa?, in: 
Die neuen Herausforderungen im Lichte des Energierechts, 2008, p. 11 at p. 13 et seq. 
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market in electricity” on 19.09.07 (“the European Commission’s Proposal”) 57 the 
implementation of several consecutive steps.58
In a first step, the European Commission proposed to “strengthen the powers of the 
regulatory authorities”.59 In line with the European Commission’s view, the ERGEG 
claimed that there was “a regulatory gap in Europe” and that “EU legislation was (is) 
not always implemented (at national level) in the spirit of the law”. As a result, “the 
powers and independence of national energy regulators differed (differ) widely and 
often they did (do) not have the powers to do the job properly”.60 The regulation of the 
internal electricity markets should thereby not be “carried out by one or more national 
regulatory authorities”, as allowed under former regime of Directive 2003/54/EC, but 
be exercised through “a single national regulatory authority at national level”.  
In a second step, the European Commission proposed, disguised under the slogan 
“demonstrable independence of regulators brings market confidence”61, to guarantee 
the independence of national energy regulators in also political terms (article 35 para. 4 
sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC). It will be revealed that the obligation to 
ensure national energy regulators’ political independence applies thereby only to the 
Member States. The European Commission, on the contrary, reinforces its control over 
Member States’ national energy regulators. The problem of compatibility encountered 
with regard to traditional constitutional principles of certain Member States, such as 
the obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions could 
thereby not be resolved. 
                                                 
57 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, presented by the European 
Commission on 19.09.2007, COM (2007) 528 final, 2007/0195 (COD). 
58 See H. Weyer, Die Energiewirtschaftsaufsicht im Jahr 2009, N&R, 1/10, p. 18 et seq; see also 
ERGEG, ERGEG’s response to the European European Commission’s Communication “An Energy 
Policy for Europe”, Ref. C06-BM-09-05, 6 February 2007.  
59 See the European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.1. 
60 See ERGEG, Fact Sheet on a European System of Energy Regulation:  Regulatory and EU Network 
Bodies, Ref: FS-07-05-30, final, p. 1. 
61 See European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.2. 
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In a third step, the European Commission vested itself with numerous powers, such as 
the power to issue binding guidelines. The establishment of European institutions, such 
as the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (the Agency) 62 and the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators (the ENTSO) should thereby 
assist the European Commission with the regulation of the electricity markets. We will 
see that it is, in particular, the Agency which, vested with important decision-making 
powers, interferes within crucial areas of national energy regulators’ competences. The 
European Commission, at the same time, secures control over these European 
institutions. 
Based upon the European Commission’s Proposal, Directive 2009/72/EC requires 
Member States to principally consolidate their national energy regulators to a single 
regulatory authority at national level (article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC). It 
increases furthermore their duties (article 37 and 38 of Directive 2009/72/EC) and 
vests them with a powerful set of regulatory powers (article 37 para. 4 of Directive 
2009/72/EC). 
 
                                                 
62 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJEU, L 211/1, 14.08.2009. 
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2 The enhancement of powers of national energy regulators under 
the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC  
Directive 2009/72/EC aims, in accordance with the European Commission’s 
Proposal, at enhancing national energy regulators’ powers. “Enhanced powers” as the 
European Commission claims, can be achieved, firstly, through a consolidation of 
national energy regulators to a single national regulatory authority at national level 
(2.1) and, secondly, through a substantial increase of national energy regulators’ duties 
and powers in comparison to those established under former regime of Directive 
2004/54/EC (2.2). 63  
2.1 The consolidation of national energy regulators to a single national 
regulatory authority at national level through article 35 para. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC 
The first step to enhancing national regulators’ powers is the consolidation of 
national energy regulators to a single national regulatory authority at national level, 
codified through article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC.64  
In its Proposal, the European Commission explains that, although in several Member 
States national regulatory authorities are “well-established bodies with substantial 
powers and resources”, in other Member States “their powers are weaker”. This 
“weakness” stems, according to the European Commission, from the fact that in several 
Member States their powers are “dispersed over different bodies”. The “lack of 
uniformity” resulting thereof can, in the European Commission’s view, be overcome 
through the consolidation of national energy regulators to a single national regulatory 
authority at national level.65 Hence, in accordance with article 22a para. 1 of the 
                                                 
63 See European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.1. 
64 Ibid. 
65 As to the European Commission’s critical point of view on the Austrian electricity sector in 
particular, see e.g. E-control, Presse-Unterlage, Europäische Kommission präsentiert aktuelle 
detaillierte Analyse des europäischen Energiemarkts – zahlreiche Mängel aufgezeigt, Vienna (10 
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European Commission’s Proposal, article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC requires 
Member States to “designate a single national regulatory authority at national level”.66
2.1.1 In-depth analysis: the interference of article 35 para. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC with Member States’ Federal structures 
2.1.1.1 Introduction 
Whereas under article 23 para. 1 sent.1 of Directive 2003/54/EC Member 
States, were given the choice to designate “one or more competent bodies” with the 
function of regulatory authorities, under article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, 
they are obliged to designate “a single national regulatory authority at national level”. 
Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009 has a major impact on those Member States, 
which have established Federal structures in the area of energy regulation. It affects, in 
particular, the competences of the Federal States. Whereas paragraph 1 of article 35 
para. 1 of Directive 2009 is established as the basic principle, paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC67 are constituted as exceptions to paragraph 1.  
Generally, the possibility of the European Union to interfere with the Federal structures 
of Federally structured Member States derives from the system of division of 
                                                                                                                                            
January 2007), http://www.e-
control.at/portal/page/portal/medienbibliothek/presse/dokumente/pdfs/PA%2010-01-
2007%20EU%20Dokumente.pdf (2.07.2008).  
66 In its report “Progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market”, the European Commission 
claims that “despite the Electricity and Gas Directives requiring regulators to hold a minimum set of 
powers, the unequal levels of regulatory powers across border have not improved.” According to the 
European Commission the reason lies in the fact that “in some Member States, powers are split 
between several regulators at national and regional levels, including the competition authority and/ or 
ministry”, which is “all likely to add to incoherence”; see Report from the European Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, 
COM (2008) 192 final, 15.04.2008, p.6. 
67 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of art. 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC have been added to the European 
Commission’s Proposal following the Common Position 1439/08 of the Council, Common Position EC 
No 8/2009 with a view to the adoption of Directive 2009/…/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of … concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC, Preparatory Act, OJEU 2009/C 70 E/01. 
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competences that has been established between the European Union and the Member 
States. Indeed, despite the principle of conferral (Prinzip der begrenzten 
Einzelermächtigung), the European Union is empowered to extensively use its 
competences. This is, first and foremost, attributed to the fact that only few areas of 
competences are explicitly assigned to the European Union, limiting its competences to 
these specific areas.68 Moreover, contrary to the constitutional laws of the Member 
States, the competences of the European Union are characterised through the 
determination of goals, rather than through the allocation of specific areas of 
competences. Indeed, whenever a European measure serves the realisation of a 
common European goal, such as the realisation of a single European market, the 
European Union may assume competence.69 The economical factor that is required, in 
this regard, is usually established on the grounds that even areas, which, at first sight, 
show no economical goal almost always bear certain economical aspects. In addition, 
European principles, such as the principle of harmonisation of a single European 
market (Binnenmarktharmonisierung), the principle of supplement of the Treaty 
(Vertragsergänzung) or the principle of “effet utile” are applied by the European Union 
in an extensive way.70 Finally, the principle of subsidiarity, which requires decisions to 
be taken as closely as possible to the citizens71, has so far not been very effective.72 
Indeed, it is neither thoroughly scrutinised by the European European Commission, nor 
extensively examined by the European Court of Justice. 73 The Lisbon Treaty clarifies 
                                                 
68 See P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als Hürde 
vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 15 at 16 et seq. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See W. Pühs, Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht. Formen und Grenzen eines effektiven 
Gemeinschaftsrechtsvollzugs und Überlegungen zu seiner Effektuierung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 1997, 
1997, p. 83 et seq. 
71 See Preamble of the Treaty on European Union, last paragraph in connection with art. 5 para. 3 TEU. 
72 See P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als Hürde 
vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 15 at 17. 
73 See R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den 
Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl, 2001, 481 at 486; see also 
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the system of division of competences between the European Union and the Member 
States. It strengthens, for instance, the principle of subsidiarity and establishes an early 
warning system (Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle), including the possibility 
of ex-post examination through the action of subsidiarity (Subsidiaritätsklage). It 
remains to be seen, whether these measures will limit the European Union in its 
extensive use of competences. 74   
The Second Part (2) will serve to show that the European Union has the formal 
competence to take measures in the sector of energy regulation, including the 
enactment of article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC (formelle Rechtmäßigkeit des 
Artikel 35 Abs. 1 der Direktive 2009/72/EG). The Third Part (3) will demonstrate that 
the European Union, by using its competences in the sector of energy regulation, has 
the obligation to respect the Federal structures of federally structured Member States. 
This part will show that the European Union’s obligation to respect Member States’ 
Federal structures derives from various provisions of European law (Schutz des Artikel 
35 Abs. 1 der Direktive 2009/72/EG). Part Four (4) will prove that article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC interferes with the core areas of Member States’ Federal 
structures (Eingriff des Artikel 35 Abs. 1 der Direktive 2009/72/EG). Whether the 
European Union’s interference can be justified upon European law, in particular upon 
the principle of proportionality, will be dealt with under Part Five (5), (Rechtfertigung 
des Artikel 35 Abs. 1 der Direktive 2009/72/EG. Part Six (6) will come to the 
conclusion that article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC can only be regarded as 
compatible with European law if it is applaid in combination with article 35 para. 2 
and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
                                                                                                                                            
P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als Hürde vor 
weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 15 at 17 - 19. 
74In this sense, see P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon 
als Hürde vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. 
Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, 
Baden-Baden 2008, p. 15 at 20 et seq. 
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2.1.1.2 The competence of the European Union to adopt article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC 
2.1.1.2.1 The system of division of competences established in the energy sector 
The European Union’s competences are governed by the principle of conferral, 
which is laid down in article 5 para. 1 and 2 of the Lisbon Treaty (ex article 5 TEC). It 
signifies that the European Union is allowed to act only “within the limits of 
competences that have been conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties in 
order to attain the objectives set out therein”. Having no competence of its own right, 
the European Union may therefore act only within areas that are specifically assigned 
to it and only within the specific form prescribed.75 Any activity of the European 
Union must therefore bear a legal basis (Ermächtigungsgrundlage).76 As a 
consequence and in accordance with article 4 para. 1 and article 5 para. 2 sent. 2 
Lisbon Treaty (ex article 5 TEC), “competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States”. 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the use by the European Union of its competences has not 
always been accepted without doubt. Lack of being explicitly specified within the 
European treaties, the competences of the European Union were either based upon 
provisions attributing specific power of competence (Einzelermächtigung), the 
doctrine of Implied Powers (Implizite Kompetenz) or upon provisions attributing 
general power of competence (Generalermächtigung), such as former article 308 TEC 
(Vertragsergänzung) or article 95 TEC (Binnenmarktharmonisierung).77  
                                                 
75 M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, 49 at 49 and 50. See also R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung 
der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mitgliedstaaten unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 486. 
76 See R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den 
Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 486. 
77 Ibid; see also I. Pernice, Kompetenzabgrenzung im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund, JZ 18/ 2000, 
p. 866 et seq. 
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With the Lisbon Treaty, the competences of the European Union have been classified 
into three types of competences. In accordance with articles 3 to 6 Treaty on European 
Union (hence TEU)78, the European Union may assume either exclusive power of 
competence (ausschließliche Zuständigkeit), concurrent power of competence (geteile 
Zuständigkeit), or the power to provide supportive measures (Befugnis für 
unterstützende Maßnahmen).79 Each type of competence contains an exhaustive list of 
competences (Kompetenzlisten).80 
2.1.1.2.2 The use of competences of the European Union in the area of energy 
regulation  
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, no separate chapter was dedicated to the energy 
sector in the European treaties and no provision was therein contained, which 
conferred upon the European Union the explicit power of competence for energy 
related matters. In accordance with the principle of conferral, this basically meant, that 
the Member States remained the competent authorities in the energy sector. 81 
However, the European Union took various measures and established, inter alia, a 
regulatory framework in the energy sector. It assumed its competences most of the time 
on the basis of general provisions of competences.82 Directive 90/547/EC on the transit 
of electricity through transmission grids83 was, for instance, enacted on the basis of 
article 100a EEC Treaty; Directives concerning common rules for the internal market 
                                                 
78 Article 1 para. 1 TEU declares that “by this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among 
themselves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’, on which the Member States confer 
competences to attain objectives they have in common”.  
79 See P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als Hürde 
vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 15 at p. 21. 
80 Ibid. 
81 For more details, see R. Steinberg/ G. Britz, Die Energiepolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und 
europäischer Regelungskompetenzen, DÖV 1993, p. 313 at p. 314. 
82 See J. A. Kämmerer, Strategien zur Daseinsvorsorge, Dienste im allgemeinen Interesse nach der 
„Altmark“-Entscheidung des EuGH, NVwZ 2004, p. 28 at p. 30. 
83 OJEU No. L 313/30 of 13 November 1990; OJEU No. L 147/37 of 12 June 1991. 
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in electricity and natural gas84 were based upon articles 57 II, 66 and 100a ECC 
Treaty.85  
The possibility of the European Union to assume competence in the energy sector is 
based upon the fact that tasks carried out in the area of energy supply are defined as 
tasks of services of general interest (Staatliche Daseinsvorsorge)86, which are declared 
by article 14 TEU (ex-article 16 TEC) as a common European goal (“shared values of 
the Union”). 87 Regarding the establishment of a liberalised European energy market 
this means that, whenever tasks of services of general economic interest are carried out 
in a Member State to the exclusion of competition, the European Union may assume 
competence. It is even obliged to take the measures that are necessary in the 
achievement of the liberalisation of the respective market pursuant to article 106 para. 
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hence TFEU), (ex-article 86 para. 
3 TEC). Since the energy sector is a sector where competition is principally possible, it 
needs to be strengthened.88 Based on article 106 para. 3 TFEU (ex-article 86 para. 3 
TEC), articles 103 TFEU (ex-article 83 TEC) and 109 TFEU (ex-article 89 TEC) and 
article 114 TFEU (ex-article 95 TEC), the European Union has established a regulatory 
framework in the energy sector, which is aimed at demolishing monopoly structures, 
sanctioning anti-competitive behaviour and, thus, strengthening competition. 89  
                                                 
84 Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market OJEU 
30.1.1997, L 27/20; Directive 98/30/EC of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas, OJEU 21.7.1998, L 204/1.   
85 See R. Steinberg/ G. Britz, Die Energiepolitik im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer 
Regelungskompetenzen, DÖV 1993, p. 313 at p. 314. 
86 For a detailed overview on the services of general interest in general, see C. Heinze, Daseinsvorsorge 
im Umbruch, BayVBl 2/2004, p. 33 et seq. 
87 See J. A. Kämmerer, Strategien zur Daseinsvorsorge, Dienste im allgemeinen Interesse nach der 
„Altmark“-Entscheidung des EuGH, NVwZ 2004, p. 28 at p. 28, 29; see also G. Kühne, in: M. Bartsch/ 
A. Röhling/ P. Salje/ U. Scholz, Stromwirtschaft: Ein Praxishandbuch, 2. Auflage, Köln 2008, p. 248. 
88 See J. A. Kämmerer, Strategien zur Daseinsvorsorge, Dienste im allgemeinen Interesse nach der 
„Altmark“-Entscheidung des EuGH, NVwZ 2004, p. 28 at p. 30. 
89 Prior to the Treaty on European Union, the European Union based its measures in the energy sector 
upon a variety of provisions; that’s why it is often referred to a “patchwork of laws” (Flickenteppich) 
in the energy sector; see e.g. K. Papenkort/ J.K. Wellershoff, Der Energietitel im Vertrag von Lissabon, 
RdE 3/2010, p. 77 at p. 77; see also U. Ehricke, Zur Rechtfertigung staatlicher Regulierung für die 
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With the Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, a basis of competence (Kompetenzgrundlage) 
has been introduced, which confers upon the European Union the explicit power to 
adopt measures in the energy sector.90 Article 194 TFEU provides in paragraph 1 that, 
in the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with 
regard to the need to preserve and improve the environment, the European Union shall 
aim to “ensure the functioning of the market” (a), “ensure security of energy supply in 
the Union” (b), “promote energy sufficiency and energy saving and the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy” (c) and “promote the interconnection of energy 
networks” (d). Pursuant to article 4 para. 2 (i) TEU, the area of energy is thereby part 
of the shared competences between the European Union and the Member States.91
2.1.1.3 The obligation of the European Union to respect the Federal structures of 
Federally structured Member States 
The European Union has the obligation to respect the Federal structures of 
federally structured Member States, including those of Austria and Germany (3.1). The 
question arises from which legal basis the European Union’s obligation may be drawn. 
It could possibly derive from the Federal structure of the European Union itself (3.2), 
from a European principle of Federalism (3.3), from the obligation of the European 
Union to respect the national identities of the Member States pursuant to article 4 para. 
2 TEU (ex article 10 TEC), (3.4) or from the principle of loyalty (Prinzip der 
Gemeinschaftstreue) pursuant to article 4 para. 3 TEU (ex article 5 TEC) (3.5). 
                                                                                                                                            
Schaffung von Wettbewerb auf dem Energiemarkt, in: Entwicklungstendenzen des Energierechts nach 
Inkrafttreten des EnWG, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierechts an der Universität zu Köln, 
Band 131, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2007, p. 17 at p. 22 et seq. 
90 See P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als Hürde 
vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 15 at 20; for a detailed overview on the system of competences under the European treaties, 
see A. Weber, Vom Verfassungsvertrag zum Vertrag von Lissabon, EuZW 1/2008, p. 7 at p. 11 et seq; 
see also K. Papenkort/ J.K. Wellershoff, Der Energietitel im Vertrag von Lissabon, RdE 3/2010, p. 77 
et seq. 
91 For more details on the European energy market since the Lisbon Treaty, see e.g. G. Hermes, in: R. 
Schulze/ M. Zuleeg/ S. Kadelbach, Europarecht, Handbuch für die deutsche Rechtspraxis, 2. Auflage, 
Baden-Baden 2010, § 35. 
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2.1.1.3.1 The core areas of the Austrian and German Federal structures 
Austria and Germany have been established as Federal states and therefore 
dispose of a distinct Federal structure. The core areas of these Federal structures 
include the physical division of the territory between the different Federal levels, the 
attribution of representation rights to the Federal sub-entities at Federal level as well as 
the establishment of a system of division of competences between the Federal levels.92   
In Austria, the Federal order emanates from article 2 para. 1 of the B-VG, which 
stipulates that “Austria is a Federal state”. State entities are the Federation (Bund), the 
Federal States (Länder)93 and the municipalities (Gemeinden). The Federal territory 
comprises the territories of the Federal States (article 3 para- 1 of the B-VG)94, which 
are divided into municipalities (article 116 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG). According to 
article 2 para. 2 of the B-VG, the Federal States are “autonomous”, which signifies, 
that their state power does not derive from the Federation but from the Austrian citizen, 
forming an independent Pouvoir Constituant.95 Federal States’ constitutional autonomy 
includes their financial autonomy as well as the attribution of their own set of 
competences. According to article 116 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG, the municipalities 
are territorial corporate bodies entitled to self-administration (Gebietskörperschaft mit 
dem Recht auf Selbstverwaltung). Regarding the division of competences, the 
legislative and executive competences are divided between the Federation and the 
                                                 
92 See e.g. A. Benz, Im Dickicht des Rechts. Die Verfassung des deutschen Föderalismus, in: Jahrbuch 
des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 
2009, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, p. 109 at p. 111; for more details on the German principle of 
Federalism, see e.g. K.-P. Sommermann, in: H.v. Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ C. Starck, GG, Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz, Band 2, Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. Auflage, München 2010, art. 20 para. 1 GG, para. 24 et seq. 
93 Pursuant to art. 20 para. 2 B-VG, the Federal State is composed of the autonomous Länder of 
Burgenland, Carinthia (Kärten), Lower Austria (Niederösterreich), Upper Austria (Oberösterreich), 
Salzburg, Styria (Steiermark), Tirol, Vorarlberg and Vienna. 
94 For more details on the Austrian Federalism, see A. Gamper, Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Austrian Federal Constitution, 2/2008, p. 92 at p. 99 et seq, www.ici-journal.com (05.05.2009). 
95 See T. Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen 
Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß: Wechselseitige Rezeption, konstitutionelle Evolution und föderale 
Verflechtung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2003, p. 89; see also K.-P. Sommermann, in: H.v. Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ 
C. Starck, GG, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 2, Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. Auflage, München 2010, 
art. 20 para. 2 GG, para. 169. 
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Federal States and are, by means of an explicit enumeration, attributed either 
exclusively to the Federation or the Federal States (articles 10 to 15 of the B-VG).96 
The legislative powers remain principally within the autonomous sphere of 
competences of the Federal States, insofar as the matter is not expressly assigned 
through the Federal Constitution to the Federation (article 15 para. 1 of the B-VG). The 
legislative powers of the Federation are exercised through the National Council 
(Nationalrat) jointly with the Federal Council (Bundesrat), (article 24 of the B-VG), 
those of the Federal States through the respective parliaments of the Federal States 
(Landtage) pursuant to article 95 para. 1 of the B-VG.  
In Germany, article 20 para. 1 of the GG provides that Germany is a “democratic and 
social Federal state”.97 Like in Austria, the state entities consist of the Federation, the 
Federal States and the municipalities.98 The Federal States dispose of “existential state 
                                                 
96The Government program of 11.01.2007 (http://www.austria.gv.at) proposed under the title 
“Constitutional and Administrative Reform”, inter alia, the establishment of a new system of division 
of competences between the Federation and the Federal States. A first draft, designed to amend the B-
VG and presented by a group of experts in 2007, proposed the so-called “Three-Column-Model” (Drei-
Säulen-Modell). According to this model, the first and second column includes the areas of 
competences that are exclusively reserved either to the Federation or the Federal States. The third 
column attributes common competences to the Federation and the Federal States. In this common area 
of competences, the Federal States are principally competent as long as the Federation does not 
exercise its power of competence; for more details, see P. Bußjäger, Die Staats- und 
Verwaltungsreform ist das Herzstück des Regierungsübereinkommens - Österreich vor einem 
wiederholten Anlauf zur Verfassungsreform, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, p. 350 at 353 and 
363; see also G. Pallaver, Ein Jahr im Tiefflug - Föderalismus in Österreich: Ein Rückblick auf das 
Jahr 2006, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus Forschung Tübingen, Jahrbuch des 
Föderalismus. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2007, 
Band 8, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 355 at p. 358 et seq; the Three-Column-Model has not been 
adopted. The second draft, designed to amend the B-VG and presented by the same group of experts in 
March 2008, emphasising again the importance of a new system of division of competences, has 
equally not been adopted; see G. Pallaver, Österreich 2008 - Ein föderalistisches Übergangsjahr, in: 
Ein föderalistisches Übergangsjahr, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus Forschung Tübingen, 
Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa, Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2009, Band 10, 1. 
Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, p. 300 at p. 304 et seq. 
97 Being constituted by constitutional act rather than by Federal agreement, Germany is considered as 
an artificial Federal state (unechter Bundesstaat); for a detailed overview as to Germany’s Federal 
development, see T. Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen 
Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß: Wechselseitige Rezeption, konstitutionelle Evolution und föderale 
Verflechtung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2003, p. 85 et seq; fore more details, see e.g. K. - P. Sommermann, in: 
H.v. Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ C. Starck, GG, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 2, Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. 
Auflage, München 2010, art. 20 para. 2, para. 144 et seq. 
98 For further details, see B. Remmert, 60 Jahre Grundgesetz: Kommunale Selbstverwaltung, in: 
Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2009, p. 161 et seq.; see furthermore K.-P. Sommermann, in: H.v. 
Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ C. Starck, GG, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 2: Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. 
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quality”, thus enjoying autonomous and sovereign status and disposing of 
constitutional and financial autonomy as well as of a core set of competences (Hausgut 
eigener Aufgaben).99 According to article 79 para. 3 of the GG, this core set of 
competences is intangible (unantastbar).100 The German Constitutional Court 
confirmed in its recent judgment of 30 June 2009 on the compatibility of the Act 
approving the Treaty of Lisbon with the German Basic Law that amendments to the 
principles laid down in article 79 para. 3 of the GG were inadmissible and even 
withdrawn from the competences of the legislator amending the Basic Law.101 Article 
28 para. 2 of the GG guarantees municipalities and associations of municipalities 
(Gemeindeverbände) the right of self-Government according to the laws (Recht der 
Selbstverwaltung). It requires that the municipalities have the right to regulate all local 
tasks (Angelegenheiten der örtlichen Gemeinschaft) on their own responsibility within 
the limits prescribed by the laws (eigener Wirkungskreis der Gemeinden). Like in 
Austria, the legislative competences are exercised through the Federal States insofar as 
they are not transferred to the Federation through the Basic Law. Article 30 of the GG 
stipulates, in this regard that, except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic 
Law, the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the 
Federal States (article 70 para. 1 of the GG). The division of competences is thereby 
governed through the provisions of the Basic Law, which provide for exclusive power 
(ausschließliche Gesetzgebung), particularly through article 73 of the GG, and 
concurrent legislative power (konkurrierende Gesetzgebung), particularly through 
                                                                                                                                            
Auflage, München 2010, art. 20 para. 1 GG, para. 26; see also H. Hofmann, in: B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu/ 
F. Klein/ H. Hofmann/ A Hopfauf, GG, Grundgesetz, Kommentar, 11. Auflage, Köln 2008, art. 20, p. 
640. 
99BVerfGE 34, 9 at 19 et seq: see T. Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im 
transnationalen Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß: Wechselseitige Rezeption, konstitutionelle Evolution 
und föderale Verflechtung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2003, p. 93 et seq; see also M. Brenner, Der unitarische 
Bundesstaat in der Europäischen Union, DÖV 1992, p. 903 at p. 905 et seq. 
100 See e.g. K. Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen 
Union, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 259 et seq; see also H. Dreier, in H. Dreier, Grundgesetz 
Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, Tübingen 2006, art. 79 para. 3 GG; see K. E. Hain, in: 
H.v. Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ C. Starck, GG, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 2: Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. 
Auflage, München 2010, art. 79 para. 3 GG; see also H. Hofmann, in: B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu/ F. Klein/ 
H. Hofmann/ A Hopfauf, GG, Grundgesetz, Kommentar, 11. Auflage, Köln 2008, art. 20, p. 641. 
101 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 261. 
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article 72 para. 1 of the GG in connection with article 74 of the GG. Hence, contrary to 
Austria, the legislative competences in Germany are divided by a further category, 
namely the category of concurrent legislative powers. Whereas in the area of exclusive 
legislative powers of the Federation, the Federal States dispose of legislative 
competences only “when and to the extent” (wenn und soweit) they have been 
expressly authorised to do so by Federal law (article 71 of the GG), in the area of 
concurrent legislative powers they have the power to legislate “so long as and to the 
extent” (solange und soweit) the Federation has not exercised its legislative powers by 
enacting a law (article 72 para. 1 of the GG). 
2.1.1.3.2 The respect of Member States’ Federal structures deriving from the 
European Union’s own Federal structure? 
The European Union is itself built upon a Federal structure. One could thus 
draw the conclusion that it is obliged to respect Member States’ Federal structures as 
well (3.2.1). We will, however, see that the European Union’s Federal structure is a 
different one. It is built upon a two-tier structure, which is principally not concerned 
about Member States’ internal structures, whether they are Federal or not. This has 
been confirmed by the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 
June 2009 (3.2.2).102
2.1.1.3.2.1 The European Union’s Federal structure 
The European Union’s Federal structure has firstly been established with the 
European Communities and is still prevalent today. Indeed, whether under the treaties 
upon which the European Communities have been founded, the Maastricht Treaty or 
the European Treaties, i.e. the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
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functioning of the European Union103 today, the European Union has always been 
structured in a Federal way. 104
The European Communities, although interacting with each other in a mere cooperative 
manner, disposed since their beginnings of a distinct hierarchical structure. Within the 
course of their development, the form of cooperative interaction was gradually elevated 
to a system of supra-nationality. This led, for instance, from unanimous to majority 
decisions within the European Council and the integration of the European European 
Commission as independent organ into the law-making process of the European 
Communities. The establishment of a system of supra-nationality resulted in an 
increased awareness of the importance attached to the division of competences 
between the European Union and the Member States. 105  
The Maastricht Treaty106, although considerably changing the system of division of 
competences established between the European Union and the Member States, did not 
alter the European Union’s basic Federal structure.107  
Today, the European Union is still structured in a Federal way. Various European 
principles highlight the European Union’s Federal structure, such as the principle of 
                                                 
103 According to article 1 para. 3 TEU, the European Union is founded on the Treaty on European 
Union and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those two Treaties have the same 
legal value. The Union replaces and succeeds the European Community. For more details on the 
historical development, see e.g. K. H. Fischer, Der Vertrag von Lissabon, Text und Kommentar zum 
Europäischen Reformvertrag, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 17 et seq; see also A. Haratsch/ C. 
Koenig/ M. Pechstein, Europarecht, 7. Auflage, Tübingen 2010, p. 3 – 14. 
104 See M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 56 et seq. 
105 Ibid. 
106 The Maastricht treaty, according to its “three-pillar-model” (Drei-Säulen-Modell), integrated the 
European Communities under its “roof” in form of “the European Union”. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the Treaty of Nice are not cited hereunder due to the fact that they do not constitute treaties of their 
own right, but are merely a series of amendments to the existing Treaties. For more details on the 
European Union architecture, in particular on the three-pillar-model, see D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, in: A. 
Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth 
Edition, London 2006, p. 324 – 336. 
107 See M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 52 et seq. 
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conferral or the principle, which confers upon the Member States the role of the 
“masters of the Treaties”.108 Further Federal elements can be found in the principle of 
subsidiarity109, the principle entrusting Member States with the execution of European 
law or the principle of the supremacy of European law.110 However, various 
measures, such as the establishment of the Agency, reveal the European Union’s 
tendency of centralism. The structural problem of the European Union was at the 
centre of the review of constitutionality in the judgment of 30 June 2009 of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court.111 In this judgment, the Court considered that 
the European Union’s freedom of action had continuously risen so that its structure 
resembled, on the one hand, to that of a Federal state, i.e. was analogous to that of a 
state. On the other hand, however, the decision-making and appointment procedures 
remained predominantly committed to the pattern of an international organisation, i.e. 
was analogous to international law.  Hence, according to the German Constitutional 
Court, the European Union still followed the principle of equality of states. 112 It held 
that, as long as no uniform European people were subject of legitimation, the peoples 
of the Member States remained the decisive holder of the European Union’s public 
authority.113 It can thus be concluded that the European Union remains a union of rule 
(Herrschaftsverband), which is founded on international law and supported by the 
sovereign Member States. As a result, one can say that the European Union, due to its 
own Federal structure, has a principle understanding of the principle of Federalism, 
such as established in Austria and Germany. 
                                                 
108 Ibid at p. 68. 
109 The principle of subsidiarity, introduced in art. 3b TEC as compensation for the European Union’s 
increasing powers of competences, presupposes the Federal structure of the European Union; see M. 
Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich 
und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 52, p. 53.  
110 Ibid, p. 49 and p. 56. 
111 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009. 
112 Ibid, para. 279. 
113 Ibid, leading principles, para. 1. 
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2.1.1.3.2.2 The European Union’s two-tier structure 
However, the European Union is built upon a two-tier structure, which consists 
of the European Union, on one side, and the Member States, on the other side. 114  
Historically, Member States’ internal structures have not been integrated within the 
European Union’s structure. Under the Treaties, upon which the European 
Communities were founded, no reference was made to Member States’ internal 
structures.115 The European Communities were considered as being “blind of the 
existence of the Federal States” (“Landesblindheit der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften”).116 Indeed, where referring to “countries” (Länder), third countries 
(Drittländer) were addressed.117 Where referring to “territories of Member States”, the 
extra-European territories were meant rather than the Federal States.118 Merely article 
68 para. 3 EEC, concerned with the liberalised movements of capital, referred to 
“regional or local authorities”. This article was, however, equally addressed to the 
Member States rather than the Federal States.119  
With the European Economic Area and the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union 
started to integrate Member States’ internal structures, including the Federal ones, into 
European law. This is, for instance, reflected in article 300 para. 1 and 3 and 305 TFEU 
                                                 
114 See art. 1 TEU. See e.g. M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den 
Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, 49 at 56 et seq; see K. 
Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen Union, 1. 
Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 242 et seq. 
115 See G. Ress, Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der deutsche Föderalismus, EuGRZ 1986, p. 
549 at p. 550. 
116 Used by H.P. Ipsen, in: G. Ress, Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der deutsche Föderalismus, 
EuGRZ 1986, p. 549 at 550; see also K. Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, 
Spanien und der Europäischen Union, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 242. 
117 See e.g. art. 3b EEC in connection with art.s 9 and 110 EEC et seq., which establish a common 
customs tariff as well as a common commercial policy towards “third countries”; see also art. 3k EEC 
in connection with art. 131 EEC et seq. regarding the “association of the overseas countries and 
territories”. 
118 See G. Ress, Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der deutsche Föderalismus”, EuGRZ 1986, p. 
549 at 550. 
119 Ibid. 
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(ex-article 198a TEC), which establishes the Committee of the Regions, an advisory 
body that consists of “representatives of regional and local bodies”. It is furthermore 
apparent by virtue of article 16 para. 2 TEU, which entitles a “representative of each 
Member State at ministerial level” to participate within the Council in order to commit 
the Government of that Member State.  
With the European Treaties, the European Union’s awareness of Member States’ 
Federal structures increased further. Article 5 para. 3 TEU, for instance, refers 
explicitly to the sub-entities of the Member States, requiring the European 
Commission, upon examination of the principle of subsidiarity, to take into account the 
interests of the Federal States, the Regions as well as the Communities (“either at 
central level or at regional and local level”).120  
Although a certain attenuation of the European Union’s two-tier structure may thus be 
acknowledged, the European Union nevertheless retains its basic two-tier structure.121
Hence, the protection of the Austrian and German Federal structures cannot be based 
upon the argument that the European Union is itself federally structured. The European 
Union, although considering Member States’ Federal structures, does not prescribe 
them. It accepts Member States as they are, structured in the way they are. The 
decision to establish Federal structures remains thus within the sole responsibility of 
the Member States. Consequently, lack of prescribing them, Member States cannot 
invoke their direct protection through European law.  
                                                 
120 See also P. Straub, Das Frühwarnsystem zur Subsidiaritätskontrolle im Vertrag von Lissabon als 
Hürde vor weiterer Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Union?, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. 
Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, 
Baden-Baden 2008, p. 15 at p. 21. 
121 See e.g. K. Bretz, who, already in 2005, stated that the European Union could not be considered 
anymore as having a strict two-tier structure (partielle Revidierung des Modells der Zweistufigkeit), in: 
Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen Union, 1. Auflage, 
Berlin 2005, p. 242, 260; see also K. Hailbronner, Die deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, p. 
149 at p. 152. 
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However, the fact that the European Union regulates exclusively its relationship with 
the Member States does not signify that it is not obliged to respect Member States’ 
Federal structures. 
2.1.1.3.3 The respect of Member States’ Federal structures deriving from a 
European principle of Federalism? 
The European Union’s obligation to respect Member States’ Federal structures, 
including those of Austria and Germany, could emanate from a European principle of 
Federalism established as a general principle of European law. 
Generally, a general principle of European law is gained through an evaluative 
comparison of all legal orders of the Member Sates.122 Although European law does 
not prescribe a uniform principle to be present in all Member States, it nevertheless 
requires that a similar principle to the one seeking to be recognised, exists in, at least, 
the majority of the Member States. Only where one can speak of a “European 
tradition”, can a national principle be recognised as a general principle of European 
law. 
It is thus necessary that similar Federal structures have been established in, at least, the 
majority of the Member States. When comparing the internal structures of the Member 
States it appears, however, that only few Member States have established similar 
Federal structures. Indeed, most of the Member States are organised in a centralised 
way. Even where certain Federal structures can be acknowledged, such as in Belgium, 
Spain or Italy, they cannot be compared to those existent in Austria and Germany.123 
This is particularly true with regard to the extensive competences that are attributed in 
Austria and Germany to the municipalities, a characteristic that is unknown to most of 
the Member States. Finally, even where Federal sub-entities have been established in 
certain Member States, they do not dispose of the same substantial rights of 
                                                 
122 See K. Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen 
Union, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 260. 
123 Ibid. 
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participation at Federal level, as it is the case in Austria and Germany.124 Hence, lack 
of adhering to similar Federal structures in the majority of the Member States, the 
Federal structures established in Austria and Germany have not reached the status of a 
general principle of European law.125  
2.1.1.3.4 The respect of Member States’ Federal structures deriving from the 
“national identities” of the Member States? 
Article 4 para. 2 Lisbon Treaty obliges the European Union to respect “the 
national identities” of the Member States. Hence, if the Federal structures of the 
Member States form part of their “national identity”, the European Union is obliged to 
respect them. 
2.1.1.3.4.1 The notion of “national identity” 
Article 4 para. 2 sent. 1 TEU obliges the European Union to respect Member 
States’ “national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-Government”. This includes, 
according to article 4 para. 2 sent. 2 TEU, the obligation to respect “their essential 
State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State.” Article 4 para. 
2 TEU is based upon former article 10 TEC, which was introduced as a counterbalance 
to the European Union’s steadily increasing competences. Aimed at protecting 
Member States’ national and regional diversity within the European Union, article 4 
para. 2 TEU leaves it to the Member States to determine their own national identity. 
The ”identity” of a Member State is formed through the idea contents (Ideengehalte) of 
the People, helping them to find self-determination and inner security. As a result, the 
“nationality” of a Member State can be defined on the basis of two elements 
                                                 
124 See G. Ress, Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der deutsche Föderalismus, EuGRZ 1986, p. 
549 at 551. 
125 See K. Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen 
Union, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 260. 
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complementing each other: firstly, the state forming will of the People (plébiscite de 
tous les jours) and, secondly, the People’s common language, history and culture. 126
2.1.1.3.4.2 Member States’ Federal structures as part of their “national 
identity”? 
Member States’ Federal structures are undoubtedly part of their national 
identity.127 This becomes, first of all, apparent upon article 4 para. 2 sent. 1 TEU, 
which obliges the European Union to respect the “national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
Government”. The “fundamental structures” comprise Member States’ Federal 
structures. It emanates furthermore from sent. 2 of article 4 para. 2 TEU, which, as part 
of Member States’ “essential State functions”, also protects their territorial integrity. 
Moreover, it is due to the Federal structures and, in particular, the allocation of 
competences on sub-Federal level that the People are able to participate at the political 
decision-making process of the Member States. It is due to the establishment of 
political institutions at sub-Federal level, that the People have a closer connection to 
their nation state, which enables them to better identify themselves with. Indeed, they 
are more involved in the decision-making process in that they contribute in a more 
direct way to political decisions. In addition, the establishment of Federal structures 
increases the responsibility of the Government towards the People in that it must 
justify its actions in a more direct way.128  
                                                 
126 See A. Bleckmann, Die Wahrung der “nationalen Identität” im Unions-Vertrag, JZ 1997, p. 265. 
127 See also K. Bretz, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Deutschland, Spanien und der Europäischen 
Union, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2005, p. 260 et seq. 
128 Other interests of the Member States, which are protected, include their cultural diversity and 
traditions (art. 3 para. 4 subpara. 4, art. 13 TEU) or their linguistic diversity (art. 3 para. 4 subpara. 4 
TEU); see e.g. A. Bleckmann, Die Wahrung der “nationalen Identität” im Unions-Vertrag, JZ 1997, p. 
265 at p. 266. 
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2.1.1.3.5 The respect of Member States’ Federal structures deriving from the 
principle of loyalty? 
Article 4 para. 3 sent. 2 and 3 TEU codifies the principle of loyalty (Prinzip 
der Gemeinschaftstreue). Whether this principle includes an obligation for the 
European Union to respect the interests of the Member States, in general (3.5.1), and 
whether it comprises the Federal structures of Austria and Germany, in particular 
(3.5.2), will be dealt with in the following. 
2.1.1.3.5.1 The respect of Member States’ interests in general 
The principle of loyalty, initially codified in former article 10 TEC, is now 
incorporated in article 4 para. 3 sent. 2 and 3 TEU. It states: “the Member States shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and 
refrain from any measure, which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's 
objectives.” In obliging Member States to support the European Union in the fulfilment 
of its achievements (Unterstützungspflicht), on one side, and to refrain from actions, 
which jeopardise the European Union’s objectives (Unterlassungspflicht), on the other 
side, article 4 para. 3 sent. 2 and 3 TEU is principally addressed to the Member States 
rather than the European Union.129 However, despite its clear wording, former article 
10 TEC was also applied with the aim to establish an obligation of loyalty of the 
European Union towards the Member States. This was based on the perception that the 
principle of loyalty constitutes a mutual principle of European law and establishes 
therefore obligations on both side, the Member States and the European Union. The 
fact that the principle of loyalty constitutes a mutual principle of European law can also 
be seen by virtue of the systematic position it occupies within article 4 para. 3 TEU. 
                                                 
129 See e.g. I. Pernice, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, DVBl 1993, p. 909 at p. 916; see also R. Halfmann, Entwicklungen des 
deutschen Staatsorganisationsrechts im Kraftfeld der europäsischen Integration, Die Zusammenarbeit 
von Bund und Låndern nach Art. 23 GG im Lichte der Staatsstrukturprinzipien des Grundgesetzes, 1. 
Auflage, Berlin 2000, p. 276 et seq. 
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Indeed, its insertion after the principle of sincere cooperation according to which “the 
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties” (article 4 para. 2 sent. 1 TEU), indicates that it 
is part of the mutual obligations of the Member States and the European Union. 
Moreover, in accordance with the European principle of effet utile (Effizienzgebot), 
which requires European provisions to be given their best possible effectiveness, 
loyalty obligations need to be established on both sides. Indeed, if the European Union 
was not obliged to respect Member States’ interests, it would risk that Member States 
withdraw their loyalty from the European Union and refuse to support it in the 
achievement of its goals.130
Based upon the principle of loyalty, established in article 4 para. 3 sent. 2 and 3 TEU, 
the European Union is therefore obliged to respect Member States’ interests in general. 
2.1.1.3.5.2 The respect of Member States’ Federal structures in particular 
The obligation of the European Union to respect Member States’ interests in 
general, does not automatically include its obligation to respect Member States’ 
Federal structures in particular.  
Against such assumption speaks that European law is principally not concerned about 
Member States’ internal structures. Indeed, contracting partners of the European Union 
are exclusively the Member States and not the Federal States. Moreover, the principle 
of the supremacy of European law requires European provisions to be examined 
independently from the constitutional orders of the Member States.131 In addition, since 
only few Member States have established Federal structures, one could argue that these 
are not significant enough to be taken into account. Finally, obliging the European 
Union to consider the internal structures of each individual Member State could entail 
the risk that it obstructs the European Union’s capacity to act (Handlungsfähigkeit). 
                                                 
130 See K. Hailbronner, Die deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, p. 149 at p. 152. 
131 Ibid. 
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In my view, Member States’ Federal structures should nevertheless be included in the 
scope of protection of article 4 para. 3 TEU. The fact that Member States’ internal 
structures do not serve as criteria of examination of European law, does not exclude the 
possibility that they are protected by it. The inadmissibility of deducing such obligation 
from the constitutional orders of the Member States does not exclude the recognition of 
such obligation on the basis of European law. Member States’ internal structures, 
although not directly serving as criteria of examination, may nevertheless become 
relevant in the light of the examination of European law. Moreover, the argument that 
only few Member States have established Federal structures with the result that they 
should not be taken into account is not convincing. Such conclusion would have the 
consequence that Member States’ interests were only protected, if they existed in more 
or less all the Member States. This would lead to the result that the Member States are 
not protected in their quality as individual nation states, but only in their quality as a 
global community. However, protecting Member States only in their quality as a global 
community without considering each individual Member State cannot be justified upon 
European law. The European Union, which is on itself not recognised as a state in the 
sense of international public law, is built upon the Member States in their quality as 
autonomous nation states.132 In addition, the variety of forms of internal structures that 
exist within the Member States would make it difficult to find a single common basis. 
Moreover, at what point would the interests of the Member States as a global 
community considered as, indeed, being affected? How many Member States would 
need to have established the same principle in order to be declared “worthy enough” to 
apply it on European level? To leave the decision of whether or not to consider the 
interests of a particular Member State to the discretion of the European Union, would 
undermine the power of this Member State to autonomously and independently decide 
about its internal structures. The European Union would risk losing the support of this 
Member State, which would rather return to its own national interests. In the end, the 
protection of the Member States only as a global community would jeopardise the 
achievement of the European Union’s goals, which would in return contradict the 
                                                 
132 See A. Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Föderalismus: “Landesblindheit” und Pflicht zur 
Berücksichtigung innerstaatlicher Verfassungssstrukturen, EuR 1994, p. 301 at p. 315. 
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European principle of effet utile. Hence, the principle of loyalty as a mutual principle 
of European law includes the European Union’s obligation to protect Member States’ 
Federal structures. 
As a conclusion it can be said that Member States’ Federal structures, including those 
of Austria and Germany, are protected through European law. They are included within 
the scope of protection of article 4 para. 2 TEU, which protects Member States’ 
national identities as well as within the scope of protection of the principle of loyalty 
laid down in article 4 para. 3 TEU. 
2.1.1.4 The interference of article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC with 
Member States’ Federal structures 
In general, the European Union has been conferred upon the power to interfere 
with the competences of the Member States (4.1). Considering article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, its interference is particularly far-reaching (4.2). 
2.1.1.4.1 The interference of the European Union with Member States’ 
competences in general 
The European Union disposes of different forms of interference (Formen der 
Kompetenzbeeinträchtigung) (2.1.1.4.1.1), which may also result in an interference 
with the competences of the Federal States (2.1.1.4.1.2). 
2.1.1.4.1.1 The forms of interference of the European Union 
The European Union may interfere with Member States’ competences either 
through primary or secondary legislation.  
As to primary legislation, provisions may either confer jurisdiction over an entire area 
of competence to a legal entity, such as the European Union, a Member State or a 
Region (Kompetenznormen) or may assign specific rights and duties within a specific 
area of competence (Sachnormen). Where jurisdiction over an entire area of 
competence is conferred upon the European Union, the competences of the Member 
States are at the same time excluded. The exclusion of the competences of the 
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Federation thereby leads to an exclusion of competences of the Federal States, if these 
were competent according to domestic laws. The degree of exclusion depends on the 
question of whether the European Union enjoys exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction 
over that specific area of competence. Where specific rights and duties within a 
specific area of competence are conferred upon the European Union, the competences 
of the Member States are limited. Again, the limitation of competences of the 
Federation leads to a limitation of competences of the Federal States, if these were 
competent according to domestic laws. 133  
As to secondary legislation, i.e. legislation enacted by the European legislator on the 
basis of primary legislation, the competences of the Member States are either further 
limited (e.g. through a European Directive) or entirely excluded, such as through a 
European Regulation (Verordnung) or a very detailed Directive.  
2.1.1.4.1.2 The interference with the competences of the Federal States  
The interference of the European Union with the competences of the Federal 
States results from the transfer of sovereign rights of the Federation to the European 
Union.134 The loss of competences born by the Federation may lead to a loss of 
competences of the Federal States, thereby affecting all three areas of state power, i.e. 
the legislative, executive and judiciary power.  
The European Union may, for instance, interfere with Federal States’ legislative 
competences. In this case, it affects Federal States’ competences not only in respect of 
their own areas of competences, but also in respect of the competences of the 
Federation.135 Indeed, through the transfer of competences of the Federation to the 
                                                 
133 See R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den 
Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 484 and 
p. 485. 
134 See art. 24 GG and art. 23d Abs. 5 B-VG respectively. 
135 See D. O. Reich, Zum Einfluß des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Kompetenzen der 
deutschen Bundesländer, EuGRZ 2001, p. 1 at 3; see also R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der 
Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 485. 
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European Union, Federal States may lose their participation rights, via the Bundesrat, 
at the law-making process of the Federation136, such as the right to introduce a 
legislative proposal in the Bundestag (Initiativrecht),137 the right to comment on the 
legislative proposal of the Bundestag (Recht der Stellungnahme)138 or the right to 
object to a legislative proposal adopted by the Bundestag (Recht des Einspruchs).139 
The European Union may also interfere with the executive competences of the Federal 
States. In this case, it affects Federal States’ competences in respect of the execution of 
Federal law, of Federal States’ law140 as well as of European law or Federal law 
enacted on the basis of European law. 141  
2.1.1.4.2 The interference of the European Union through article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC in particular 
As to the interference of article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC in particular, 
a distinction needs to be drawn between the Federal structures established in Austria 
and those established in Germany in the area of energy regulation.  
In Austria, no Federal structures have been established in the area of energy regulation. 
Although the Federal Minister of Economics and Labour and local state authorities are 
involved in the regulatory decision-making process, no real Federal structures have 
                                                 
136 Art. 50 GG and art. 41 et seq. B-VG respectively. 
137 Art. 76 para. 1 GG and art. 41 para. 1 B-VG respectively. 
138 Art.76 para. 2 GG and art. 42 para. 1 B-VG respectively. 
139 Art. 77 para. 3 GG and art.42 paras. 2, 3 and 4 B-VG respectively. 
140See art. 30, 83 et seq. GG and art. 15 para. 1 B-VG; for more details, see D. O. Reich, Zum Einfluß 
des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Kompetenzen der deutschen Bundesländer, EuGRZ 
2001, p. 1 at p. 8; see also R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen 
Union und den Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 
at p. 485. 
141 As to Federal States’ judiciary competences, see e.g. R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen 
zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 486. 
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been established.142 The main regulators are the E-control GmbH and the E-control 
Kommission and no regional divisions of these regulatory authorities exist. 143
In Germany, on the contrary, a strict Federal system has been established in the area of 
energy regulation. These Federal structures are deeply affected through article 35 para. 
1 of Directive 2009/72/EC.144
Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC has, first of all, a major impact on the 
territorial structures that have been established in the area of energy regulation. 
Indeed, article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, considered on its own, would 
require Germany to consolidate its regulatory authorities established at Federal States’ 
level to a single regulatory authority at national level. This would mean that Germany 
would have to abolish its territorial structure in the area of energy regulation and to 
replace them through a single and centralised territorial structure. 
Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC affects furthermore the system of division of 
competences that has been established in the area of energy regulation between the 
regulatory authorities at Federal level and Federal States’ level. Indeed, article 35 para. 
1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, considered on its own, would require Germany to 
concentrate energy regulatory matters on a single energy regulatory authority at 
national level. This would lead to an entire withdrawal of competences from those 
authorities, which are responsible for energy regulatory matters at Federal States’ 
                                                 
142 See CEER, IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Austria – E-control GmbH, p. 2 – p. 3. 
143 See CEER, IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Austria – E-control GmbH, p. 2, 3. In 2008, several constitutional provisions have been introduced into 
sub-constitutional laws, which have an impact on the Austrian Federal framework, including the 
EWIOG and the E-RBG; for details, see G. Pallaver, Österreich 2008 – Ein föderalistisches 
Übergangsjahr, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus Forschung Tübingen, Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa, Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2009, Band 10, 1. Auflage, Baden-
Baden 2009, p. 300 at p. 306 – p. 307. 
144 See R. Streinz, Die Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den 
Mitglaidstaaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Regionen, BayVBl 2001, p. 481 at p. 484 and 
p. 485. 
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level.145 In Germany, the authorities competent for energy regulatory matters on 
Federal States’ level dispose of their own regulatory competences. 146 They are 
competent for regulating electricity networks, which serve fewer than 100.000 
customers directly or indirectly, provided that the electricity networks do not extend 
beyond the borders of a (single) Federal State (section 54 para. 2 of the EnWG). 147 
Their tasks are thereby carried out either through the BNetzA, lending its entity to the 
Federal States (Organleihe)148, or through distinct entities at Federal States’ level. 149 
Where carried out through distinct Federal States’ entities, these competences would be 
withdrawn through article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC.  
As a conclusion, article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC interferes deeply with the 
Federal structures of Germany established in the area of energy regulation, in particular 
affecting the competences of the Federal States. 
2.1.1.5 The justification of the European Union’ interference with Member 
States’ Federal structures 
The interference of the European Union with Member States’ Federal 
structures, in order to be legitimate, must be justified on the basis of European law. 
                                                 
145 See e.g. T. Eggers/ T. Floren, Rolle der Regulierungsbehörden zwischen Aufsichts- und 
Verfolgungsbehörde, ZNER 2010, p. 10 at p. 12. 
146 Ibid. 
147 See CEER, IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Germany – Federal Network Agency, p. 4; see also T. Eggers/ T. Floren, Rolle der 
Regulierungsbehörden zwischen Aufsichts- und Verfolgungsbehörde, ZNER 2010, p. 10 at p. 11 et 
seq. 
148 Distinct regulatory authorities at Federal States’ level exist in Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower 
Saxony, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. 
149 North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria. 
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2.1.1.5.1 European law as the sole criterion of examination 
Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC must comply with European law, 
which serves as sole criteria of examination (Prüfungsmaßstab und - umfang).150 The 
national laws, including the constitutional laws of the Member States, are principally 
not taken into account. This stems from the principle of supremacy of European law 
(Vorrang des Europarechts), which provides that any European provision, whether 
primary or secondary, prevails over the national laws of the Member States, including 
their constitutional laws.151 As a consequence, national laws opposed to European law 
become inapplicable to situations of European character (Anwendungsvorrang). They 
are, however, not void (Geltungsvorrang), which means that they remain applicable to 
situations that have a purely national character.152  
2.1.1.5.2 The violation of the principle of proportionality? 
The principle of proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip) has been 
codified in Article 5 para. 4 TEU (ex-article 5 TEC). Under this principle, the content 
and form of the European Union shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties. In the energy sector, this principle is complemented through 
Article 194 para. 2 TFEU, which provides that the European Parliament and the 
Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after 
having consulted the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives set out in 
paragraph 1, including the functioning of the energy market, security of energy 
supply, the promotion of energy sufficiency, energy saving and the development of 
renewable energies and the interconnection of energy networks. 
                                                 
150 See e.g. W. Höfling/ S. Augsberg, Grundrechtsfragen im Zusammenhang mit der geplanten 
Erweiterung der Befugnisse der nationalen Regulierungsbehörden auf den Strom- und Gasmärkten, 
RdE 12/ 2008, p. 353 at p. 354. 
151 Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., Reference for a preliminary ruling: Giudice conciliatore di 
Milano – Italy, E.C.R (1964), 00585. 
152 See K. Hailbronner, Die deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, p. 149. 
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Under the principle of proportionality the question arises whether a European measure 
can be justified in view of the realisation of its objective despite its interference with 
another interest that is equally protected by European law. The principle of 
proportionality serves, firstly, to control the extent to which measures adopted by the 
European institutions are permitted to override the interests of particular individuals 
and, secondly, to limit the scope that has been conferred upon the Member States to 
protect important public interests through derogations from fundamental principle of 
European law.153 Here two legal interests, both protected by European law, are at stake. 
On one side, there is the legitimate interest of federally structured Member States, in 
particular Germany, that the Federal structures established in the area of energy 
regulation remain intact and protected. On the other side, there is the legitimate interest 
of the European Union that Member States progress with the European process of 
integration and, in particular, with a single European energy market. On one side, the 
activities of the European Union may not lead to the result that Member States’ Federal 
structures are deprived of their substance. On the other side, the respect of Member 
States’ Federal structures may not have the consequence that the European Union is 
obstructed in the realisation of its goals. These two interests relate to each other on an 
equal basis and must adequately be balanced, which means that both of them must be 
given the best possible effectiveness.  As a result, the European Union’s obligation to 
respect Member States’ Federal structures must not be considered in an isolated way 
but rather needs to be embedded in the European process of integration.154 In applying 
the principle of proportionality, it must be examined whether the measure used is 
suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired objective and whether it does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.155 Hence, article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, in order to be legitimate, must be suitable (geeignet), necessary 
(erforderlich) and adequate (angemessen) in view of the realisation of its aim. 
                                                 
153 See e.g. D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, European Union Law, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. 
Ross/ E. Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, Fifth Edition, London, 2006, p. 110 – p. 112.  
154 In this sense, see A. Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Föderalismus: “Landesblindheit” und Pflicht 
zur Berücksichtigung innerstaatlicher Verfassungssstrukturen, EuR 1994, p. 301 at p. 318 and p. 319.  
155 For more details, see D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. 
Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 110 et seq. 
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2.1.1.5.2.1 Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC as a suitable measure? 
Article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC constitutes a suitable measure, if it is 
able to achieve the aim herewith pursued.  
The European Union’s overall aim in the electricity sector is the creation of an 
“internal market in electricity”, which provides “efficiency gains, competitive prices, 
and higher standards of service”, and which “contributes to security of supply and 
sustainability”.156 According to the European Union, Directive 2009/72/EC aims to 
achieve what Directive 2003/54/EC was unable to provide: a sufficient “framework for 
achieving the objective of a well-functioning internal market”.157 Placed in this wider 
European context, the establishment of a single national regulatory authority per 
Member State, as provided for by article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC, has the aim 
to achieve “strong national regulators to oversee the running of electricity and gas 
markets”.158 According to the European Commission, the dispersion of energy 
regulatory powers over different bodies leads to a “lack of uniformity” and therefore 
energy regulators’ “weakness”. As a result, in the European Commission’s view, the 
consolidation to a single regulatory authority at national level has become necessary.159 
The concentration of competences to a single entity undoubtedly strengthens this entity 
in that it is more effective in terms of organisation, performance, taking of decisions 
and of execution of energy regulatory matters. Article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC 
can thus be regarded as a suitable measure in view of the achievement of its aim. 
                                                 
156 See introduction of Directive 2009/72/EC (1). 
157 Ibid. 
158 See European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, 
Explanatory Memorandum, Strong national regulators to oversee the running of electricity and gas 
markets, COM (2007) 528 final, at no. 2.1.  
159 Ibid. 
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2.1.1.5.2.2 Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC as a necessary measure? 
Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009 constitutes a necessary measure, if the 
European Union disposes of no other means, which is as effective as article 35 para. 1 
of Directive 2009/72/EC (gleich geeignetes Mittel), but which is, at the same time, less 
intrusive with Member States’ Federal structures (milderes Mittel). 
A less intrusive measure could be the decision to let the Member States decide about 
their internal structures in the area of energy regulation. With a view to the European 
Union’s aim to establish a single internal electricity market, such a decision would, 
however, not be as effective. Indeed, to let the Member States decide about their 
internal structures in the area of energy regulation, as it is the case today, results in 
various different forms of regulatory oversight. This has the consequence that it is 
more difficult for the European Union to act in a uniform way and to “talk with a 
single European voice” in the area of energy regulation. Given the increasing number 
of acceding European countries, the decision-making process in the area of energy 
regulation becomes more and more cumbersome. 
Another less intrusive measure could be the enactment of a provision, which 
differentiates between the different Member States in dependence of their internal 
structures. To differentiate between the different Member States would fulfil the 
European Union’s obligation to respect the history, culture, tradition and national 
identity of each individual Member State. Such differentiated approach would permit 
that Member States’ individual structures were taken into account. Member States 
would be presented with alternatives, which would give them the possibility to comply 
with their obligation to participate at the establishment of a united Europe without 
being forced to act in contradiction to their own constitutional laws. 160  
                                                 
160 See e.g. art. 23 para. 1 sent. 1 GG; the possibility to distinguish between the different Member 
States was particularly discussed in connection with the principle of subsidiarity; for details, see D. 
Schindler, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich 
und der Schweiz, in: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus Forschung Tübingen, Jahrbuch des 
Föderalismus. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 
Band 9, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, p. 83. 
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Applied to article 35 Directive 2009/72/EC, this approach would lead to a 
differentiated Federalism (differenzierter Föderalismus).161 A similar solution can, in 
my view, be seen in the enactment of paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of article 35 
Directive 2009/72/EC.  
Paragraph 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC stipulates, that under certain conditions 
paragraph 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC is “without prejudice to (berührt nicht/ ohne 
Auswirkung auf) the designation of other regulatory authorities at regional level” 
within the Member States. It refers to the Federal structures established on the different 
Federal sub-levels in the area of energy regulation. Safeguarding Member States’ 
territorial integrity, they are not forced to consolidate the authorities established at 
regional level to a single national regulatory authority at national level.  
Paragraph 3 of article 35 Directive 2009/72/EC allows Member States, “by way of 
derogation” (abweichend von), to designate under certain conditions “regulatory 
authorities for small systems on a geographically separate region”. It refers to the 
powers and competences of regulatory authorities, independently of the Federal sub-
structures. In this case, Member States are not forced to concentrate energy regulatory 
matters on a single national authority at national level. Such is, for instance, the case in 
Germany. 
The question is whether article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC, in combination with 
paragraph 2 and 3 of article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC, could be regarded as 
effective as article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC, considered on its own. Given the 
fact that through such a differentiated approach article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC 
would lose its uniformity, it can, in my view, only be regarded as effective, if its 
uniformity can otherwise be guaranteed. Such has been achieved through the 
requirement laid down in both, paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC, 
to appoint a senior representative for representation and contact purposes at European 
level within the Board of Regulators of the European Agency. On one side, the 
attribution of a purely representative role to the senior representative guarantees that 
                                                 
161 Ibid at p. 82 et seq. 
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the decision-making power remains with the regulatory authorities established at 
regional level. On the other side, the representation of a single senior representative at 
European level facilitates the decision-making process of the European Union in the 
area of energy regulation. 
As a result, in combination with paragraph 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC, article 35 
para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC constitutes a measure, which is as effective as article 
35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC on its own, but which is, at the same time, less 
intrusive with Member States’ Federal structures.  
2.1.1.5.2.3 Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC as a proportionate 
measure? 
The progress that shall be achieved through article 35 para. 1 Directive 
2009/72/EC within the European process of integration must be proportionate in 
relation to its interference with Member States’ Federal structures. 162
Article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC, considered on its own, is in my view not 
proportionate in relation to its aim pursued.163 Its scope of applicability (materielle 
Anwendungsbereich) is too far-reaching in that it principally applies to all the Member 
States and in respect of all energy regulatory matters and within all areas of energy 
regulation. In addition, its interference with Member States’ Federal structures reaches 
too deeply (Tiefe des Eingriffs) in that it affects an area of competence that is typically 
reserved to the Member States.  The energy sector is a sector, which usually depends 
on the national and regional particularities and traditions of the Member States and 
which constitutes therefore one of the sectors that are most closely connected to its 
Member State. Moreover, although article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC does not 
deprive the Member States from their sovereignty, it withdraws the sovereignty from 
                                                 
162 See A. Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Föderalismus: “Landesblindheit” und Pflicht zur 
Berücksichtigung innerstaatlicher Verfassungssstrukturen, EuR 1994, p. 301 at p. 321.  
163 See e.g. S. Neveling, Verschärfte Regulierung der Strom- und Gasmärkte in der EU - Vorschläge der 
Kommission für ein 3. Richtlinienpaket, ZNER 2007, p. 378 at p. 379. 
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the Federal States in the area of energy regulation.164 Finally, article 35 para. 1 
Directive 2009/72/EC would oblige federally structured Member States to act in a way 
that is contradictory to their constitutional laws, plunging them into an unsolvable 
conflict between European and constitutional law.165
Article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC can furthermore not be justified upon the 
argument that Federal States dispose of participation rights at European level.166  
Generally, in Germany167 as well as in Austria168, Federal States have been conferred 
upon indirect and direct participation rights at the law-making process of the European 
Union as a compensation for the loss of competences encountered through the transfer 
of sovereign rights of the Federation to the European Union 
(Mitwirkungskompensation). The Federal States participate indirectly at the law-
making process of the European Union by contributing, via the Bundesrat and the 
Integration Conference of the Federal States (Integrationskonferenz der Länder), to the 
                                                 
164 The European Union’s interference with Member States’ competences by virtue of art. 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC can therefore not be compared to its interference in the area of monetary policy 
(Währungshoheit), where Member States’ sovereignty has almost entirely been transferred to the 
European Central Bank. However, even in this area, the transfer of sovereignty of Member States’ 
monetary policy does not result in an entire loss of state sovereignty; for details, see T. Stein, 
Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der 
Schweiz, VVDStRL 53, p. 26 at p. 31 and p. 46. 
165 See K. Hailbronner, Die deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, p. 149 at p. 152. 
166 See e.g. M. Brenner, Der unitarische Bundesstaat in der Europäischen Union, DÖV 1992, p. 903 et 
seq. 
167 See art. 23 para. 2, para. 4 to 6 GG in connection with the Law on the Cooperation between the 
Federation and the Federal States regarding Matters of the European Union (Gesetz über die 
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, EUZBLG). 
168 See art. 23 d to 23f B-VG in connection with two agreements concluded, upon art. 15a B-VG, 
between the Federation and the Federal States, on the one hand, and between the Federal States 
between themselves, on the other hand (Vereinbarungen über die Mitwirkungsrechte der Länder und 
Gemeinden in Angelegenheiten der Europäsischen Integration of 12.03.1992); for details, see R. 
Halfmann, Entwicklungen des deutschen Staatsorganisationsrechts im Kraftfeld der europäischen 
Integration, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2000, p. 327 et seq. The difference to the German approach is, that in 
Austria the Federal States do not participate via the Bundesrat at the law-making process of the 
European Union, but via the so-called “Integration Conference of the Federal States” 
(Integrationskonferenz der Länder). Where the integration conference takes a unanimous decision 
(einheitliche Stellungnahme), art. 23 d para. 2 sent. 1 B-VG stipulates that the Federation is, in 
principal, bound by it; for a detailed and comparative analysis between German and Austrian law, see 
M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 59 and p. 64 et seq. 
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law-making process of the Federation. 169 The degree of participation depends thereby, 
in Germany170 as well as in Austria171, on the degree of interference of the European 
Union with the competences of the Federal States. They directly participate at the law-
making process of the European Union 172 through bodies such as the Council of 
Regional and Local Authorities (Beirat der regionalen und lokalen 
Gebietskörperschaften), a consultative organ without any noteworthy powers173, the 
Committee of the Regions, an assembly of local and regional representatives with 
                                                 
169 See A. Zoller, Die Weiterentwicklung der Bund-Länder Zusammenarbeit in EU-Angelegenheiten 
vor dem Hintergrund des Vertrages von Lissabon, Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, 
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 
2008, p. 570 at p. 575. 
170 In Germany, where a European measure affects primarily (im Schwerpunkt) the legislative 
competences of the Federal States, the constitution of Federal States authorities or their administrative 
procedures, the voting of the Federal States within the Bundesrat constitutes a decisive factor as to the 
law-making process of the European Union (maßgebliche Berücksichtigung); it has binding character 
(art. 23 para. 5 sent. 2 in connection with section 5 para. 2 LZusAG). Where, on the contrary, the 
interests of the Federal States are concerned (Berührung von Länderinteressen), such as in the case of 
the European Union’s interference with exclusive competences of the Federation, the voting of the 
Bundesrat is merely to be taken into account; it has no binding character; for details, see A. Zoller, Die 
Weiterentwicklung der Bund-Länder Zusammenarbeit in EU-Angelegenheiten vor dem Hintergrund 
des Vertrages von Lissabon, in: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen 
in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 570 at p. 575 et seq.; 
see also M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 59 et seq; see also D. Reich, Zum Einfluß des 
Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Kompetenzen der deutschen Bundesländer, EuGRZ 2001, p. 
1 at p. 12.  
171 In Austria, where the Federal States have taken a unanimous decision (einheitliche Stellungnahme) 
with regards to a European project that lies within the scope of legislative competences of the Federal 
States, the Federation is principally bound by it  (art. 23 para. 2 sent. 1 B-VG). The opportunity to 
present their views (Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme) must be given to the Federal States, without delay, 
in all those cases, in which a European measure affects the autonomous sphere of competence of the 
Federal States (selbständiger Wirkungsbereich der Länder) or which could otherwise be of interest to 
them (von Interesse sein könnten), (art. 23 para. 1 B-VG); for details, see M. Schweitzer, Europäische 
Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz?, 
VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 62 et seq.  
172 For Germany, see art. 23 para. 6 GG in connection with section 6 LZusAG; for a critical view as to 
art. 23 para. 6 GG, see I. Pernice, Föderalismus im Umbruch, Zur Frage der Europafähigkeit des 
föderalen Deutschland, 2004, www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-paper0604.pdf (28.06.10). For 
Austria, see art. 23 e para. 1, 6 B-VG. 
173 European Commission Decision of 24 June 1988 setting up the Consultative Council of Regional 
and Local Authorities (88/487/EEC), OJEC, 06.09.1988, No. L 247, p. 23; see also M. Schweitzer, 
Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der 
Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 58 et seq. 
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advisory powers174 or the European Charta of the Regions, vesting them with veritable 
participation rights.175  With the Lisbon Treaty, their participation rights have further 
been enhanced, establishing a better delimitation of competences as well as an early 
warning system, aimed at securing compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 176
However, Federal States’ participation rights at the law-making process of the 
European Union do in my view not justify the withdrawal of competences from the 
Federal States in the area of energy regulation. First of all, the decisions of the Federal 
States are, within the Bundesrat, subject to majority decisions. Furthermore, the right 
to participate at the law-making process is not able to compensate veritable decision-
making rights.177
2.1.1.5.3 The violation of article 79 para. 3 of the German Basic Law 
Article 79 para. 3 of the GG states: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting 
the division of the Federation into the Federal States, their participation on principle in 
the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 (GG) shall be 
inadmissible” (unzulässig). The so-called eternity guarantee withdraws the disposal of 
the identity of the free constitutional order even from the hands of the constitution-
amending legislature. The constituent power has not granted the representative bodies 
of the People a mandate to change the constitutional principles, which are, according to 
article 79 para. 3 of the GG, fundamental. 
                                                 
174 See M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in Deutschland, 
Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at p. 58 et seq. 
175 The Charta has, however, no binding character; see M. Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder 
Chance für den Föderalismus in Detuschland, Österreich und der Schweiz?, VVDStRL 1993, p. 49 at 
p. 58 et seq. 
176 See A. Zoller, Die Weiterentwicklung der Bund-Länder Zusammenarbeit in EU-Angelegenheiten 
vor dem Hintergrund des Vertrages von Lissabon, Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, in: Jahrbuch des 
Föderalismus. Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa: Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2008, 
1. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2008, p. 570 at p. 571 et seq. 
177 See D. Reich, Zum Einfluß des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die Kompetenzen der 
deutschen Bundesländer, EuGRZ 2001, p.1 at p. 13.  
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Although European law prevails over the national laws of the Member States, 
including their constitutional laws, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
acknowledges exceptional cases, in which it examines whether European law complies 
with national constitutional law.178  
Indeed, where secondary European law collides with German basic rights (article 1 to 
article 20 of the GG), the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 
the decisions Solange I179, Solange II180, and Maastricht181 applies.182 Where secondary 
European law stands in contradiction to the structural principles of the German 
Constitution (Strukturprinzipien des Grundgesetzes), as guaranteed by article 79 para. 
3 of the GG, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that it had the competence 
to assume the no-binding character of European law (Unverbindlichkeit des 
Gemeinschaftsrechts). This view was reaffirmed by the Court in its recent judgment of 
30 June 2009 with the German Basic, where it considered that the Basic Law did not 
permit the specific bodies of the legislative, executive and judicial power to dispose of 
the essential elements of the constitution, i.e. of the constitutional identity (article 23 
para. 1 of the GG in connection with article 79 para. 3 of the GG). It ruled that, within 
the boundaries of its competences, it was necessary that it watched over the European 
                                                 
178 Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., Reference for a preliminary ruling: Giudice conciliatore di 
Milano – Italy, E.C.R (1964), 00585. 
179 In the decision Solange I, the German Constitutional Court ruled that, as long as (“solange”) the 
European Union did not dispose of its own codified catalogue of basic rights, it remained competent to 
examine whether secondary European law was compatible with the German basic rights (BVerfGE 37, 
271 at 278). 
180 In the decision Solange II and the decision of Maastricht, the German Constitutional Court ruled 
that it had no longer the competence to rule on the compatibility of secondary European law with the 
German basic rights due to the fact that a sufficient level of protection of basic rights had been 
established within the European Union and that it constituted a level comparable to the one guaranteed 
by the German Basic Law (BVerfGE 73, 339 at 378 – 381). 
181 In the decision of Maastricht, the German Constitutional Court ruled that it remained competent in 
two cases: it remained, firstly, competent to guarantee the unalterable level of basic rights 
(Gewährleistung des unabdingbaren Grundrechtsstandards), whereas the European Court of Justice 
provided, on the other side, the protection of the basic rights for the entire sovereign territory of the 
European Union; it remained, secondly, competent to examine whether the European Union acted 
outside of its competences conferred upon it through art. 23 para. 1 GG (ausbrechender Rechtsakt, 
ultra-vires Handeln),  BVerfGE 89, 155. 
182 For more details, see e.g. W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, 
Neuauflage, Berlin 2010, p. 105 – p. 106. 
 
55
 
 
Union not violating the constitutional identity by its acts and not evidently 
transgressing the competences conferred upon it. It held that the transfer of 
competences, which had further been increased through the Treaty of Lisbon, and the 
independence of decision-making procedures therefore required an effective ultra vires 
review and an identity review of instruments of the European origin in the area of 
application of the Federal Republic of Germany. 183
The principles laid down in article 79 para. 3 of the GG are part of the structural 
principles of the German Constitution. European law may thus not lead to the result 
that the sovereignty of the Federal States is eroded (Aushöhlung der Eigenstaatlichkeit 
der Länder).184 Being part of the German Federal order (deutsche Bundesstaatlichkeit), 
Federal States’ existential state quality must be guaranteed, which includes the 
guarantee of an untouchable core set of own competences (unantastbares Hausgut 
eigener Aufgaben).185  
The assessment of whether article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC deprives Federal 
States of their untouchable core set of competences depends upon the definition of 
Federal States’ untouchable core set of competences. Whereas the quantitative 
approach is based on the numbers of competences that are withdrawn from the Federal 
States, the qualitative approach examines which specific areas of competences are 
affected. 186 The competences, which are part of the untouchable core set of 
competences, are per se not transferable. This includes Federal States’ organisational, 
administrative, personal and financial sovereignty.187 According to the functional 
approach, decisive factor are not the specific areas of competences affected, but rather 
                                                 
183 See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 261.  
184 See T. Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen 
Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß: Wechselseitige Rezeption, konstitutionelle Evolution und föderale 
Verflechtung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2003, p. 248 et seq. 
185 BVerfGE 34, 9 at 19 et seq. 
186 T. Giegerich, Europäische Verfassung und deutsche Verfassung im transnationalen 
Konstitutionalisierungsprozeß: Wechselseitige Rezeption, konstitutionelle Evolution und föderale 
Verflechtung, 1. Auflage, Berlin 2003, p. 250 et seq. 
187 Ibid. 
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whether the Federal States remain in the position of taking measures that are of 
political significance. Federal States must remain in a position, which enables them to 
constitute a political counterbalance to the Federation. First of all, article 35 para. 1 
Directive 2009/72/EC does not withdraw competences from the Federal States that are 
so numerous that their entire existence is endangered (quantitative approach). 
Moreover, article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC does not withdraw from the Federal 
States competences that are per se not transferable (qualitative approach). Although 
article 35 para. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC is far-reaching in its consequences in that it not 
only reduces the competences of the Federal States, but entirely excludes them, it 
nevertheless needs to be viewed in a wider European context. Decisive factor is 
whether Federal States lose the ability to carry out their core competences. This is not 
the case. Federal States, despite the withdrawal of competences in the area of energy 
regulation remain, overall seen, a politically significant counterbalance to the 
Federation.  
2.1.1.6 Other outcome through art. 35 para. 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC? 
Both paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC have been 
added following the Council’s Common Position (EC) No. 8/2009.188 Article 35 para. 
2 of Directive 2009/72/EC stipulates that, provided certain circumstances are met, the 
designation of a single national regulatory authority at national level is “without 
prejudice to the designation of other regulatory authorities at regional level within 
Member States”. The term “without prejudice” signifies, in my view, that the 
designation of a single national authority at national level has no effect on the existence 
of other regulatory authorities at regional level. Prerequisite is, however, that a 
representative is designated for representation and contact purposes at Community 
level. It also means that the obligation of paragraph 1 of article 35 of Directive 
2009/72/EC exists, irrespective of whether of other regulatory authorities have been 
                                                 
188 Common Position (EC) No 8 /2009 adopted by the Council on 9 January 2009 with a view to the 
adoption of Directive 2009/…/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of … concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 24.03.2009, C 
70 E/01 at 22. 
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designated at regional level within Member States. Article 34 para. 3 of Directive 
2009/72/EC, allows, “by way of derogation” and under certain circumstances the 
designation of other regulatory authorities.189  One can thus conclude that both, 
paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC attenuate, at least to 
a certain extent, the impact that article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC has on 
Member States’ internal Federal structures. However, decisive factor is that, by virtue 
of paragraph 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, the basic principle has been set forth; 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC are merely constituted as 
exceptions. The most important step to consolidate Member States’ existing national 
regulatory authorities at national and regional level to a single regulatory authority at 
national level has thus been taken. 
2.1.2 Conclusion 
Member States’ internal Federal structures are protected through European 
law. By enacting article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, the European Union had 
the obligation to respect these Federal structures. Although its obligation may neither 
be drawn from its own Federal structure nor from a European principle of Federalism, 
it may nevertheless be deduced from article 4 para. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
protects Member States’ national identities as well as from article 4 para. 3 TEU, 
which establishes the mutual principle of loyalty. By enacting article 35 para. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, the European Union touches the core areas of the Federal 
structures that have been established in the area of energy regulation. It affects, in 
particular, the competences of the Federal States. Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC can, however, be justified upon the principle of proportionality, if it is seen 
                                                 
189 Art. 34 para. 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC may be seen as an attempt of proposing a solution to 
Member States, which have adopted a Federal system in the area of energy regulation; C. Schoser, 
representative of the European Commission, explains, in this regard, that aim of the European 
Commission is “not the disempowerment of national energy regulators at Federal States’ level and their 
replacement through a unitary regulatory system, but the intensification of cooperation of national 
energy regulators at European level”, in: J. Ebbinghaus, Auf dem Weg zum “echten” 
Energiebinnenmarkt: Konsens im Ziel, Dissens über die Methoden, Zur Fachtagung des Instituts für 
Berg- und Energierecht der Ruhr-Universität Bochum am 21.02.2008, EuZW 9/ 20008, p. 270 at p. 
271. 
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in combination with paragraph 2 and paragraph 3. Article 35 para. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC can be seen as a suitable measure, which is able to realise a single 
European energy market: it can furthermore be considered as necessary in order to 
harmonise and unify energy regulatory matters on European level. And it can finally be 
regarded as proportionate, if it is viewed in combination with paragraph 2 and 
paragraph 3 of article 35 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Although the jurisprudence of the 
German Constitutional Court of the decisions Solange I, Solange II, and Maastricht is 
applicable, article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC does, in my view, not violate 
article 79 para. 3 of the GG. As a result, although paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of 
article 35 of Directive 2009/72/E may attenuate the consequences of paragraph 1 of the 
same article, the basic principle, requiring Member States to designate a single national 
authority at national level, has find its way in the European treaties. And it is this 
principle, which plunges federally structured Member States, such as Germany, in an 
unsolvable conflict between their national constitutional laws and European law. 
2.2 The assignment of further duties and the attribution of a new set of powers 
upon national energy regulators through Directive 2009/72/EC 
The second step to enhancing national regulators’ powers is the assignment of 
further duties and the attribution of a new set of powers.190  
Based upon the European Commission’s view, national energy regulators have not 
been vested with “substantial powers and resources, allowing them to ensure proper 
market regulation”191. Article 37 para. 4 of Directive 2009/72/EC requires Member 
States therefore to ensure that “regulatory authorities are granted the powers enabling 
them to carry out the duties referred to in paragraph 1, 3 and 6 in an efficient and 
expeditious manner”.192 Sub-section will elaborate on the duties conferred upon 
                                                 
190 See European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.1. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Where independent transmission system operators have been designated, art. 37 para. 5 of Directive 
2009/72/EC confers upon national energy regulators additional duties and powers. 
 
59
 
 
national energy regulators through article 37 para. 1, 3 and 6 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
and will examine whether they have been increased in comparison to those established 
under Directive 2003/54/EC (2.2.1). Sub-section will critically analyse the new set of 
powers attributed to national energy regulators by virtue of article 37 para. 4 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC (2.2.2). Main focus will thereby be put on the issue of 
applicability of these powers to market areas, where effective competition has been 
established.  
2.2.1 The assignment of further duties under the framework of Directive 
2009/72/EC in comparison to the framework of Directive 2003/54/EC 
“Regulatory oversight over undertakings active in the electricity (…) market 
needs to be increased”, the European Commission explains in its Proposal. “Electricity 
and gas differ fundamentally from other traded goods because they are network-based 
products that are impossible or costly to store. This makes them sensitive to market 
abuse (…)”.193 As a consequence, compared to former regime 2003/54/EC, the duties 
of national energy regulators have been increased. They reach into further areas of 
Member States’ internal electricity markets (2.2.1.1) and extend to areas involving 
cross-border issues (2.2.1.2).  
2.2.1.1 The increase of duties in Member States’ internal electricity markets  
Regarding Member States’ internal electricity markets, article 37 para. 1, 3, 
and 6 of Directive 200972//EC establishes an exclusive list of duties for national 
energy regulators (“shall have the following duties”).194 These duties exist in the areas 
of network infrastructure (2.2.1.1.1) as well as in areas, where effective competition 
exists (2.2.1.1.2). 
                                                 
193 See European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.1. 
194 Art. 37 para. 1, 3, and 6 of Directive 200972//EC stands in contrast to art. 23 of Directive 
2003/54EC, which contained a minimum set of competences (shall “at least be responsible”). 
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2.2.1.1.1 In the areas of network infrastructure 
Whereas in the area of connection and access to electricity networks, national 
energy regulators’ duties remain unchanged,195 they have been extended in the area of 
operation of electricity networks. 
As to national energy regulators’ monitoring duties, they have been increased. Under 
former article 23 para. 1of Directive 2003/54/EC national energy regulators were, by 
way of example, entrusted with various monitoring duties. They comprised, for 
instance, the duty to monitor compliance with interconnection196 and congestion 
management,197 to monitor time management of connections and repairs of 
transmission and distribution networks198, certain publication obligations for 
transmission and distribution system operators,199 the duty to monitor the effective 
unbundling of accounts200 or the terms, conditions and tariffs of grid connection of new 
electricity producers.201 Under article 37 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, national 
energy regulators have the additional duty to monitor investment plans of transmission 
system operators,202 compliance with network security and reliability rules and 
monitoring standards and requirements for quality of network service,203 the level of 
transparency and ensure compliance with transparency obligations204 as well as to 
                                                 
195National energy regulators are required under both, former art. 23 para. 2 of Directive 2003/54/EC 
and art. 37 para. 6 and 7 of Directive 2009/72/EC, to fix or approve at least the methodologies used to 
calculate or establish the terms and conditions for connection and access to national networks as well 
as for provisions of balancing services. National energy regulators are, furthermore, empowered under 
both, former art. 24 para. of Directive 2003/54/EC and art. 37 para. 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC, to 
require transmission and distribution system operators to modify the terms and conditions.  
196 Art. 23 para.1 (a) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
197 Art. 23 para.1 (b) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
198 Art. 23 para.1 (c) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
199 Art. 23 para.1 (d) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
200 Art. 23 para.1 (e) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
201 Art. 23 para.1 (f) of Directive 2003/54/EC. 
202 Art.37 para. 1 (g) of Directive 200972/EC. 
203 Art.37 para. 1 (h) of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
204 Art. 37 para. 1 (i) of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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monitor the implementation of rules by market participants under Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009. 205
As to national energy regulators’ decision-making powers, they still act as dispute 
settlement authority in disputes, which involve transmission or distribution system 
operators and other market participants and which arise in relation to network 
connection and access or operation.206
As to market abuse proceedings in the area of monopoly networks, the role of national 
energy regulators is still limited to a mere reporting role. However, whereas article 23 
para. 8 of Directive 2003/54/EC required the regulatory authority to provide a specific 
report on “market dominance, predatory and anti-competitive behaviour”, this 
obligation is now merged into the general obligation of article 37 para. 1(e) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, requiring to report “annually on its activity and the fulfilment of 
its duties to the relevant authorities of the Member States, the Agency and the 
European Commission.” 
2.2.1.1.2 In well-functioning competitive markets 
In well-functioning competitive markets, the duties of national energy 
regulators have been increased in comparison to those established under former regime 
of Directive 2003/54/EC.207  
Under former article 23 para. 1 (h) of Directive 2003/54/EC, the monitoring duties of 
national energy regulators were restricted to the duty to monitor “the level of 
transparency and competition”. Under the new regime of Directive 2009/72/EC, 
national energy regulators are not only required of “monitoring the level of 
                                                 
205 Art. 37 para. 1 (q) of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
206 See former art. 23 para. 5 in connection with para. 1, 2, and 4 of Directive 2003/54/EC and art. 36 
para. 9 and 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
207 As to the question of whether the application of regulatory means, which aim to establish 
competition, are compatible with European primary law, see U. Ehricke, in E. Homann, Berichte und 
Dokumente, Erwartungen an das neue Energierecht im nationalen und europäischen Kontext, 35. 
Jahrestagung des Instituts für Energierecht and er Universität zu Köln, 9.11.2006, RdE 1/ 2007, p. 30. 
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transparency, […] and ensuring compliance of electricity undertakings with 
transparency obligations” (article 37 para. 1 (i) of Directive 200972/EC), but also of 
“monitoring the level and effectiveness of market opening and competition at wholesale 
and retail levels, […], as well as any distortion or restriction of competition, […]” 
(article 37 para. 1 (j) of Directive 2009/72/EC). The term of article 37 para. 1 (j) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC “distortion or restriction of competition” presupposes, in my 
view, that competition is existent within the market area in question. Hence, based 
upon its clear wording, article 37 para. 1 (i) of Directive 2009/72/EC is also applicable 
to competitive markets. The application of regulatory means within areas, in which 
competition exists, can be regarded as compatible with European law, if they aim at 
“establishing and guaranteeing effective competition within upstream and downstream 
market areas.” 208
2.2.1.2 The increase of duties of national energy regulators in areas involving 
cross-border issues 
In areas involving cross-border issues, national energy regulators’ duties have 
been clarified and have furthermore been increased compared to those established 
under former regime of Directive 2003/54/EC. The European Commission justified its 
view on the grounds that ”competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable internal 
electricity and gas markets within the European Union” can only be achieved by giving 
national energy regulators a “clear mandate to cooperate at European level, in close 
cooperation with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and the 
European Commission”.209 Hence, compared to former article 23 para. 12 of Directive 
2003/54/EC, which codified in a mere general way the obligation of national energy 
regulators “to cooperate with each other and with the European Commission in a 
transparent manner”, the new regime of Directive 2009/72/EC lays down, in a very 
detailed way, their cooperation duties. Whereas national energy regulators’ general 
                                                 
208 See U. Ehricke, in: E. Homann, Berichte und Dokumente, Erwartungen an das neue Energierecht im 
nationalen und europäischen Kontext, 35. Jahrestagung des Instituts für Energierecht und der 
Universität zu Köln, 9.11.2006, RdE 1/ 200, p. 30. 
209 See European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.1. 
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obligation is codified in article 37 para. 1(c) of Directive 2009/72/EC, providing for 
cooperation  “in regard to cross-border issues with the regulatory authority or 
authorities of the Member States concerned and with the Agency”, the detailed 
cooperation duties are set out in article 38 of Directive 2009/72/EC, a separate article 
dedicated to the new “regulatory regime for cross-border issues”.  
2.2.2 The attribution of a new set of powers under the framework of Directive 
2009/72/EC in comparison to the framework of Directive 2003/54/EC  
Article 37 para. 4 sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC requires Member States “to 
ensure that national energy regulators are granted the powers enabling them to 
perform the duties referred to in paragraph 1, 3 and 6 in an efficient and expeditious 
manner”. For this purpose, article 37 para. 4 of Directive 200972/EC establishes a 
“minimum set of powers”210 (“shall have at least the following powers”). 
2.2.2.1 Article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC as the central 
provision of national energy regulators’ powers 
Article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC constitutes the 
central provision as to national energy regulators’ powers. It sets forth a new set of 
powers, dividing them into investigation powers, decision-making and enforcement 
powers. These powers all have in common that they need to “promote effective 
competition and ensure the proper functioning of the market”. Considering this 
wording, the question arises whether these powers are restricted to monopoly areas of 
the electricity market or whether they extend to competitive areas as well. Where these 
powers extend to competitive areas as well, the question is how the national energy 
regulators and national competition authorities relate to each other and how the 
cooperation between these authorities can effectively be construed.  
                                                 
210 Directive 2003/54/EC uses the term “minimum set of competences”, see Recital (15) of Directive 
2003/54/EC. 
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Within monopoly areas, national regulatory authorities may undoubtedly use their 
entire set of powers. This follows from the term “to promote effective competition” of 
article 37 para. 4 (b) sent. 1 Directive 2009/72/EC. Indeed, the promotion of effective 
competition presupposes that effective competition is not yet achieved; such is the case 
in monopoly areas of the electricity market. 211
Within areas, where competition exists, a distinction needs to be drawn between the 
areas involved, on the one hand, and the competences concerned, on the other hand. 
Indeed, the areas involved, whether monopoly or competitive areas do not necessarily 
correlate with the competences of the national energy regulators or the competent in 
areas, where competition exists, just the same as national competition authorities may 
assume competences within monopoly areas of the electricity market. Decisive factor 
is, in my view, which sector of law is concerned.  
In areas, where competition exists and where competition laws have been violated, the 
national competition authorities and not the national energy regulators are competent. 
This is the case irrespective of whether these laws have been violated in monopoly or 
competitive areas. This view is reflected in article 22c para. 3b of the European 
Commission’s Proposal, which explicitly stipulated, that the national regulatory 
authorities are competent only “in the absence of violations of competition rules”.  
In areas, where competition exists without that, however, competition laws have been 
violated, the national energy regulators have been attributed certain powers. These 
powers have, compared to Directive 2003/54/EC, been extended under Directive 
2009/72/EC. This conclusion may, for instance, be drawn from the term “to ensure the 
proper functioning of the market”, as laid down in article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent.  1 
of Directive 2009/72/EC. The term “to ensure” presupposes that competition 
principally exists. It becomes, furthermore, apparent upon article 37 para. 4 sent. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC and its its referral to article 37 para. 1 (j) of Directive 
                                                 
211 See e.g. U. Ehricke, Die von der Kommission geplanten Kompetenzerweiterungen der 
Regulierungsbehörde auf dem Energiesektor nach den Entwürfen zur Änderung der Richtlinien 
2003/54/EG und 2003/55/EG und deren Vereinbarkeit mit Art. 3 Abs. 1 lit.g) EG-Vertrag, RdE 6/2008, 
p. 159 at p. 161. 
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2009/72/EC. These provisions enable the national regulatory authorities to use their set 
of powers in order to assume their duty of “monitoring (…) the effectiveness of market 
opening and competition (…), as well as their duty of monitoring “any distortion or 
restriction of competition (…)”. Hence, article 37 para. 1 (j) of Directive 2009/72/EC 
enables the national energy regulators, in the absence of violation of competition laws, 
to monitor and evaluate the competitive areas of the electricity market. This includes, 
according to article 37 para. 1 (j) of Directive 2009/72/EC, the power of “providing 
any relevant information, and bringing any relevant cases to the relevant competition 
authorities”. 
Directive 2009/72/EC establishes thus the obligation for national energy regulators and 
the competition authorities to monitor and evaluate, in cooperation, the electricity 
market. As such, article 37 para. 1 (j) of Directive 2009/72/EC contributes to a more 
effective control of the electricity market. 212
2.2.2.2 New investigation rights 
Article 37 para. 4 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC empowers national 
energy regulators to “carry out investigations into the functioning of the electricity 
markets, […] to promote effective competition and ensure the proper functioning of the 
market.” Applying the conclusion drawn above, these investigation rights may, in 
principle, be exercised in monopoly as well as in competitive areas, however, below 
the threshold of a violation of competition laws. However, as to national energy 
regulators’ investigation rights, article 37 para. 4 (b) sent. 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
contains a specific regulation. It gives the national regulatory authorities the additional 
“power to cooperate” with, inter alia, the national competition authorities, where 
“investigations relating to competition law” become necessary. Hence, although 
competition law is relevant, national energy regulators may assume certain cooperation 
                                                 
212 U. Ehricke refers to the term “Mehr-Augen-Prinzip”; see U. Ehricke, Die von der Kommission 
geplanten Kompetenzerweiterungen der Regulierungsbehörde auf dem Energiesektor nach den 
Entwürfen zur Änderung der Richtlinien 2003/54/EG und 2003/55/EG und deren Vereinbarkeit mit 
Art. 3 Abs. 1 lit.g) EG-Vertrag, RdE 6/2008, p. 159 at p. 161. 
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powers. These powers exist, however, only “where appropriate”. At what point it is 
considered to be appropriate is, however, not defined by Directive 2009/72/EC. As to 
the settlement of disputes, article 37 para. 4 (e) of Directive 2009/72/EC vests national 
energy regulators with “appropriate rights of investigations”. These rights are restricted 
to the area of access and connection to electricity networks pursuant to article 37 para. 
11 and 12 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
2.2.2.3 New decision-making powers  
2.2.2.3.1 The power to decide upon any necessary and proportionate measures 
Article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC confers upon 
national energy regulators the power to “decide upon […] any necessary and 
proportionate measures to promote effective competition and ensure the proper 
functioning of the market.”213 Based upon its wording and the conclusion drawn above, 
the national regulatory authorities may therefore also take measures within competitive 
areas of the electricity market. Where, however, competition laws become relevant, 
their decision-making powers are excluded. This follows, in my view, from article 37 
para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC argumentum e-contrario, which 
explicitly states that, where competition law is concerned, the national regulatory 
authorities may merely assume certain cooperation powers. Here again, it is not 
determined by Directive 2009/72/EC, at what point a measure can be regarded as 
“necessary and proportionate”. 
As to their form, the decisions taken by national energy regulators must be “fully 
reasoned and justified to allow for judicial review” and be “available to the public 
while preserving the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information” pursuant to 
article 37 para. 4 (16) of Directive 200972//EC. 
                                                 
213 National energy regulators may, for instance, impose penalties on public utility companies (section 
94 sent. 1 EnWG), decision of the higher regional court Düsseldorf (OLG Düsseldorf), 27.05.2009, VI-
3 Kart 45/08 (V), RdE 1/2010, p. 32 et seq. 
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2.2.2.3.2 The specific case of article 37 para. 4 (a) of Directive 2009/72/EC 
Article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (a) of Directive 2009/72/EC empowers national 
energy regulators to “issue binding decisions on electricity undertakings”. It does not 
confer further decision-making powers upon national energy regulators, but merely 
regulates the specific case of decisions taken by national energy regulators on 
electricity undertakings. In specifying that these decisions have binding character, it 
codifies the legal effect of these decisions. It implies, at the same time, that decisions 
issued on other market participants have no legally binding character.  
2.2.2.4 New enforcement powers  
Article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC vests national 
energy regulators with new enforcement powers aimed at promoting effective 
competition and ensuring the proper functioning of the market (2.2.2.4.1). In addition, 
article 37 para. 4 (d) of Directive 2009/72/EC regulates the specific case of the 
imposition of penalties by the national energy regulators on electricity undertakings 
(2.2.2.4.2) 
2.2.2.4.1 The power “to impose any necessary and proportionate measures”  
Article 37 para. 4 sent.2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 200972/EC confers upon 
national energy regulators the power to “impose any necessary and proportionate 
measures to promote effective competition and ensure the proper functioning of the 
market”. These powers may extend to competitive areas as well, provided that 
competition law is not concerned. Where competition laws become relevant, their 
enforcement powers are excluded. Again, Directive 2009/72/EC does not specify, at 
what point a measure can be regarded as necessary and proportionate. 
2.2.2.4.2 The specific case of article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (d) sent. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC  
Article 37 para. 4 sent.2 (d) sent.1 of Directive 2009/72/EC empowers national 
energy regulators to “impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties on 
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electricity undertakings not complying with their obligations under this Directive or 
any relevant legally binding decisions of the regulatory authority or of the Agency, or 
to propose that a competent court impose such penalties”.  
Article 37 para. 4 (d) of Directive 2009/72/EC does not contain further enforcement 
powers, but regulates the specific case of enforcement-powers taken by national energy 
regulators on electricity undertakings. Where national energy regulators intend to 
impose penalties upon electricity undertakings, they must fulfil specific obligations.  
Such penalties imposed on electricity undertakings either through the national energy 
regulators or proposed to the court, must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. 
It is furthermore required that electricity undertakings must have acted in violation of 
their obligations placed upon them by Directive 2009/72/EC or by binding decisions of 
the national energy regulators or the Agency.  
2.2.2.5 New information rights  
Article 37 para. 4 (c) of Directive 200972/EC confers upon national energy 
regulators the power to “request any information from electricity undertakings relevant 
for the fulfilment of its (their) tasks”. These powers may be assumed within monopoly 
areas well as competitive areas, provided that competition law is not concerned.  
2.3 Conclusion 
In comparison to former regime of Directive 2003/54/EC, the powers of 
national energy regulators have, undoubtedly, been enhanced under the regime of 
Directive 2009/72/EC.214 This has, firstly, been achieved by virtue of article 35 para. 1 
of Directive 2009/72/EC, which requires the consolidation of national energy 
regulators to a single regulatory authority at national level, thereby bundling their 
                                                 
214 See H. Lecheler, Verschärfung des Regulierungsregimes durch die drei neuen Verordnungs-
Entwürfe im Paket vom 19.09.2007, RdE 6/2008, p. 167 at p. 172. 
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powers to a single entity. The conflict, which arises in this regard between the 
constitutional laws of the Member States and European law, has thereby been resolved 
in an unsatisfactory manner. Indeed, article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
interferes deeply with the core areas of the Federal structures prevalent in Member 
States, such as in Austria and Germany. The solution that article 35 of Directive 
2009/72/EC offers by introducing paragraphs 2 and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC, does 
few to attenuate the huge impact of article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC on 
Member States’ Federal structures. The enhancement of energy regulators’ powers 
results, secondly, from an increase of their duties, extending them not only into further 
areas of Member States’ internal electricity markets, including competitive areas, but 
also into areas involving cross-border issues. It has, finally, been achieved through 
article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, which vests the national 
energy regulators with a new set of regulatory powers, including new investigation 
rights, decision-making powers, enforcement powers and information rights. The 
question of whether this set of powers is restricted to monopoly areas of the electricity 
market or whether it extends to competitive areas as well is, in particular, due to the 
imprecise wording of the central provision of article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, not easy to answer. Its applicability in areas where competition 
exists gives rise to the question of delimitation of competences between the national 
energy regulators and the national competition authorities. Decisive factor is thereby 
not which specific area is involved, but rather which sector of law is concerned. As 
soon as competition laws have been violated, the national competition authorities 
become competent. An exception constitutes article 37 para. 4 (b) sent. 2 of Directive 
2009/72/EC, which confers upon the national energy regulators additional powers of 
investigation, however, only in cooperation with the relevant competition authorities.  
The enhancement of national energy regulators’ power is, however, of no benefit to the 
Member States. We will see that they lose their powers of control over their own 
national energy regulators.  
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3 The loss of power of the Member States over their own national 
energy regulators 
National energy regulators’ enhanced powers do not benefit the Member States 
which, on the contrary, lose power over their own national energy regulators. Their 
loss of power is mainly a result of the further strengthening of national energy 
regulators’ independence in comparison to former Directive 2003/54/EC (3.1). The 
independence in also political terms, codified in article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, poses thereby a problem of compatibility with German and 
Austrian constitutional law (3.2).  
3.1 The strengthening of national energy regulators’ independence under the 
framework of Directive 2009/72/EC in comparison to the framework of Directive 
2003/54/EC 
“Strengthening national energy regulators’ independence” is a “key principle 
of good governance and a fundamental condition for market confidence” and 
”therefore a priority”, the European Commission claimed in its Proposal. 215 As a 
consequence, compared to former regime of Directive 2003/54/EC national energy 
regulators’ independence has further been strengthened. Whereas under the former 
regime of Directive 2003/54/EC national energy regulators were required to be 
independent in legal, financial and functional terms, under the regime of Directive 
2009/72/EC, they are required to be independent in also political terms (3.1.1). As to 
the Austrian and German energy regulators, their status of independence differs 
considerably. This has the consequence that the analysis of whether the required 
political independence complies with Austrian and German constitutional law leads to 
a different result (3.1.2). 
 
                                                 
215 See the European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.2 and Recital (16). 
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3.1.1 The status of independence of national energy regulators under Directive 
2003/54/EC and the actual situation under Austrian and German laws 
Former article 23 para. 1 of Directive 2003/54/EC required national energy 
regulators to be “wholly independent of the interests of the gas and electricity 
industry”.216 Leaving wide room for discretion to the Member States, the regimes, 
which were adopted in Austria and Germany, differ considerably from each other. 
3.1.1.1 The legal, financial and functional independence of the Austrian energy 
regulators 
The independence of national energy regulators from the interests of the 
electricity industry encompasses their legal, financial and functional independence. 217
As to the legal independence, the E-control GmbH and the E-control Kommission are 
both legal entities, which are separate from the ministries and other Government 
bodies. The E-control GmbH has been set up as a private non-profit corporation with 
limited liability. Its shares are fully owned by Austria (section 5 para. 2 sent. 2 of the 
E-RBG) and managed by the Ministry of Economics and Labour (section 3 para. 2 no. 
2 in connection with section 5 para. 2 sent. 3 of the E-RBG).218 The E-control 
Kommission has been established as a Federal European Commission, consisting of 
three members, i.e. a Federal judge, a member with relevant technical experience as 
well as a member with legal and economic experience (section 17 para. 1 of the E-
RBG).219  
                                                 
216 See e.g. R. Pirstner-Ebner, Regulierungsbehörden der Elektrizitäts- und Gaswirtschaft – 
Neuerungen auf Gemeinschaftsebene, NVwZ 2004, p. 69 et seq. 
217 See e.g. B. Leitl, Regulierungsbehörden im österreichischen Recht, Wien 2006, p. 132. 
218 Federal Act on Regulatory Authorities in the Electricity and Natural Gas Sector and the 
Establishment of the Energie-Control GmbH and the Energie-Control Kommission, Federal Law 
Gazette I no. 121/2000 (art. 8 of the Energy Market Liberalisation Act), repealed through Federal Law 
I no.  30/2010. 
219 See CEER, IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Austria – E-Control 
GmbH, p. 2; see also CEER, Regulatory Benchmark, Ref: C05-IEB-08-03, 6 December 2005, p. 8, 
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As to the financial independence, the budget process of the E-control GmbH is 
determined by Federal statute (section 6 of the E-RBG) and is separate from the central 
budget.220 Its budget is established on the basis of its estimated costs for the actual 
financial year (section 6 paragraph 2 of the E-RBG). The fees are charged to the 
operators of ultra-high voltage grids (section 6 paragraph 1 of the E-RBG). The budget 
is subject to approval by the supervisory board of the E-control GmbH (section 6 
paragraph 2 sentence 2 of the E-RBG). It must be established in accordance with an 
ordinance of the Federal Minister of Economics and Labour, which has a right of 
supervision (section 3 paragraph 3 No.1a of the E-RBG). Annual audits must be 
performed in accordance with the Private Companies Act and the Commercial Law 
Statute. The Federal Financial Supervising Authority (Österreichische Rechnungshof) 
may also perform audits. 221
As to the functional independence, the activities of the E-control GmbH are principally 
supervised through the Federal Minister of Economics and Labour (section 3 para. 2 
no.1 of the E-RBG, section 21 para. 1 of the E-RBG).222 He may give written 
instructions to the E-control GmbH (section 21 para. 2 of the E-RBG)223, which must 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Cross-Sectoral/2005/CEER_REGULATORY%20BENCHMARK_2005-12-
06_PUBLIC.PDF (03.11.2010). 
220 For more details on the financial independence of the E-control GmbH, see CEER, IEB TF 
Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Austria – E-Control GmbH, p. 4 et seq. 
221 See CEER, IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Austria – E-Control 
GmbH, p. 4 et seq; see also CEER, Regulatory Benchmark, Ref: C05-IEB-08-03, 6 December 2005, p. 
24, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Cross-Sectoral/2005/CEER_REGULATORY%20BENCHMARK_2005-12-
06_PUBLIC.PDF (03.11.2010). 
222 See e.g. B. Leitl, Regulierungsbehörden im österreichischen Recht, Wien 2006, p. 197 et seq; see, 
furthermore, P. Drexler, Elektrizitätsrecht, Österreichischer Verband für Elektrotechnik (ÖVE), Wien 
2006, p. 111 et seq.  
223 See CEER, IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Austria – E-Control 
GmbH, p. 2; for the basic organisational structure of the Austrian regulators, see also Market Report 
2007, National Report to the European European Commission, p. 8 – p. 9, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/NATIONAL_REPOR
TS/NR_2007/NR_nl/E07_NR_Austria-LL_v2.pdf (25.09.10). 
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be published (section 22 of the E-RBG). Decisions of the E-control GmbH can be 
repealed to the E-control Kommission (section 16 para. 2 of the E-RBG). The members 
of the E-control Kommission, on the contrary, are not subject to governmental 
instructions within the exercise of office (section 19 of the E-RBG in connection with 
article 20 para. 2 of the Austrian Constitutional Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 
hence B-VG). Following the amendment of the Energy Regulatory Authorities Act in 
2010, the Federal Minister of Economics and Labour (Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 
Familie und Jugend) may, however, require the E-control Kommission to be informed 
on all its activities within the exercise of office (section 19a of the E-RBG). Decisions 
of the E-control Kommission cannot be repealed.224 However, appeal to the Federal 
Administrative Supreme Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) and the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) remains possible (section 20 para. 2 of 
the E-RBG). 
3.1.1.2 The legal, financial and functional independence of the German energy 
regulators  
As to the legal independence, the BNetzA is established as a separate higher 
Federal authority (selbständige Bundesoberbehörde) within the scope of business of 
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (section 1 of the BEGTPG). 225  
As to the financial independence, the Federal Budget Code (Bundeshaushaltsordnung) 
is applicable to the budget of the BNetzA. The budget of the BNetzA is not separate, but 
is part of the general Federal budget.226 The network operators are obliged to contribute 
                                                 
224 See e.g. R. Pirstner-Ebner, Regulierungsbehörden der Eletritiäts- und Gaswirtschaft – Neuerungen 
auf Gemeinschaftsebene, NVwZ 2004, p. 69 at p. 71. 
225 See CEER, IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Germany – Federal 
Network Agency, p. 3 et seq; see also CEER, Regulatory Benchmark, Ref: C05-IEB-08-03, 6 
December 2005, p.25 and p. 26, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Cross-Sectoral/2005/CEER_REGULATORY%20BENCHMARK_2005-12-
06_PUBLIC.PDF (09.08.2010). 
226 See CEER, IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Germany – Federal 
Network Agency, p. 5. 
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to the costs of the BNetzA, whereby the contributions may not exceed 60% of 
expenditure (section 92 para. 1 of the EnWG). The Federal Government may, in 
agreement with the Upper Chamber of Parliament (Bundesrat), adopt an ordinance on 
contributions by energy network operators pursuant to section 92 para. 3 of the EnWG. 
The BNetzA must prepare annual accounts in accordance with the Federal Budget 
Code. They are reviewed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal 
Government Accounting Office (Bundesrechnungshof). 227
As to the functional independence, the BNetzA is bound to the instructions of the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. General instructions issued with 
regard to activities of the BNetzA must be published in the Federal Gazette in 
accordance with section 61 of the EnWG. 228 Decisions of the BNetzA can, in first 
instance, be repealed to the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) and, in second 
instance, to the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). 229
3.1.2 The status of independence of national energy regulators under Directive 
2009/72/EC 
Whereas under former Directive 2003/54/EC, national energy regulators were 
merely required to be independent from the “gas and electricity industry”, under 
Directive 2009/72/EC they shall be “truly independent of industry interests and 
Government intervention”.230  
                                                 
227 Ibid, p. 5 and p. 6; see also CEER, Regulatory Benchmark, Ref: C05-IEB-08-03, 6 December 2005, 
p.11, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Cross-Sectoral/2005/CEER_REGULATORY%20BENCHMARK_2005-12-
06_PUBLIC.PDF (09.08.21010). 
228 See CEER IEB TF Regulatory Benchmark, Final Version 05-07-05, Draft on Germany – Federal 
Network Agency, p. 6 et seq. 
229 Ibid, p. 7. 
230 See EurActiv, Liberalising the EU Energy Sector, 4.10.2005, last updated 7.07.2009, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/liberalising-eu-energy-sector/art.-145320 (14.08.2010).  
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For this purpose, national energy regulators’ shall be “legally distinct and functionally 
independent from any other public or private entity” (article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (a) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC). “Its staff and the persons responsible for its management shall 
act independently from any market interest” (article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) (i) sent. 1 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC). In addition, they shall be able to take “autonomous decisions, 
independently from any political body” (article 35 para. 5 sent.1 (a) of Directive 
2009/72/EC) to establish “separate annual budget allocations as well as “autonomy in 
the implementation of the allocated budget” and shall have “adequate human and 
financial resources” (article 35 para. 5 sent.1 (a) of Directive 2009/72/EC). The 
members of the board or the top management shall be appointed for at least five years 
(article 35 para. 5 sent.1 (b) of Directive 2009/72/EC) and may be relieved from office 
only if “they no longer fulfil the conditions set out in this Article [article 34 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC] or if they have been guilty of misconduct under national law” 
(article 35 para. 5 sent. 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC). 
Hence, in addition to national energy regulators’ legal, financial and functional 
independence, Directive 2009/72/EC requires them to be independent in also political 
terms. 
3.1.2.1 The political independence of article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 b (ii) of Directive 
2009/72/EC 
The political independence of an administrative body is mainly characterised 
through its capacity to take autonomous decisions (Entscheidungsautonomie). This 
again depends upon its place within the hierarchical structure of administration. The 
release of an administrative body from its obligation to comply with the instructions of 
its superiors represents, thereby, the “symbol of political independence”. 231
                                                 
231 See K. Oertel, Die Unabhängigkeit der Regulierungsbehörde nach §§ 66 ff TKG, Zur 
organisationsrechtlichen Verselbständigung staatlicher Verwaltungen am Beispiel der Privatisierung in 
der Telekommunikation, Berlin 2000, p. 287. 
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Article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC) stipulates, that 
national energy regulators shall “not seek or take direct instructions from any 
Government or other public or private entity when carrying out the regulatory tasks.” 
To aim for an independence in also political terms has, according to the European 
Commission, become necessary, because former legislation did “not specify how such 
independence can be demonstrably ensured”, as well as it did “not guarantee 
independence from short-term political interests”.232  
3.1.2.2 The terms and definitions of article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 b (ii) of Directive 
2009/72/EC 
Article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 b (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC contains a twofold 
obligation. National energy regulators are, first of all, prohibited from seeking 
instructions from their Government upon their own initiative (“seek”). They are 
furthermore prohibited from accepting instructions issued upon initiative of the 
Government (“take”). The term “from any Government or any other public or private 
entity” signifies that national regulators must be independent from any political entity 
irrespective of whether this entity is organised according to private or public law. The 
term “private entity” is thereby to be seen in relation to the term “Government” and 
refers to the organisational form of a political entity. This becomes also apparent upon 
article 35 para. 5 (a) of Directive 2009/72/EC, which explicitly states that national 
energy regulators shall be independent “from any political body”. The independence 
must thereby be guaranteed during all term of office (“when carrying out the regulatory 
tasks”). 
                                                 
232 See the European Commission’s Proposal, COM (2007) 528 final at 2.2. 
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3.2 In-depth analysis: the compatibility of article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC with German and Austrian constitutional law 
Article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC is strongly opposed 
to the hierarchical model of administration as it is prevalent in Germany and Austria. 
This model is based upon the principle that administrative organs are, in principle, 
bound by the instructions of their superiors within the exercise of office (3.2.1). 
German and Austrian energy law follow this basic principle in that they principally 
require national energy regulators to comply with the instructions of their superiors 
(3.2.2). Both legal systems recognise, however, specific cases, in which a release of 
administrative organs from their obligation to comply with the instructions of their 
superiors is justified as an exception. The question is whether article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 
(b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC, in order to be compatible with German233 and 
Austrian234 constitutional law, can be recognised as such an exception (3.2.3).  
3.2.1 The hierarchical model of administration in German and Austrian 
constitutional law 
The principle of democracy as codified in the German (article 20 para. 2 of the 
GG) and Austrian (article 1 of the B-VG) constitution requires administration to be 
organised in a hierarchical way. From this principle follows that any state activity must 
be able to be traced back, directly or indirectly, to the will of the People.235 According 
to this connection of legitimation (Legitimationszusammenhang), any state organ must 
either directly be appointed by the People by means of election or must be appointed 
by an organ that has itself been appointed by the People. Within this democratic 
                                                 
233 S. W. Müller, Ministerialfreie Räume, 1985, p. 497; see also H. Schambeck, Regierung und 
Kontrolle in Österreich, 1. Auflage, Berlin 1997, p. 33 - p. 37. 
234 See e.g. T. Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, 8. Auflage, Wien 2008, paras. 519 et seq.  
235 For Germany, see e.g. F. E. Schnapp,  in: I. v. Münch/ P. Kunig, Grundgesetzkommentar, Band 2, 
Art. 20 - 69, 5. Auflage, München 2001, art. 20, para. 18; see also B. Pieroth, in: H.D. Jarass/ B. 
Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,  Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 
2009, art. 20 GG, para. 9 et seq; see also H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier, GG, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band 
II, Artikel 20 – 82, 2. Auflage, Tübingen 2006, art. 20 para. 86 et seq. and para. 113 et seq. 
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concept, the accountability of administration towards the organs representing the 
People plays a crucial role. This is well reflected in article 52 of the B-VG, which 
empowers the National Council and the Federal Council, inter alia, to examine the 
administration of affairs of the Federal Government, to interrogate its members about 
executive activities, to demand any relevant information (para. 1) or interrogate the 
head of institutions exempted from instructions on any subject of the administration of 
affairs (para. 1a).236 The parliamentary accountability is thereby linked to the highest 
administrative organs, which, being accountable towards Parliament for the acts carried 
out by the administrative organs subordinate to them, must have the power to direct 
and supervise these organs (Leitungs-, Aufsichts- und 
Verantwortungszusammenhang).237
As a consequence, based on the hierarchical model of administration, the German238 
and the Austrian239 constitutional order establish the principle that organs, which 
carry out administrative tasks under the direction and supervision of the highest 
administrative organs of the Federation and the Federal States, are responsible to them 
in the exercise of their office and are, in principle, bound by their instructions. 
In Austria as well as in Germany, the highest organs of administration on Federal 
level are the Federal President, the Federal Government and the Federal Ministers, on 
Federal States’ level these are the Federal States’ Governments. The entities among 
these administrative organs, which supervise the tasks of the administrative organs 
subordinate to them, are usually the Federal Government and the Federal States’ 
Governments respectively (hence, thereinafter referred to as “governmental 
                                                 
236 See B. Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage,  Wien 2009, p. 128, para. 356. 
237 Ibid. 
238 See e.g. H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, 
Tübingen 2006, art. 20, para. 124 et seq. 
239 See e.g. T. Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, 8. Auflage, Wien 2008, paras. 503 et seq; see also H. 
Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 17. Auflage, München  2008, § 21 Verwaltungsorganisation, 
p. 521 et seq; see furthermore H. P. Bull/ V. Mehde, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht mit 
Verwaltungslehre, 8. Auflage, Heidelberg 2009, § 3, p. 43 – p. 61; see S. Detterbeck, Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht, 6. Auflage, München 2008, p. 65 – p. 70. 
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instructions”). The Federal Government consists thereby of its individual members, 
i.e. the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Vice-Chancellor and the other Federal 
Ministers, on the one side (art. 69 para.1 sent. 1 of the B-VG and art. 62 of the GG 
respectively) and of the Federal Government as administrative body under the 
chairmanship of the Federal Chancellor (art. 69 para.1 sent. 2 of the B-VG and art. 65 
of the GG respectively), on the other side. They are entrusted with the highest 
administrative business of the Federation (oberste Verwaltungsgeschäfte des Bundes), 
insofar as this is not assigned to the Federal President. On Federal level, the entities 
among the administrative organs that usually carry out the specific administrative 
tasks in question are the Federal ministries and the authorities subordinate to them 
(hence, thereinafter referred to as “administrative organs”). Article 77 para. 1 of the 
B-VG provides in this regard that the Federal ministries and the authorities 
subordinate to them shall carry out the business of the Federal administration 
(Besorgung der Geschäfte der Bundesverwaltung). Similarly, article 65 of the GG 
stipulates that the Federal ministries are responsible to conduct, within the general 
guidelines of policy (Richtlinien der Politik) determined by the Federal Chancellor, 
the affairs of their departments independently and on their own responsibility. On 
Federal States’ level, the executive power of the Federation are principally exercised 
through the Federal States (in Austria the Land Governor, Landeshauptmann and the 
authorities subordinate to them) in their own right, i.e. in form of indirect Federal 
administration (mittelbare Bundesverwaltung), insofar as no Federal authorities exist 
(article 102 para. 1 of the B-VG) or insofar as the Basic Law does not provide 
otherwise (article 83 of the GG), i.e. in form of direct Federal administration 
(unmittelbare Bundesverwaltung). When carrying out indirect Federal administration, 
the Federal States’ authorities are subject to the instructions issued through the 
Federal Government and the individual Federal ministers (article 103 para. 1 of the B-
VG in connection with article 20 of the B-VG and article 84 para. 5 and 85 para. 3  of 
the GG respectively). 240
                                                 
240 For more details, see e.g. B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehördenmodell, Wien 201l, 
p. 145 et seq; see also B. Pieroth, in: H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland,  Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 84, paras 16-17 and art. 85 para. 5 – 6. 
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The hierarchical model of administration can be seen as the counterpart to the 
principle of democratic accountability of the highest administrative organs towards 
Parliament (das hierarchische Verwaltungsmodell als Pendant zur parlamentarischen 
Verantwortlichkeit der obersten Organe).241 Indeed, by virtue of the principle of 
democratic accountability of the highest administrative organs towards Parliament, 
the highest administrative organs can be held responsible before Parliament for the 
acts carried out by administrative organs that are subordinate to them. However, the 
accountability of the highest administrative organs towards Parliament for acts that 
are carried out by administrative organs subordinate to them is only justified, if these 
administrative organs can in return be held responsible before the highest 
administrative organs for these acts. The connection of responsibility between the 
administrative organs and Parliament is established by virtue of the obligation of the 
administrative organs to comply with the instructions of their superiors. It is due to 
this obligation that a connection of democratic accountability between the 
administrative organs and Parliament can be ensured.242  
3.2.1.1 The obligation of administrative organs to comply with the instructions of 
their superiors as basic principle of constitutional law 
The obligation of administrative organs to comply with the instructions of their 
superiors constitutes, in Germany (3.2.1.1.1) as well as in Austria (3.2.1.1.2), a basic 
principle of constitutional law. 
                                                 
241 See e.g. T. Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, 8. Auflage, Wien 2008, paras. 519 et seq; see also H. 
Schambeck, Regierung und Kontrolle in Österreich, 1. Auflage, Berlin 1997, p. 27 et seq. 
242 For more details, see H.-H. Trute, in: W. Hoffmann-Riem/ E. Schmidt-Aßmann/ A. Voßkuhle, 
Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, Band I: Methoden - Maßstäbe - Aufgaben - Organisationen, 
München 2006, § 6 Die demokratische Legitimation der Verwaltung, p. 307 et seq. 
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3.2.1.1.1 Article 20 para. 2 of the German Basic Law  
In Germany, the principle, upon which the administrative organs are obliged 
to comply with the instructions of their superiors when carrying out administrative 
tasks, represents a basic principle of constitutional law. 243
This principle is, contrary to the Federal Austrian Constitution, not explicitly codified 
in the German Basic Law. Its existence is however undisputedly recognised as a 
principle emanating from the fundamental principles of the German Constitution. 
Indeed, it is acknowledged by the Federal Constitutional Court and the German law 
doctrine as a principle of constitutional law and is applied as such in administrative 
practice. Lack of disposing of an explicit constitutional basis, this principle is deduced 
from the principle of democracy, which is enshrined in article 20 para. 2 of the GG.  
Article 20 para. 2 of the GG stipulates: “all state authority derives from the People. It 
shall be exercised by the People through elections and other votes and through 
specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies”. The reason for deducing this 
principle from the principle of democracy has been summarised by the German 
Constitutional Court in two decisions rendered in 1986244 and 1993245: “within a free 
democracy, all state authority derives from the People […]. This implies that the 
People are able to exert an effective influence on the organs of the state authority in 
the exercise of their office. Their acts must be based upon the will of the People and 
must be justified before them. The causal connection between the People and the 
exercise of state authority is established through the election by the People of 
Parliament, through the laws, which are enacted by Parliament and which serve as 
                                                 
243 See H. Dreier, in H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, Tübigen  
2006, art. 20, para. 124 et seq.; see also K.-P. Sommermann, in: H.v. Mangoldt/ F. Klein/ C. Starck, 
GG, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Band 2: Artikel 20 bis 82, 6. Auflage, München 2010, art. 20 para. 
1 GG, para. 39. 
244 Decision on foreigners’ right to vote for the Hanburg district elections (Urteil zum 
Ausländerwahlrecht für die Hamburger Bezirksversammlungen), BverfGE 83, p. 60 at p. 71 et seq. 
245 Decision on the law on co-determination of Schleswig-Holstein (Urteil zum Schleswig-
Holsteinischen Mitbestimmungsgesetz), BverfGE 93, p. 37  at p. 66 et seq. 
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benchmark for the executive authority, through the influence of Parliament on 
political decisions of the Government as well as through a general subjection of 
public administration to the Government.”246 The German Constitutional Court states 
furthermore: “this [the democratic legitimation] requires that the public officials act 
on behalf of and according to the instructions of the Government [...] and that, as a 
result of it, the Government is put in a position, which enables it to assume 
responsibility before the People and Parliament for the tasks carried out by its public 
officials”.247
Hence, decisive factor is that the People remain, at all times, in a position, which 
enables them to exert an effective influence on the state authority in enabling them to 
exert an effective influence on those organs, which are indeed carrying out the 
administrative tasks. However, since the People are not legitimised to exert a direct 
influence on the executive authorities, their influence can only be achieved in an 
indirect way.248 Such indirect influence is achieved through the empowerment of the 
People to exert an influence on Parliament, which in return exerts an influence on the 
executive authority. The influence of Parliament on the executive authority may 
thereby be exercised in two different ways. It may, firstly, bind the executive 
authority in a direct way, by placing them under the obligation to strictly adhere to the 
laws. It may, secondly, bind the executive authority in an indirect way, by exercising 
a parliamentary control on the Government. The reason why the control of Parliament 
on the Government may only be exercised in an indirect way results from the fact that 
the German Basic Law accords a direct form of control only in few specific cases. 
Such is, for instance, the case with regard to the right of Parliament to require the 
                                                 
246 BverfGE 93, p. 37 at p. 66. 
247 BverfGE 93, p. 37 at p. 67; in line with these principles, see BverfG, 2 BvL 5/98 and BvL 6/98, in 
F. Becker, The principle of democracy: watered down by the Federal Constitutional Court, German 
Law Journal, Vol. 04, No. 08, p. 759 et seq, 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol04No08/PDF_Vol_04_No_08_759-
769_public_Becker.pdf (26.03.2011).  
248 People have only a direct influence with regard to decisions that are taken by referendum as well as 
with regard to elections of the members of Parliament. 
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attendance of the Federal Government and the Federal Council during parliamentary 
sessions (Zitierrecht)249, the right of Parliament to be heard (Interpellationsrecht) 250 
or the constructive vote of no confidence in the Federal Chancellor (konstruktives 
Misstrauensvotum).251 Apart from the control of Parliament on administrative organs 
through a strict adherence to the laws, administrative organs may be controlled by 
Parliament only through the possibility of subjecting them to the control of the 
Government. However, a control of the Government on the administrative organs is 
achieved through an obligation of the latter to comply with the instructions of the 
former. It is this obligation, which, in the end, establishes a connection of 
responsibility between the People and the administrative organs. 
3.2.1.1.2 Article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the Austrian Federal Constitution  
In Austria, the principle, which obliges administrative organs to comply with 
the instructions of their superiors when carrying out administrative tasks, represents a 
principle of constitutional law. Codified in article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG252, it 
stipulates that “they are responsible to their superiors for the exercise of office and 
are, save as otherwise provided for by laws pursuant paragraph 2, bound by the 
instructions of these”. Article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG highlights the importance 
that is attached to the obligation to comply with governmental instructions as a 
central element of the relationship of supervision and responsibility (Leitungs-und 
                                                 
249 Art. 43 para. 1 GG. 
250 Art. 43 para. 2 GG. 
251 Art. 67 GG. 
252 Despite various Federal constitutional laws and ordinary Federal laws containing constitutional 
provisions, including the high number of amendments, the B-VG of 1920 still represents the main body 
of Austrian Federal constitutional law. In 2008, the B-VG experienced a far-reaching constitutional 
reform, BGBl I 2008/2. For details, see A. Gamper, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Austrian Federal Constitution, p. 92, www.icl-journal.com, (05.02.2008). See furthermore K. 
Lachmayer, Zwischen Ordnung und Chaos, von der Notwendigkeit der Verfassungsbereinigung und 
der Illusion des Inkorporationsgebotes, JRP 2007, p. 200 et seq. 
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Verantwortungszusammenhang) as it is laid down in article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the 
B-VG.253
3.2.1.1.2.1 Instructions 
Instructions can be defined as orders (Befehle) that are inherent to 
relationships governed by public law and typically addressed from a superior organ to 
a subordinate organ (Über-Unterordnungsverhältnis). They entitle the superior organ 
to exercise power of order (Befehlsgewalt) solely by virtue of the fact that the organ is 
superior to the organ subordinate to it. The obligation to comply with the instructions 
of their superiors exists thus independently from the obligations that may result from 
the position of the organ as a civil servant (dienstrechtliche Weisung), which 
represents an instrument of supervision that emanates from civil service law 
(dienstrechtliche Aufsicht). 254 Instructions constitute internal acts addressed to 
subordinate organs in their exclusive function as subordinate organs. Lack of specific 
formal requirements, they may take any form, such as requests (Anordnungen) or 
mandates (Aufträge), as long as they are recognisable as orders.  They may be 
addressed to a single person (individuelle Weisung) or a specific group of people 
(generelle Weisung). There are no specific consequences laid down in article 20 para. 
1 sent. 2 B-VG, which requires merely that the subordinate organs are responsible to 
the highest administrative organs for their exercise of office. This means that they 
have to report on and are responsible for their activities. 255
                                                 
253 See B. Raschauer, Art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 69. 
254 For more details, Ibid, para. 20 and 72. 
255 For more details, see B. Raschauer, Art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG, in: Korinek/Holoubek, 
Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 
2000), 2. Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 71 and 72. 
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3.2.1.1.2.2 Organs conducting the administration in the sense of article 20 para. 1 
sent. 1 of the B-VG 
Article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG, by stipulating that “they” are subject to 
instructions, refers to the organs as determined in article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-
VG. Considering the wording, subject to instructions are elected organs (auf Zeit 
gewählte Organe), appointed professional organs (ernannte berufmäßige Organe) or 
contractually appointed organs (vertraglich bestellte Organe), which conduct 
administration in accordance with the laws. 256 The term “organ”, as considered by 
some, is thereby neither restricted to the legal representatives of the respective organs 
(Organwalter), i.e. the functionaries who are leading the administrative office 
(Dienststelle), nor to public servants (öffentlich Bedienstete) or other functionaries of 
public offices. The Austrian administration is therefore not reserved to civil servants 
(Beamtenvorbehalt).257 Article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG stands in contrast to German 
constitutional law, which requires, upon article 33 para. 4 of the GG, that the exercise 
of sovereign authority on a regular basis is principally, conferred upon “members of 
the public service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty defined by public 
law” (öffentliches Dienst- und Treueverhältnis). Article 33 para. 5 of the GG provides 
that the law governing the public services shall thereby be regulated and developed 
with due regard to the traditional principles of the professional civil service 
(hergebrachte Grundsätze des Berufsbeamtentums).  Article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG 
includes therefore any organ, which conducts administration.258 This also comprises 
the entrustment of private entities with sovereign tasks, since they represent organs 
conducting administration.259  This follows, first of all, from the clear wording of 
                                                 
256 For more details, ibid, paras. 36 - 41, paras. 71 and 72. 
257 See W. Berka, Verfassungsrecht, Grundzüge des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts für das 
juristische Studium, 3. Auflage, Wien 2010, para. 654; see also B. Raschauer, art. 20 para 1 B-VG, in: 
K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, 
(Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 45. 
258 B. Raschauer, Art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG, in: Korinek/Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 35 and 76 - 77. 
259 Ibid, paras. 49 - 55 and paras. 76 -78. With regard to the legitimacy of outsourcing outsourcing 
administrative tasks to entities established outside of the hierarchical structure of administration and 
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article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG, which refers to the general term “organ”. The 
enumeration of the different types of organs is thereby historically grown and serves 
to determine the relationship of the organs to each other.260 It is furthermore 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court, which clearly states that any administrative 
organ, which is no highest organ of administration, must be subject to the instructions 
of its superior organ. It finally results from article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG, 
which contains central principles of constitutional law. It contains aspects of the 
principle of democracy in that it determines that the highest organs of administration 
are responsible to representatives elected by the people. It comprises furthermore 
elements of the principle of rule of law, guaranteeing that the laws are executed 
through organs, which are either directly democratically legitimised or which are 
responsible to the highest Federal and Federal States authorities. Another requirement 
of article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG constitutes the democratic legitimation, 
which aims to ensure that the organs are appointed either directly through the people 
or through organs, which dispose themselves of a sufficient legitimate basis. 
Moreover, article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG includes elements of the principle of 
separation of powers, highlighting, by virtue of the obligation to comply with 
governmental instructions, an organisational aspect of administration and herewith the 
delimitation to the independence of the judiciary. It finally shows the aim to unite the 
administrative organs by, inter alia, governmental instructions, to an administrative 
entity that is consistent within itself (Einheit der Verwaltung).261
Hence, the enumeration of organs contained in article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG is 
neither comprehensive nor exclusive. Whatever organ is entrusted with the exercise of 
                                                                                                                                            
the limits defined by the Constitutional Court particularly in the case VfSlg 14.473/1996 (Austro 
Control Jurisprudence), see 3.2.2.2.1.2. 
260 For more details, see B. Raschauer, Art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG, in: Korinek/Holoubek, 
Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 
2000), 2. Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), paras. 42 - 45. 
261 Ibid, paras. 6 - 10. 
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administrative functions is subject to the principles laid down in article 20 para. 1 of 
the B-VG. 
3.2.1.1.2.3 The highest organs of the Federation and the Federal States in the 
sense of article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG 
Article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG states that the administrative organs are 
responsible to “their superiors” and are principally bound by the instructions of 
“these”.  The superiors are, in accordance with article 20 para. 1 sent. 1 of the B-VG, 
the highest authorities of the Federation and the Federal States. These are principally 
the Federal ministers, the Federal States’ Governments (article 19 of the B-VG) and, 
although they do not dispose of their own public office subordinate to them, the 
Federal president and the Federal Government.262  
As a result, contrary to German constitutional law, the obligation of the Austrian 
administrative organs to comply with the instructions of their superiors is therefore 
explicitly and clearly codified by the Austrian Constitution. Article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 
of the B-VG is thus consistent with the classical hierarchical model of the Austrian 
administration established by article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG.  
As a conclusion it can be said that the obligation of administrative organs to comply 
with the instructions of their superiors is recognised, in Germany as well as in 
Austria, as a basic principle of constitutional law. It represents in both countries an 
essential element of the principle of democracy.263
                                                 
262 In this sense also B. Raschauer, Art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG, in: Korinek/Holoubek, 
Österreichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 
2000), 2. Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), paras 28 et seq. 
263 Ibid, p. 69 et seq. 
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3.2.1.2 The release of administrative organs from the instructions of their 
superiors as exception of constitutional law 
German (3.2.1.2.1) as well as Austrian constitutional law (3.2.1.2.2) recognise 
cases, in which administrative organs may be released from their basic obligation to 
comply with governmental instructions.  
3.2.1.2.1 The exceptions recognised by German constitutional law 
Due to the fact that the principle itself is not codified in the German Basic 
Law, no reference is made to the fact that cases exist, in which a release of 
administrative organs from governmental instructions can be justified.  
In the German Basic Law, only few provisions explicitly allow for a release of 
administrative organs from governmental control. Examples are independent bodies 
such as the Federal Court of Audit (Bundesrechnungshof) according to article 114 
para. 2 of the GG (the members of the Federal Court of Audit enjoy “judiciary 
independence”), the municipalities pursuant to article 28 para. 2 sent. 1 of the GG, the 
broadcasting stations by virtue of art. 5 para. 1 sent. 2 of the GG or the universities by 
virtue of article 5 para. 3 of the GG. 
In German law doctrine and administrative practice, further exceptions from this 
principle are recognised. Examples are decisions taken by corporations, institutions or 
foundations of public law as well as decisions taken by expert committees or by 
privatised public entities.  
The approach of the German law doctrine and administrative practice is consistent 
with the German Constitutional Court, which claimed at no time that this principle 
was to be applied without exception. On the contrary, the German Constitutional 
Court made clear that the principle constituted merely a “general” obligation of 
administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions.  In a decision 
rendered in 2002, the German Constitutional Court pointed out that the principle of 
democracy was a principle, which was “open for development” (entwicklungsoffen) 
and “adjustable” (anpassungsfähig) whenever the circumstances so required.  In its 
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judgment of 30 June 2009, the Constitutional Court confirmed this view, stating that 
the principle of democracy was open to the objective of integrating Germany into an 
international and European peaceful order.   
3.2.1.2.2 The exceptions recognised by Austrian constitutional law 
Upon article 20 of the B-VG, Austrian constitutional law recognises cases, 
which justify a release of administrative organs from their basic obligation to comply 
with governmental instructions. 
The constitutional reform in 2008 has brought a fundamental change to article 20 of 
the B-VG. 264 Whereas former article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG permitted a release of 
administrative organs from their basic obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions only in those cases, which were “provided for by constitutional laws”265, 
revised article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG now allows for such a release in all those cases, 
which are “otherwise determined by ordinary laws according to para. 2 [of article 20 
B-VG]”. A comparison of former article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG with current 
article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG shows that administrative organs may be released from 
their obligation to comply with governmental instructions not only on the basis of a 
provision with the status of constitutional law, but also on the basis of a provision, 
which disposes of the status of sub-constitutional law, i.e. ordinary Federal or 
Federal state law. However, in this regard, revised article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-
VG requires that one of the categories listed in article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG is 
fulfilled. 
The revision of article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG leads, in my view, to a shift of 
powers, which have been attributed to the constitutional legislator, the Federal 
legislator and the Federal States’ legislators. On the one hand, revised article 20 para. 
1 sent. 2 of the B-VG restricts the powers of the constitutional legislator. Indeed, 
                                                 
264 BGBl I/2008. 
265 See former art. 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG. 
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whereas under former article 20 para. 1 sent. 2  of the B-VG the constitutional 
legislator was free to provide for a release of administrative organs from their 
obligation to comply with governmental instructions, its powers are now limited to 
the  “categories” listed in article 20 para. 2 sent. 2 of the B-VG. Outside the scope of 
application of paragraph 2 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 2 of the B-VG no exceptions are 
permitted anymore. However, upon article 44 para. 1 of the B-VG, the constitutional 
legislator is still able to release administrative organs from their obligation to comply 
with governmental instructions. On the other hand, revised article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of 
the B-VG extends the powers of Federal and Federal States’ legislator. They are now 
empowered to provide for a release of administrative organs from their obligation to 
comply with governmental instructions in all those cases listed in article 20 para. 2 
sent. 2 of the B-VG. 
As a conclusion it can be said that Austrian constitutional law sets out in clear terms 
the requirements, which must be met in order to release administrative organs from 
their obligation to comply with governmental instructions.  In contrast, German 
constitutional law neither codifies the principle nor admits the fact, that exceptions 
from this principle exist.  
3.2.2 The application of the hierarchical model of administration in German and 
Austrian energy law 
3.2.2.1 The current situation under German energy laws  
3.2.2.1.1 The BNetzA as an autonomous higher Federal authority 
The BNetzA has been established as an autonomous higher Federal authority 
(oberste Bundebehörde). As such, it is, in accordance with article 86 of the GG, part 
of the Federal administrative authorities, which carry out Federal administration 
(bundeseigene Verwaltung). The Federal administrative authorities consist of the 
highest Federal authorities, the higher Federal authorities (Bundesoberbehörden), the 
Federal authorities at intermediate level (Bundesmittelbehörden) and the lower 
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Federal authorities (Bundesunterbehörden). The highest Federal authorities exercise 
oversight, in terms of legality (Rechtsaufsicht) and of appropriateness of execution 
(Fachaufsicht), over the higher Federal authorities, which are directly subordinated to 
them (unmittelbar nachgeordnet) and which usually have no authorities subordinate 
to them. The Federal authorities at intermediate level are placed between the Federal 
ministries and the lower administrative level. They exercise, together with the lower 
Federal authorities (Bundesunterbehörden) subordinate to them, competences in 
specific and limited areas, such as in the area of foreign service (Auswärtige Dienst), 
Federal financial administration (Bundefinanzverwaltung), administration of Federal 
waterways and shipping (Verwaltung der Bundeswasserstrassen und Schifffahrt) or 
Federal defence administration (Bundeswehrverwaltung), (article 87 para. 1 of the GG 
and article 78b of the GG).  
The BNetzA finds its legal basis in article 87 para. 3 of the GG. It stipulates that an 
autonomous Federal higher authority may be established through Federal law for 
matters on which the Federation has legislative powers. Article 87 para. 3 of the GG 
article enables thus the Federation to establish a Federal authority, which executes 
Federal laws, although the execution of Federal laws is, either in their own right  
(article 84 para. 1 of the GG) or on Federal European Commission (article 85 of the 
GG), principally attributed to the Federal States (article 83 of the GG).  Hence, article 
87 para. 3 of the GG de facto establishes a Federal competence of administration 
(Bundesverwaltungskompetenz) within all areas of legislative competences of the 
Federation. Article 87 para. 3 of the GG represents therefore a general provision of 
Federal competence of administration.266 Article 87 para. 3 of the GG allows the 
Federation even to establish Federal authorities at intermediate and lower level where 
                                                 
266 See e.g. G. Hermes, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band III, Artikel 83 – 146, Tübingen 
2000, art. 87, para. 65 et seq.  
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it is confronted with new responsibilities on matters on which it has legislative 
power.267   
The Federation disposes of concurrent legislative power (article 74 para. 1 no. 11 of 
the GG) in the energy sector. In this area as well as in the area of executive legislative 
powers of the Federation, it is legitimate to establish, by Federal law, an autonomous 
Federal higher authority, such as the BEGTPG. Article 87 para. 3 of the GG 
establishes in this regard an exclusive competence of the Federation. 268
3.2.2.1.2 Governmental control over the BNetzA 
German energy laws strictly subject the German energy regulators to the 
instructions of their superiors and do not allow for any exception.  
When examining German energy regulations, it becomes, firstly, apparent that the 
German energy regulators are to the greatest possible extent integrated into the 
hierarchical structure of the state. It becomes, secondly, apparent that cases exist, 
where the German Government itself assumes the role of the energy regulator. 
Firstly, section 61 of the Energy Industries Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, hence 
EnWG) establishes the BNetzA as an autonomous higher Federal authority within the 
business of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour.269 As such it is 
explicitly subject to the “general instructions” of the Federal Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Labour. Moreover, the way in which the German energy regulators are 
                                                 
267 See e.g. G. Hermes, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band III, Artikel 83 – 146, Tübingen 
2000, art. 87, para. 65 et seq; see also B. Pieroth, in: H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 87 GG, para. 12. 
268 See H.-G. Henneke, B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu/ F. Klein/ H. Hofmann/ A Hopfauf, GG, Grundgesetz, 
Kommentar, 11. Auflage, Köln 2008, art. 87, p. 1756 – p.1757. 
 269 Section 54 para. 1 EnWG in connection with art. 2 para. 1 of the law establishing the BNetzA 
(Gesetz über die Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen 
vom 7. Juli 2005, BGBl. I S. 1970, 2009), last amended through art. 15 para. 12 of law dated 5.02.09 
(BGBl. I p. 160). 
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appointed also demonstrates their dependence on the Government.  Indeed, upon 
section 3 para. 3 of the law establishing the BNetzA, the President and Vice-president 
of the BNetzA are appointed by the Federal Government. In addition, the constitution 
of the BNetzA shows that the German energy regulators are subject to governmental 
control. The advisory board of the BNetzA, which is supposed to assume tasks in an 
impartial way, is composed, in equal parts, of members of the Bundestag as well as of 
the Bundesrat.270 Moreover, the control of the Government on the German energy 
regulators is reinforced through section 54 para. 2 of the EnWG, which confers 
important powers to the Federal States in the area of energy network regulation. 
Finally, section 60a of the EnWG, establishing a Federal States’ Committee 
(Länderausschuss) with the aim of securing a consistent Federal execution of national 
energy policy, is a further prove of German energy regulators’ dependence on the 
Government. 271
Secondly, the Federal Government assumes certain regulatory tasks itself. Indeed, by 
virtue of section 24 of the EnWG, the German Government is empowered to establish 
a framework in the area of energy regulation by means of ordinances. These 
ordinances contain various provisions, which set out the limit for the tasks of the 
BNetzA. The same applies for the energy regulators on Federal States’ level. 272
3.2.2.2 The current situation under Austrian energy laws  
Austrian energy laws are consistent with article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG 
in that they require the Austrian energy regulators, in principal, to comply with the 
instructions of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour. The E-control GmbH 
and the E-control Kommission273 are thereby subject to a specific regime of 
                                                 
270 Section 5 of the law establishing the BNetzA in connection with section 60 EnWG. 
271 See also art. 8 of the law establishing the BNetzA. 
272 See section 54 para. 1 sent. 1 no. 3 and 6 E-RBG. 
273 Sections 4 and 15 E-RBG. 
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governmental control. Whereas the E-control Kommission is exempted from 
governmental control (3.2.2.2.1), the E-control GmbH274, as the main Austrian energy 
regulator, must, to a certain extent, comply with the instructions of the Government 
(3.2.2.2.2). 
3.2.2.2.1 The E-control GmbH as a private entity outside of the hierarchical 
structure of administration 
The E-control GmbH has been established as a legal entity of private law 
vested with own regulatory powers and competences. It is thus not merely an organ 
that supports the administrative authorities as established in article 133 no. 4 of the B-
VG, but constitutes a veritable administrative organ (Regulierungsbehörde), entitled 
to carry out sovereign acts (Hoheitsakte).275 Its establishment outside of the 
hierarchical structure of administration (Ausgliederung), could, on the one hand, lead 
to the assumption that it is not subject to article 20 para. 1 of the B-VG. Its exercise of 
administrative tasks could, on the other hand, signify that it needs to be integrated 
into the hierarchical structure of administration.  
3.2.2.2.1.1 The legitimacy of outsourcing administrative tasks to entities 
established outside of the hierarchical structure of administration 
The outsourcing of administrative tasks to entities outside of the hierarchical 
structure of administration, either as entities of private or public law, is recognised as 
being principally compatible with the Austrian constitutional law.276 Neither Austrian 
constitutional law nor the Austrian Constitutional Court prohibits the outsourcing of 
                                                 
274 Section 5 para. 2 E-RBG. 
275 See e.g. B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehördenmodell, Wien 201l, p. 141 et seq; see 
also B. Raschauer, article 20 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 47; see furthemore T. Öhlinger, Weisungfreie 
Verwaltungsbehörden nach der B-VG Novelle, BGBl I 2008/2, JRP 2008, p. 85 at p. 89. 
276 See e.g. B. Raschauer, art. 20 para 1 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Text und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. Auflage, Wien 
1999 (März 2000), para. 47. 
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administrative tasks per se. Indeed, the B-VG, although not referring to it, does not 
prohibit it either. 277 In addition, the Austrian constitution provides in article 10 to 
article 15 of the B-VG merely that the legislative and executive powers fall either 
within the competences of the Federation or the Federal States. It does not stipulate 
whether these competences have to be carried out by the Federation and the Federal 
States themselves or whether they may also be exercised through entities established 
outside of the hierarchical structure of administration.278As a result, article 20 para. 1 
of the B-VG does not act as a barrier to the outsourcing of administrative tasks 
(Ausgliederungssperre).279  
3.2.2.2.1.2 The limits of outsourcing administrative tasks to entities established 
outside of the hierarchical structure of administration (Austro Control 
Jurisprudence) 
The outsourcing of administrative takes to entities established outside of the 
hierarchical structure of administration is subject to limits, which have been clearly 
defined by the Constitutional Court in the case VfSlg 14.473/1996 (so-called Austro-
Control jurisprudence).280   
In this case, the Constitutional Court ruled that the outsourcing of administrative tasks 
to entities outside of the hierarchical structure of the state was only permitted insofar 
as no core functions of the state (staatliche Kernaufgaben) were concerned. Core 
functions included, for instance, tasks relating to criminal law.281 In addition, only 
                                                 
277 In this sense, B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehördenmodell, Wien 201l , p. 146. 
278 Ibid, p. 45 et seq. 
279 See e.g. B. Raschauer, art. 20 para 1 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 55. 
280 Fore more details, ibid, para. 54. 
281 See e.g. K. Pabel, Judgement on the Mandatory Civil Service: The influence of the Fundamental 
Rights on the Discussion about Outsourcing, ICl journal, Vol. 4, 2/2010, p. 222 et seq. 
http://www.internationalconstitutionallaw.net/download/2dda9e5f8ee22702cc7e944ab5e5e2d
3/Pabel.pdf (26.02.2011). 
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single administrative tasks (vereinzelte Aufgaben) and no entire administrative areas 
(ganze Verwaltungsbereiche) could be conferred upon such entities. The Court did, 
however, not determine, at which point the threshold from a delegation of single 
administrative tasks to an entire administrative area was exceeded. 282 In the case 
VfSlg 14.474/1996, the remaining power of the Federal minister to enact ordinances 
(Verordnungserlassung) was established as possible criteria of delimitation. In the 
case VfSlg 16.995/2003 (ECG), it was the requirement for outsourced entities to 
dispose of an ordinance as their legal basis (Verordnungsermächtigung). 283 
Moreover, according to the Constitutional Court, the outsourcing of administrative 
tasks to entities outside of the hierarchical structure of administration has to comply 
with the principle of equity (Sachlichkeitsgebot) and efficiency (Effizienzgebot), 
which requires the examination of whether such outsourcing can be justified 
(Vertretbarkeitskontrolle).284 The Court did finally rule that entities outsourced from 
the state structure were nevertheless required to be subject to the instructions of their 
superiors in order to comply with the principle of accountability towards Parliament 
(Weisungs- und Verantwortungszusammenhang).285 According to the Constitutional 
Court, article 20 of the B-VG is not directly applicable to entities outsourced from the 
state structure, if they carry out sovereign tasks. In this case, the legislator is obliged 
to provide for rules, which confer upon the highest organ effective tools of direction 
and control. If these entities carry out non-sovereign tasks, the question, of whether 
article 20 B-VG is directly applicable, remains. It must, however, at least be 
                                                 
282 See VfSlg 14.474/1996; see furthermore H. Eberhard, Limits of outsourcing “core functions” of the 
state such as the execution of criminal law, Austrian Constitutional Court Judgment from 12 December 
2991, G 269/01, VfSlg 16.400, ICl journal, Vol. 4, 2/2010, p. 217 at p. 218. 
283 See e.g. B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehördenmodell, Wien 201l, p. 149 and p. 150. 
284 Ibid; see also B. Raschauer, art. 20 para 1 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 54. 
285 See B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsbehördenmodell, Wien 201l, p. 151 et seq. 
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guaranteed that, where the exercise of tasks can be qualified as “leading the 
administration”, respective tools of control are in place (Ingerenz). 286
In Germany, the outsourcing of administrative tasks is subject to similar restrictions: 
only definable parts of administrative tasks may be outsourced (abgrenzbare 
Teilaufgaben); the core area of the administrative matter (Kernbereich der 
Verwaltungsmaterie) must remain within the competence of the administrative 
authority; and the connection to the state authority (Anbindung an den Staat) must be 
guaranteed. 287 Moreover, the limits laid down by the Austrian Constitutional Court 
recall the limits that have been established by the German Constitutional Court with 
regards to the transfer of competences from the Federation to the European Union and 
article 79 para. 3 of the GG. The German Court held that an untouchable core set of 
own competences (unantastbares Hausgut eigener Aufgaben) had to remain with the 
Federal States in order to guarantee their sovereignty. 288  As criteria of determination 
of the “untouchable core set of competences” different approaches were considered, 
including the quantitative approach, which referred to the number of competences 
withdrawn from the Federal States, the qualitative approach, which examined what 
specific areas of Federal States’ competences were affected and the functional 
approach, which examined whether core competences of the Federal States had been 
withdrawn. The German Court aimed at ensuring that the sovereignty of the Federal 
States (Eigenstaatlichkeit der Länder) was not eroded, which was triggered through a 
transfer of competences from the Federation to the European Union. Similarly, the 
Austrian Constitutional Court aimed to guarantee that state functions are not 
withdrawn from public state power. Hence, in both cases, the aim is to uphold the 
constitutional Federal order and, in particular, the hierarchical structure of 
administration. It is merely on a different level within the state structure, that the 
                                                 
286 For more details, see B. Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Wien 2009, paras. 
376 -378. 
287 See e.g. B. Pieroth, in: Jarass/Pieroth, H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,  Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 87 GG, para. 16. 
288 BVerfGE 34, 9 at 19 et seq. 
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decisions have been taken: one on the level of the European Union and the Member 
States, the other on the level of public administration. In both cases, the overall aim is 
to maintain the lien of responsibility that is established between entities carrying out 
administrative tasks and Parliament. 
As a result, although established outside of the hierarchical structure of 
administration, Austrian constitutional law requires the E-control GmbH principally 
to comply with the instructions of its superiors.  
3.2.2.2.2 Governmental control over the E-Control GmbH? 
The Energy Regulatory Authorities Act is consistent with Austrian 
Constitutional law in that it subjects the E-control GmbH to governmental control. 
Pursuant to section 21 para. 2 of the Energy Regulatory Authorities Act 
(Energieregulierungsbehördengesetz, hence E-RBG), the activities of the E-control 
GmbH are subject to different forms of supervisory control of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour.289 Central provision is section 4 and section 21 para. 2 of the 
E-RBG. These provisions confer upon the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour 
the general right to give instructions to the E-control GmbH within the exercise of its 
supervisory functions. The only precondition is that the instructions of the Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Labour are set out in writing and that they are followed by 
reasons. Another provision, which demonstrates well the extent to which extent the E-
control GmbH is subject to governmental control, is section 21 para. 4 of the E-RBG. 
This provision entitles the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour to revoke the 
appointment of the managing director of the E-control GmbH, if the latter fails to 
comply with its instructions. The right of revocation of the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour is thereby without prejudice to the right of the General 
Assembly to revoke the managing director of the E-control GmbH by shareholder 
                                                 
289 Section 21 para. 1 E-RBG. 
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resolution or by court order on important grounds.290 Finally, the E-control GmbH is 
also subject to the instructions of the E-control Kommission in all those cases, in 
which it assumes tasks on behalf of the latter.291  
3.2.2.2.3 Governmental control over the E-Control Kommission? 
The E-control Kommission is constituted as a collegial body with a judicial 
element in the meaning of articles 20 para. 2 of the B-VG and 133 no. 4 of the B-VG. 
Pursuant to article 20 para. 2 no. 3 and article 133 no. 4 B-VG in connection with 
section 19 of the E-RBG, the members of the E-control Kommission are not bound by 
any instructions within the exercise of their office.  
As a conclusion it can be said that the German and Austrian energy laws are 
consistent with the German and Austrian constitutional law respectively, in that they 
subject their main national energy regulators, in principle, to the instructions of the 
Government.  
3.2.3 Article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC as recognised 
exception of German and Austrian constitutional law? 
3.2.3.1 Under German constitutional law 
Under German constitutional law administrative organs are, in principal, bound 
by the instructions of their superiors (“governmental instructions”).292 The exercise of 
public authority through administrative organs that have been released from their 
                                                 
290 Sections 5 para. 5 and 21 paras. 1 and 4 E-RBG in connection with section 16 of the Limited 
Liabilities Companies Act (RGBl no 58/1906): for more details, see P. Draxler/ C. Regehr, E-Recht: 
Der österreichische Weg, 1. Auflage, Wien 2007, p. 94 et seq. 
291Section 15 para. 2 E-RBG. 
292 See B. Pieroth, in: H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,  
Kommentar, art. 20 GG, no. 10. 
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obligation to comply with governmental instructions is thus, in principal, incompatible 
with German constitutional law. As a result, exceptions from this constitutional 
principle are recognised in only few cases.293 In addition to the exceptions explicitly 
laid down by the German Basic Law, the German Constitutional Court has developed 
specific categories, in which a release of administrative organs from the obligation to 
comply with governmental instructions is recognised as being constitutional.  
Among these categories are administrative decisions that are classified as being 
decisions of “minor political relevance” (Verwaltungsentscheidungen von geringer 
politischer Tragweite) (3.2.3.1.1). Regarded as constitutional are, furthermore, cases, 
in which the obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental 
instructions is substituted through other elements of democratic legitimation (3.2.3.1.2) 
or which is compensated by some other form of governmental control (3.2.3.1.3) 
Whether article 35 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC can be classified as one of 
the categories developed by the German Constitutional Court, will be dealt with in the 
following. 
3.2.3.1.1 Energy regulatory decisions as decisions of “minor political relevance”? 
According to German constitutional law, administrative organs may, in 
principal, be released from their obligation to comply with governmental instructions, 
if their decisions are of “minor political relevance” (3.2.3.1.1.1). Energy regulatory 
decisions, in order to fall within this category, must thus constitute decisions of “minor 
political relevance” (3.2.3.1.1.2). 
                                                 
293 For a detailed overview, see C. Fichtmüller, Zulässigkeit ministerialfreien Raums in der 
Bundesverwaltung, AöR 91 (1966), 297 et seq; see also B. Pieroth, in: Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz 
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 65 GG, no. 1 and 
art. 86, no. 3; as to the privatization of the telecommunications and post sector, see e.g. T. Mayen, 
Verwaltung durch unabhängige Einrichtungen, DÖV 2004, p. 45 et seq; regarding the right of 
supervision on the BNetzA, see W. Kahl/ A. Glaser, Wer führt die Fachaufsicht über die 
Bundesnetzagentur bei Ausführung des EEG, IR (4) 2008, p. 74 at p.76. 
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3.2.3.1.1.1 Administrative decisions of “minor political relevance” 
In the decision on the law of employee representation of Bremen294, the 
German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled that there were 
administrative tasks, which could, by virtue of their “political relevance”, not generally 
be withdrawn from the scope of responsibility of the Government and be conferred 
upon administrative organs that are independent from the Government and the 
Parliament.295 The Court based its view on the principle of separation of powers 
(Gewaltenteilungsprinzip) and the role of the Government (Regierungsfunktion).296 
The Court did not define, at which point administrative decisions were to be considered 
as politically relevant but pointed out that, contrary to decisions of minor political 
relevance, decisions of major political impact were those, which had far-reaching 
economic consequences and which fell into the decision-making competences of the 
Government. 297  
In the decision on foreigners’ voting rights for the representatives of the districts of 
Hamburg298, the German Constitutional Court clarified that the recognition of an 
administrative task as one of minor relevance was, on itself, not sufficient to justify a 
release of administrative organs from their obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions. The Court emphasised that it was additionally necessary that the 
competences of the public official were strictly limited to the subject matter of the 
individual case (“gegenständlich im einzelnen…eng begrenzt”)299 as well as strictly 
limited within their scope of application (“und auch ihrem Umfang nach eng 
                                                 
294 BVerfGE 9, 268 (Entscheidung zum Bremischen Personalvertretungsgesetz). 
295 BverfGE 9, 268 at 282; see also BVerfGE 83, 130 at 150; for further details, see B. Pieroth, in: 
Jarass/Pieroth, H.D. Jarass/ B. Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,  
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 86, no. 3. 
296 Ibid at 281; see also S. Broß, in I. v. Münch/ P. Kunig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Band 3: Artikel 70 
– 146, 6. Auflage, München 2001, art. 86, no. 16. 
297 BverfGE 9, 268 at 281. 
298 BverfGE 83, 60. (Entscheidung zum Ausländerwahlrecht für die Hamburgischen 
Bezirksvertretungen). 
299 BverfGE 83, 60 at 74. 
 
102
 
 
begrenzt”).300 Moreover, the content of the decision needed to be pre-structured to an 
extent, which permitted to reduce the decision to an in-detail verifiable execution of the 
laws (“…und die zu treffende Entscheidung inhaltlich soweit vorstrukturiert ist, dass 
sie sich auf etwa die messbar richtige Plan- oder Gesetzesdurchführung 
beschränkt”).301  
It is only upon the fulfilment of these requirements that a release of administrative 
organs from their obligation to comply with governmental instructions can be regarded 
as constitutional. 
3.2.3.1.1.2 Energy regulatory decisions of “minor political relevance”? 
The question of whether energy regulatory decisions constitute decisions of 
minor political relevance cannot generally be answered. It is rather necessary to 
differentiate between the different areas of energy regulation involved.   
To be included in the assessment are all those decisions, which fall within the scope of 
application of article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Article 35 para. 
4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC requires national energy regulators to be 
independent from the Government or any other public or private entity “when carrying 
out the regulatory tasks”. “The regulatory tasks” are neither listed under the definitions 
of article 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC nor are they specified in article 35 of Directive 
2009/72/EC itself with the consequence that it applies to any regulatory task. 
Moreover, based on its wording, the regulatory tasks are not restricted to a specific area 
of energy regulation. As a result, article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC requires national energy regulators to be independent in respect of any 
regulatory decision taken within any area of energy regulation. 
                                                 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid; see also BVerfGE 83, 130 at 150, in: NJW 1991, p. 899 et seq. 
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When examining selected areas of energy regulation, it appears that energy regulatory 
decisions constitute partly decisions of major political relevance, partly decisions of 
minor political relevance. 
Within the area of energy supply, for instance, energy regulatory decisions are 
decisions of major political relevance rather than of minor political relevance.   
Firstly, based on the definition of the German Constitutional Court, decisions taken in 
this area have far-reaching economic consequences. Being generally addressed to a 
large part of the population, they usually entail important financial consequences. 
Furthermore, they have a considerable impact on the entire energy sector in that they 
influence the organisation and development of one of the most important economical 
sectors. Secondly, these decisions fall into the decision-making competence of the 
Government. Article 74 no. 11 of the GG stipulates that the concurrent legislative 
powers (konkurrierende Gesetzgebung) extend to the area of the law relating to 
economic matters (Recht der Wirtschaft), which includes, inter alia, the energy 
industry (Energiewirtschaft). The energy industry encompasses not only the generation 
of energy (Energiegewinnung), but includes also the distribution (Energieverteilung) of 
energy, including the safeguarding of energy supply.302 Although article 72 para. 1 of 
the GG determines that the Federal States are principally competent for concurrent 
legislative matters the Federation may seize the matter by exercising its legislative 
powers. Indeed, the Federal States are only competent, “as long and to the extent that 
the Federation does not exercise its legislative powers through Federal law”.303 As to 
the area of energy industry, the Federation exercised its legislative powers through, 
inter alia, enacting the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz). Furthermore, 
in 2008, the higher Court of Celle304 ruled that tasks that were assumed in the area of 
energy supply were to be regarded as tasks of services of general interest (Aufgaben 
                                                 
302 See B. Pieroth,  in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 74 GG at no. 22. 
303 Art. 72 para. 1 GG; see B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 72 GG at no. 6 et seq. 
304 Higher Court of Celle, 28.05.2008 – U 11/08; District Court of Hannover of 05.120.2007 – 43 O 
4/07. 
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der Daseinsvorsorge).305 The Court emphasised that these tasks were principally 
within the responsibility of the Government because the supply with sufficient energy 
constituted part of the people’s existential basic needs (existentielle Grundsicherung 
aller Bürger).306 Finally, subjecting these decisions to governmental control facilitates 
the detection and correction of mistakes that are possibly made by administrative 
organs. This results in the citizens having more confidence in their Member State in 
that they know that these decisions are scrutinised by several administrative authorities.  
In a vital core area of services of general interests (lebensnotwendiger Kernbereich der 
Daseinsvorsorge), such as the area of energy supply, administrative organs should thus 
strictly be integrated into the hierarchical structure of administration by subjecting 
them to governmental instructions. 
Within the area of connection and access to electricity networks, energy regulatory 
decisions are equally decisions of major political relevance rather than of minor 
political relevance. 307 These decisions have far-reaching economic consequences in 
that they are usually addressed to a large part of the population. According to section 
18 of the EnWG, distribution network operators are obliged to connect every 
(“jedermann”) end consumer living in the relevant municipal area to their distribution 
networks and to grant them the right to use the connection for energy abstraction. This 
obligation is similar to the one that exists in the area of water supply 
(Wasserversorgung), sewerage disposal (Abwasserbeseitigung), waste disposal 
(Abfallbeseitigung), and, in some cases, district heat supply 
(Fernwärmeversorgung).308  
                                                 
305 Higher Court of Celle, 28.05.2008 – U 11/08; for more details, see R. Ringwald, OLG Celle: 
Energieversorgung als Aufgabe der Daseinsvorsorge und Inanspruchnahme privater Grundstücke, IR 
(10) 2008, p. 230 at p. 231. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Other examples of decisions of major political relevance are energy regulatory decisions involving 
costly investments, such as decisions on network expansion. They have undoubtedly far-reaching 
economic consequences and fall into the decision-making competences of the Government. 
308 See e.g. B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 28 GG, no. 15 and 24 and art. 74 at no. 26. 
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These decisions fall equally within the responsibility of the Government due to the fact 
that they form part of the tasks of services of general interest. It is indeed due to the 
connection and access to electricity networks that the people are able of being supplied 
with energy. It is, thus, also due to the connection and access to the electricity networks 
that one of the people’s vital core areas of services of general interest can be 
guaranteed.  
On the contrary, within the area of network operation, energy regulatory decisions are 
most of the time decisions of minor political relevance. Decisions on safety standards, 
for instance, are purely technical decisions and form, thus, not part of the tasks of 
services of general interests.  
It can therefore be concluded that energy regulatory decisions cannot generally be 
classified as being decisions of “minor political relevance”. Quite the opposite is true. 
As tasks of services of general interest, they constitute most of the time decisions of 
major political relevance.  
The compatibility of article 35 para. 4b (ii) with German constitutional law can, 
therefore, not be justified upon the grounds that energy regulatory decisions are 
decisions of “minor political relevance”.  
3.2.3.1.2 The substitution of the obligation of administrative organs to comply 
with governmental instructions through other elements of democratic 
legitimation 
The obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental 
instructions as a basic principle of constitutional law derives from the principle of 
democracy.309 By requiring that all state authority emanates from the People, the 
principle of democracy requires a certain level of democratic legitimation 
(demokratisches Legitimationsniveau) that must, at all times, be guaranteed.310 This 
                                                 
309 Art. 20 para. 2 GG. 
310 See B. Pieroth, in Jarass/ Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG, no. 9. 
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constitutionally required level of democratic legitimation is composed of different 
elements of legitimation and includes, inter alia311, the element of personnel 
legitimation (personelles Legitimationselement) as well as the element of factual 
legitimation (sachlich- inhaltliches Legitimationselement).312 According to the German 
Constitutional Court, these elements of democratic legitimation interact with and 
complement each other.313 As a result, a deficit of democratic legitimation that 
occurred within one element of legitimation can be substituted through another element 
of democratic legitimation, as long as, in the end, the constitutionally required level of 
democratic legitimation is re-established. 314 The Court states in this regard: “decisive 
factor is not the form of legitimation of the acts carried out by public authorities but 
their effectiveness”.315 Article 20 para. 2 of the GG does thus not prescribe a specific 
form of democratic legitimation with regard to the exercise of public power, but 
requires that a certain level of democratic legitimation be guaranteed.316 As a 
consequence, a deficit of democratic legitimation that occurred, for instance, within a 
factual element of democratic legitimation can be substituted through either a factual or 
a personal element of democratic legitimation and vice versa. 
The obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions 
constitutes a factual element of legitimation in that it enables Parliament to exert an 
                                                 
311 Other elements of democratic legitimation are the institutional element of legitimation 
(institutionelle Legitimation) and the functional element of legitimation (funktionelle Legitimation). 
312 See B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG, no. 9a and no. 10; personelle Legitimation may 
also be translated as “personal aspect of democratic legitimation” and sachlich-inhaltliche Legitimation 
as “factual aspect of democratic legitimation”, see e.g. F. Becker, The principle of democracy: watered 
down by the Federal Constitutional Court, German Law Journal, Vol. 04, No. 08, p. 759 at 760 et seq, 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol04No08/PDF_Vol_04_No_08_759-
769_public_Becker.pdf (26.03.2011).  
313 See BVerfGE 83 (60) at 72. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid. 
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indirect influence on administrative organs via the Government.317 In establishing a 
lien of responsibility between Parliament and the administrative organs, it contributes 
to the constitutionally required level of democratic legitimation of article 20 para. 2 of 
the GG. 
A release of administrative organs from their obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions has the consequence that the lien of responsibility established between 
Parliament and the administrative organs is interrupted.318 As a result, the 
constitutionally required level of democratic legitimation is decreased. In order to re-
establish the constitutionally required level of legitimation it is therefore necessary to 
compensate the deficit of democratic legitimation hereby occurred and to substitute the 
obligation to comply with governmental instructions through another element of 
democratic legitimation. 
The First Part of this sub-section will analyse whether the obligation of administrative 
organs to comply with governmental instructions can be substituted through the 
obligation of administrative organs to strictly adhere to the laws (strikte 
Gesezesbindung der Verwaltung) (3.2.3.1.2.1). Under the Second Part of this sub-
section, it will be examined whether an increased level of personnel legitimation 
(gesteigerte personelle Legitimation) within an administrative organ is able to act as a 
substitute for the obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental 
instructions (3.2.3.1.2.2). Whether the Government disposes of other means of control 
than the right to subject administrative organs to its instructions will be dealt with 
under the Third Part of this sub-section (3.2.3.1.2.3). 
                                                 
317 See B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG, no. 10. 
318 BVerfGE 83, 60 at 73 states that an unbroken chain of legitimation (ununterbrochene 
Legitimationskette) must be guaranteed between the People and the administrative organ entrusted with 
public tasks; see also B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG at no. 9a. 
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3.2.3.1.2.1 The obligation of national energy regulators to strictly adhere to the 
laws as adequate substitute? 
Having established that a factual element of legitimation can be substituted 
through another factual element of legitimation, the question is whether the obligation 
of administrative organs to strictly adhere to the laws, as a factual element of 
legitimation319, may, in general, act as a substitute for the obligation of administrative 
organs to comply with governmental instructions (3.2.3.1.2.1.1). Whether it is 
applicable to the area of energy regulation, in particular, will be subject of the Second 
Part of this sub-section (3.2.3.1.2.1.2).  
3.2.3.1.2.1.1 A strict adherence of administrative organs to the laws  
The obligation of administrative organs to strictly adhere to the laws derives 
from the constitutional state principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip)320 and therefore constitutes 
a central element of democratic legitimation.321 In order to act as an adequate substitute 
for the obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions, it 
must be able to compensate the deficit of democratic legitimation occurred through a 
release of administrative organs from their obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions. The obligation of administrative organs to strictly adhere to the laws must 
be able to re-establish the constitutionally required level of democratic legitimation, 
This is, with a view to the underlying principle of democracy, achieved, if it establishes 
the same lien of responsibility that exists between Parliament and administrative 
organs by virtue of the obligation of administrative organs to comply with 
governmental instructions. The People must be able to exert an influence on 
                                                 
319 See B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG at no. 10. 
320 According to art. 20 para. 3 GG, the legislative authority is bound by the constitutional order, the 
executive authority and judiciary authority by law and justice. 
321 See B. Pieroth, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 20 GG, no. 39; see also T. Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, 
8. Auflage, Wien 2008, p. 343 and p. 355 et seq. 
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administrative organs that is as effective as the one achieved by virtue of the obligation 
of administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions. 
Again, no general answer can be given but rather a distinction needs to be drawn as to 
the different laws involved. Generally, laws consist of a part, which lies down the 
factual side of the case (Tatbestandsseite) and a part, which establishes the legal 
consequences of the case (Rechtsfolgenseite). Each side may contain definite and/ or 
indefinite terms. Where a law contains indefinite terms, whether on the factual or on 
the consequential side, a substitution is, in my view, not possible. Indefinite terms 
always allow for several possibilities of interpretation. They leave room for judgment 
and confer powers of discretion to the administrative organs, which may interpret the 
law in question in the way they judge appropriate in respect of the particular case.322 
Where, on the contrary, a law contains definite terms, the administrative organs have 
no other choice than to apply the law in exactly the way prescribed. In these cases, 
administrative organs are strictly bound by the laws and may not exercise own 
judgement and power of discretion. It is only in these cases that it is guaranteed that the 
will of the Parliament, enacting the laws, is transposed in the way prescribed.   
As a result, only a strict adherence to the laws may substitute the obligation of 
administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions.  
3.2.3.1.2.1.2 A strict adherence of national energy regulators to the laws  
Whether national energy regulators are placed under the obligation to strictly 
adhere to the laws needs to be assessed on the basis of the scope of application of 
article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Only decisions, which are 
included in article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, may serve as 
criterion of examination. By requiring national energy regulators’ independence in 
respect of any regulatory decision within any area of energy regulation, the question is, 
therefore, whether national energy regulators are generally obliged to strictly adhere to 
                                                 
322 See e.g. H. Jarass, in Jarass/Pieroth, GG, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Kommentar, 10. Auflage, München 2009, art. 19 GG at  no. 64. 
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the laws. This is not the case. Various energy laws exist, which leave room for 
judgment and confer power of discretion to the national energy regulators. Section 68 
and section 69 of the EnWG, for instance, attribute to the BNetzA an overall right to 
conduct inquiries to establish facts and to request information from operators, without, 
however, prescribing the exact procedures for the inquiries.323 Section 31 of the EnWG 
empowers the BNezA to investigate and remedy abusive behaviour of network 
operators. It enables any individual to file a complaint with the BNetzA where its 
interests are “seriously” affected by a network operator’s conduct. The determination 
of the seriousness of the violation is, however, left to the BNetzA. Furthermore, the 
costs incurred with regard to the taking of evidence are established through the BNetzA 
according to its equitable discretion (billiges Ermessen) pursuant to section 31 para. 4 
of the EnWG.  
It can therefore be said that national energy regulators are not generally obliged to 
strictly adhere to the laws but dispose of certain powers of judgement and discretion.  
A release of national energy regulators from their obligation to comply with 
governmental instructions as required by article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC can, therefore, not be justified upon the grounds that national energy 
regulators are obliged to strictly adhere to the laws.  
3.2.3.1.2.2 An increased level of personnel legitimation within the BNetzA? 
The obligation of national energy regulators to comply with governmental 
instructions could possibly be substituted through an increased level of personnel 
legitimation (gesteigerte persönliche Legitimation) existent within the BNetzA. Such 
increased level of personnel legitimation could emanate from the particular status of 
the President and Vice-president of the BNetzA (3.2.3.1.2.2.1). It could, furthermore, be 
seen in the participation of a judge within an energy regulatory authority, as it is the 
case in Austria (3.2.3.1.2.2.2). An increased level of personnel legitimation could, 
                                                 
323 See CEER IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Germany – Federal Network Agency, p. 12. 
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finally, emanate from the status of the members of the energy regulatory advisory 
board (3.2.3.1.2.2.3).   
3.2.3.1.2.2.1 The particular status of the President and Vice-president of the 
BNetzA  
The President and Vice-president of the BNetzA enjoy a particular status within 
the BNetzA. Pursuant to section 3 para. 3 of the Law establishing the Federal Network 
Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Posts and Railways (Gesetz über die 
Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen, 
hence BEGTPG), they are appointed by the Federal Government upon proposal of the 
Federal Network Agency’s Advisory Council. They are appointed as civil servants and 
relate to the Federal Government through an employment relationship of public-legal 
service and loyalty (öffentlich-rechtliches Dienst- und Treueverhältnis) according to 
section 4 para. 1 of the BEGTPG. Moreover, they may only be removed from their 
office upon the establishment of important cause (section 4 para. 5 of the BEGTPG). 
Finally, it is the President of the BNetzA, who has the final decision-making authority 
to select and recruit, as well as to remove and set penalties and incentives of the staff 
members of the BNetzA.324 One can thus undoubtedly argue that the President and 
Vice-president dispose of an increased level of personnel legitimation. This could, as a 
consequence, lead to an increased level of democratic legitimation of the BNetzA as a 
whole.325  
This argument is, in my view, not convincing. Firstly, although the President and Vice-
president of the BNetzA may dispose of an increased level of personal legitimation, this 
does not lead to an increased level of democratic legitimation of the BNetzA as a 
whole. According to section 59 para. 1 of the EnWG, the BNetzA decides through its 
ruling chambers rather than through its individual members. Although the President of 
                                                 
324 See CEER IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Germany – Federal Network Agency, p. 11 and 23 et seq. 
325 A similar argument is used with regard to the the president and vice-president of the regulatory 
authority for telecommunications and post, see K. Oertel, Die Unabhängigkeit der 
Regulierungsbehörde nach §§ 66 ff TKG, Berlin 2000. 2000, p. 322 ff.  
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the BNetzA participates at the voting process (section 59 para. 2 of the EnWG), he acts 
on behalf of the interests of the BNetzA rather than of his own. The increased level of 
personnel legitimation of the President and the Vice-president of the BNetzA does, 
therefore, not act as an adequate substitute for the obligation of administrative organs 
to comply with governmental instructions.  
3.2.3.1.2.2.2 The participation of a judge within an energy regulatory authority  
Contrary to German constitutional law, Austrian constitutional law allows 
under specific circumstances the release of administrative organs from their obligation 
to comply with governmental instructions. Prerequisite is, inter alia, that their 
membership includes at least one judge (Kollegialbehörde mit richterlichem 
Einschlag).326 Even if German constitutional law contained a similar legal construct, 
the participation of a judge within the BNetzA could, in my view, not justify the release 
of the BNetzA from governmental instructions.327 It is, in particular, not justifiable on 
the basis of article 97 para. 1 of the GG. Article 97 para. 1 of the German Basic Law 
determines that judges are “independent and subject only to the law”. One can thus 
argue that the judiciary independence of judges guaranteed through article 97 para. 1 of 
the GG, leads to an increased level of personnel legitimation. However, with a view to 
article 97 para. 2 of the GG and in accordance with the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court328, article 97 para. 1 of the GG is not applicable to the BNetzA. It 
applies only to judges, which are appointed to full-time positions (hauptamtlich) and 
which are in office permanently and on regular terms (planmäßig endgültig). Judges 
enjoy judicial independence only insofar as they act in their capacity as judiciary 
authority. The prohibition to subject judges to governmental instructions, which is 
                                                 
326 See e.g. art. 20 para. 2, sent. 1 no. 3 in connection with art. 133 no. 4 B-VG; see furthermore T. 
Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht, 8. Auflage, Wien 2008, paras. 639 – 641. 
327 The release of the Federal Cartel Authority from Governmental instructions, for example, is 
justified on the grounds, that the proceedings before the cartel authorities as laid down in sections 54 et 
seq. of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) is 
constituted similar to judiciary proceedings (“justizähnlich”); see J. Rodegra, Zum Problem 
aufsichtsfreier Verwaltung durch das Bundeskartellamt untersucht am Beispiel des 
Fusionskontrollverfahrens, 1992 (zugl. Jur. Diss FU Berlin), p. 33 et seq.  
328 See e.g. BVerfGE 26, 186 at 201. 
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contained in article 97 para. 1 of the GG, applies therefore only in respect of activities 
protected by article 97 para. 1 GG.329 Hence, where judges carry out tasks as members 
of administrative organs, such as the BNetzA, they may not rely upon article 97 para. 1 
of the GG. In these cases, judges are no judges in the sense of article 97 of the GG. 330  
The insertion into the German Basic Law of a provision, which is comparable to the 
Austrian article 20 para. 2, sent. 1 no. 3 of the B-VG and article 133 no. 4 of the B-VG, 
would violate article 79 para. 3 of the GG.331 Article 79 para. 3 GG stipulates that 
amendments to the Basic Law that affect the division of the Federation into Länder, 
their participation on principles within the legislative process or the principles laid 
down in articles 1 and 20, are prohibited (Ewigkeitsgarantie). The judicial 
independence is protected by virtue of article 20 para. 3 of the GG, which lies down the 
constitutional state principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip). Hence, to entrust judges with tasks 
other than judiciary ones, would violate the principle of separation of state powers 
(Gewaltenteilungsprinzip) and, as a consequence, article 20 para. 3 of the GG and 
article 79 para. 3 of the GG. 
3.2.3.1.2.2.3 The Advisory Council as a body comparable to Parliament? 
Pursuant to section 60 of the EnWG in connection with section 5 of the 
BEGTPG, the BNetzA is supported through an Advisory Council. The Advisory 
Council is composed of members, which are appointed by the Government upon 
proposal of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (section 5 para. 1 of the BEGTPG). One 
could thus argue that the members dispose of an increased level of personal 
legitimation. The Advisory Council could be seen as a parliamentary controlling body 
(parlamentarisches Kontrollorgan).332 This argument is not convincing. The 
                                                 
329 Ibid. 
330 R. Herzog, in: T. Maunz/ G. Dürig, Grundgesetz Kommentar, 53. Auflage, München 2009, art. 92 at 
75. 
331 See J. Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, ELJ, volume 14, July 
2008, p. 389 at p. 391. 
332 According to K. Oertel, the advisory board established at the regulatory authority of 
telecommunications and post through section 66 TKG can be seen as a parliamentary controlling body 
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appointment of the Advisory Council by the Government upon proposal of the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat does not elevate the advisory board to a body comparable to 
Parliament due to the fact that it does not establish the same lien of responsibility that 
is established between Parliament and the Government.  
3.2.3.1.2.3 The substitution through other means of governmental control 
The Government disposes of other means of control on administrative organs 
than the right to require compliance with its instructions. Among these rights is the 
right of removal of a civil servant from the civil service (Entfernung des Beamten aus 
dem Dienstverhältnis). Whether the right of removal of a civil servant from the civil 
service applies to the members of the BNEtzA and whether it may act as a substitute for 
the obligation of administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions, will 
be subject of the first sub-section (3.2.3.1.2.3.1). The second part will assess, with a 
view to the Austrian article 52 para. 1(a) of the B-VG, whether the German 
Government disposes of a right towards the members of energy regulatory authorities 
comparable to the right of the German Bundestag and its committees to require the 
presence of the members of the Government and to interrogate them about their 
activities carried out within the exercise of their office (article 43 of the GG), (Zitier- 
und Interpellationsrecht) (3.2.3.1.2.3.2). 
3.2.3.1.2.3.1 The right of removal of the members of the BNetzA  
Most of the staff members of the BNetzA are appointed as civil servants. 333 
Their removal (Entfernung) is thus subject to the provisions of the Federal Civil 
Servants Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz, hence BBG) and the Federal Disciplinary Act 
                                                                                                                                            
similar to Parliament, see K. Oertel, Die Unabhängigkeit der Regulierungsbehörde nach §§66 ff TKG, 
Berlin 2000. 2000, p. 331 et seq. 
333 See CEER IEB TF-Regulatory Benchmark Questionnaire, Final Version, 05-07-05, Draft on 
Germany – Federal Network Agency, p. 23. 
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(Bundesdisziplinargesetz, hence BDG).334 Section 77 para. 1 sent. 1 of the BBG 
determines that where a civil servant culpably violates an obligation that has been 
conferred upon him within the exercise of his office, he commits malfeasance of office 
(Dienstvergehen). In this case, the Federal Disciplinary Act becomes applicable 
(section 77 para. 3 of the BBG), which provides, among the disciplinary measures 
available, the right of removal of the civil servant (section 30 no. 3 of the BGG, section 
5 no. 5 of the BDG and section 10 para. 1 sent. 1 and para. 6 of the BDG). The 
decision on the disciplinary measure must be taken according to one’s best judgement 
(nach pflichtgemäßem Ermessen) pursuant to section 13 para. 1 sent. 1 of the BDG and 
must be assessed in relation to the severity of the malfeasance of office committed 
pursuant to section 13 para.1 sent. 2 of the BDG. Section 13 para. 1 sent. 3 of the BDG 
provides furthermore that the personality of the civil servant must be taken into 
account. It shall also be taken into account to what extent the public official has 
betrayed the trust of its superior or the general public.335 The disciplinary measures 
available against malfeasance of office are listed in section 5 of the BDG in relation to 
their severity. The removal of the civil servant from his office represents the 
disciplinary measure the most severe. The organ entitled to remove the civil servant is 
the respective Federal minister as the highest disciplinary superior (oberste 
Disziplinarvorgesetzte) pursuant to article 133 para. 2 of the GG. 
The removal of the President and the Vice-president of the BNetzA is laid down in the 
Law establishing the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Posts and Railways as lex specialis to the Federal Civil Servants 
Act and the Federal Disciplinary Act. According to section 4 para. 5 of the BEGTPG, 
the President336 and the Vice-president337 may be removed, either at their own request, 
or at the request of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
                                                 
334 For more details, see e.g. N. Achterberg/ G. Püttner, T. Würtenberger, Besonderes 
Verwaltungsrecht, Band II, Kommunal-, Haushalts-, Abgaben-, Ordnungs-, Sozial-, Dienstrecht, 2. 
Auflage, Heidelberg 2000, §31, para. 110. 
335 Section 13 para. 1 sent. 4 BDG. 
336 Section 4 para. 5 sent. 2 BEGTPG. 
337 Section 4 para. 8 in connection with section 4 para. 5 sent. 2 BEGTPG. 
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(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie), and after consultation of the 
Advisory Council, by the Federal Government, provided an important cause is shown. 
Prior to the request of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the 
President and the Vice-president of the BNetzA have the right to be heard (section 4 
para. 5 sent. 3 of the BEGTPG). The revocation of the appointment of the President or 
Vice-president becomes principally valid upon the execution of the resolution of the 
Government (section 4 para. 5 sent. 6 of the BEGTPG).  
The right of the Government to remove the members of the BNetzA, including the 
President and Vice-president, constitutes, in my view, an adequate substitute for the 
obligation of the BNetzA to comply with governmental instructions. This is true, 
although sections 4 para. 5 sent. 2 of the BEGTPG and 13 para. 1 sent. 1 of the BDG 
do not establish a compulsory right for the Government, but rather a right that may be 
exercised.338 The mere possibility, however, that the Government may exercise its right 
and that the members of the BNetzA may be removed from their office where they act 
contrary to the constitutional principles puts, in my view, enough pressure on them to 
act in accordance with the requirements of the Government. This is especially valid 
with a view to the legal consequences involved. Indeed, according to section 10 para. 1 
sent. 2 of the BDG, the civil servant looes its right to require his official emoluments 
and pensions. According to section 20 para. 6 of the BDG, he also forfeits his right of 
being appointed to the civil service ever again.  
3.2.3.1.2.3.2 The right to require the presence of the President and Vice-
president of the BNetzA 
Contrary to the Austrian article 52 para. 1(a) of the B-VG, the German 
Government has no right to require the presence of the members of an administrative 
organ released from governmental instructions and to interrogate them on their 
activities. It is the Bundestag and its committees, which are entitled to require the 
presence of the Chancellor and its members and to interrogate them about their 
                                                 
338 See wording of section 4 para. 5 sent. 2 BEGTPG and section 13 para. 1 sent. 1 BDG, according to 
which the appointment of the members of the BNetzA may be revoked. 
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activities.339 A comparable right can, in my view, not bee seen in the right of the 
Energy Advisory Committee (section 5 of the BEGTPG in connection with section 6 
para. 7 sent. 3 of the BEGTPG) to require the presence of the President and the Vice-
president of the BNetzA or of its representative. Although it consists of 16 members of 
the Bundestag, the Energy Advisory Committee is not elevated to a body comparable 
to Parliament.  
As a conclusion it can be said that the right of the Government to remove the members 
of the BNetzA constitutes the only means, which is able to substitute the obligation of 
administrative organs to comply with governmental instructions. 
On the basis of the Government’s right of removal of the members of the BNetzA, 
article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC can thus be regarded as 
compatible with German constitutional law. 
3.2.3.2 Under Austrian constitutional law 
Pursuant to article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG, administrative organs are 
responsible to their superiors340 for the acts carried out within the exercise of their 
office and are, in principle, bound by their instructions.  
Upon article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 B-VG (“save as otherwise provided for by laws 
pursuant to para. 2”) in connection with article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG, they may, 
however, be released from their obligation to comply with governmental instructions 
where provided for “by law”.  The release through ordinary laws341, through Federal or 
                                                 
339 Art. 43 GG. 
340 The superiors are, according to art. 20 para. 1 sent. 1 B-VG, the highest administrative organs. 
These are the Federal ministers, the Federal Government, Federal States’ Government and the 
members of the Federal States’ Governments; art. 19 B-VG is not complete; furthermore, the state 
secretaries therein mentioned are no highest administrative organs; see W. Berka, Verfassungsrecht, 
Grundzüge des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts für das juristische Studium, 3. Auflage, Wien 2010, 
para. 650; see also B. Raschauer, art. 20 para 1 B-VG, in: K. Korinek/ M. Holoubek, Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, Textsammlung und Kommentar, (Loseblattsammlung, Stand 2000), 2. 
Auflage, Wien 1999 (März 2000), para. 28 et seq. 
341 Ordinary laws in the sense, that they are subordinate to constitutional law. 
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Federal state laws is thereby only allowed upon fulfilment of one of the eight 
categories listed in article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 of the B-VG and under the conditions of 
article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG. 342
The first sub-section will examine the release of the Austrian energy regulators from 
their obligation to comply with governmental instructions in the light of revised article 
20 para. 2 of the B-VG (3.2.3.2.1). The second sub-section will assess the rights of 
supervision that have been introduced through the constitutional reform in 2008 
(3.2.3.2.2). 
3.2.3.2.1 The release of the Austrian energy regulators from governmental 
instructions upon article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG 
The E-control GmbH is principally subject to governmental instructions 
(section 21 of the E-RB). It may however be released from its obligation to comply 
with governmental instructions upon no. 5 and no. 8 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 of the 
B-VG (3.2.3.2.1.1). The E-control Kommission was, already under former article 20 
para. 2 of the B-VG, explicitly released from governmental instructions. It may now be 
released governmental instructions upon no. 3 of article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG 
(3.2.3.2.1.2) 
3.2.3.2.1.1 The release of the E-control GmbH upon article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 no. 5 
and no. 8 of the B-VG 
As to the general requirement of article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG, only “organs” 
may be released from their obligation to comply with governmental instructions. The 
                                                 
342 Upon art. 44 para. 1 B-VG, the Federal constitutional legislator is entitled to provide for further 
categories outside art. 20 para. 2 B-VG by virtue of constitutional provisions contained in ordinary 
laws.  
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E-control GmbH, although established as an entity of private law, constitutes an 
“organ” in the sense of article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG.343  
This follows, first of all, from the wording of revised article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG, 
which clearly refers to “organs” rather than to “administrative organs”. The term 
“organs” has intentionally been used, since at the time of the revision of article 20 of 
the B-VG the problem of applicability of former article 20 of the B-VG to private 
entities that have been outsourced from the hierarchical structure of the state 
(ausgegliederter Rechtsträger), was well known. 
It follows, secondly, from the fact that article 20 of the B-VG applied, already prior to 
its revision, to entities outsourced from the hierarchical structure of the state, even 
though it applied only in an indirect way.344 As a consequence, if already former article 
20 of the B-VG was applicable to these entities, it is a fortiori the case as to revised 
article 20 of the B-VG (Argumentum a fortiori). Indeed, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court (Österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof) ruled that article 20 para. 1 of the B-
VG obliged the ordinary legislator to provide for appropriate regulation, which 
guaranteed that these entities are subject to the instructions of their superiors.345 The 
rationale behind the Court’s reasoning is that the release of administrative organs from 
the instructions of their superiors was only allowed where provided for by 
constitutional laws. The only constitutional provision, which provided, however, for 
such release, was article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG in connection with article 133 no. 4 of 
the B-VG. As a consequence, administrative organs could, upon ordinary Federal and 
Federal state law, only be released from their obligation to comply with the 
                                                 
343 The question of applicability of art. 20, para. 2 of the B-VG to the E-control GmbH is different from 
the question of whether the establishment of the E-control GmbH as an entity of private law with 
sovereign powers can be regarded as constitutional. See D. Damjanovic, Weisungsfreie Behörden: der 
Vorschlag für eine Neufassung des Art 20 Abs. 2 B.VG, JRP 2007, p. 222 at p. 223 and p. 225 et seq; 
see also T. Öhlinger, Weisungfreie Verwaltungsbehörden nach der B-VG Novelle, BGBl I 2008/2, JRP 
2008, p. 85 at p. 89 et seq. 
344 In such an indirect way art. 20 B-VG applies furthermore to entities that are entrusted with specific, 
administrative tasks (Beliehene) without being outsourced from the hierarchical structure of 
administration; see e.g. B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsmodell, Wien 2011, p. 182, p. 151. 
345 VfSlg 14.473/1996, 16.400/2001, 17.421/2004, in T. Öhlinger, Weisungfreie Verwaltungsbehörden 
nach der B-VG Novelle, BGBl, I 2008/2, JRP 2008, p. 85 at p. 89. 
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instructions of their superiors if they were constituted as a “collegial organ having 
within their membership at least one judge” (Kollegialbehörde mit richterlichem 
Einschlag).346 Since the revision of article 20 para. 2 of B-VG, administrative organs 
may, upon ordinary Federal and Federal state law, also be released from their 
obligation to comply with the instructions of their superiors, if they fall within one of 
the categories listed in article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG. There is no reason why a release 
of these entities upon one of the categories listed in article 20 para. 2 B-VG should, 
suddenly, be prohibited. 347
As to no. 5 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 B-VG, the E-control GmbH may be released 
from its obligation to comply with governmental instructions upon this paragraph. It 
provides that administrative organs may be released from their obligation to comply 
with governmental instructions for the “safeguarding of competition and the exercise 
of economic supervisory powers” (Sicherung des Wettbewerbs und zur Durchführung 
der Wirtschaftsaufsicht). The “safeguarding of competition and the exercise of 
economic supervisory powers is necessary in sectors that are, in principal, market 
based and open to competition. Due to their specific economical structure as well as 
their importance for the overall economy, these sectors are economically sensible and 
require, therefore, regulatory control. 348 As to the electricity sector, the authorities, 
which are entrusted with the safeguarding of competition and the exercise of economic 
supervisory powers, are the national energy regulators. This becomes obvious upon 
various provisions of European law. Article 36 of Directive 2009/72/EC, for instance, 
provides that national energy regulators shall safeguard competition by taking “all 
reasonable measures”, such as “promoting (…) a competitive (…) internal market in 
electricity within the Community” (a), “developing competitive and properly 
functioning regional markets within the Community (…)” (b), “eliminating restrictions 
on trade in electricity between Member States (…)” (c) or “ensuring (…) the efficient 
                                                 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid. 
348 See e.g. D. Damjanovic, Weisungsfreie Behörden: der Vorschlag für eine Neufassung des Art 20 
Abs. 2 B.VG, JRP 2007, p. 222 at p. 229. 
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functioning of national market, promoting effective competition and (…) consumer 
protection” (g). In addition, article 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC entrusts national energy 
regulators with further economic supervisory duties and powers. It becomes also 
apparent upon certain provisions of national law. Sections 9 and 10 of the E-RGB, for 
instance, entrust the E-control GmbH with regulatory functions in order to safeguard 
competition as well as they confer upon them certain economic supervisor powers. In 
addition, section 10 para. 1 no. 1 of the E-RBG obliges the E-control GmbH to monitor 
compliance with competition rules, including the obligation to issue opinions and 
recommendations on competitive market activities (section 7 para. 2 sent.1 of the E-
RBG).  
As to no. 8 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 of the B-VG, the E-control GmbH may also be 
released from its obligation to comply with governmental instructions upon this 
paragraph. According to this paragraph, administrative organs may be released from 
their obligation to comply with the instructions of their superiors “to the extent 
required by European law” (soweit dies nach Maßgabe des Rechts der Europäischen 
Union geboten ist) Since article 35 para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
requires such a release, the E-control GmbH may thus, in principle, be released from 
its obligation to comply with governmental instructions. 
3.2.3.2.1.2 The release of the E-control Kommission upon article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 
no. 3 in connection with article 133 no. 4 of the B-VG 
The E-control Kommission, constituted as a collegial organ under the 
participation of a judge, is released from its obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions on the basis of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 no. 3 in connection with article 133 
no. 4 of the B-VG349 and section 19 of the E-RBG.350  
                                                 
349 Art. 133 no. 4 B-VG stipulates, that “the remaining members too are not bound by any instructions 
within the exercise of this office”. Due to the wording “too”, the conclusion is drawn, that the legislator 
presumed, that the judiciary member is not subject to Governmental instructions. 
350 The E-control Kommission constitutes a collegial body in the sense of art. 20 para. 2 sent. 1 no. 3 
and art. 133 no. 4 B-VG. It is appointed through the Federal Government and one of its three members 
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Both, the E-control Kommission and the E-control GmbH may thus be released from 
its obligation to comply with governmental instructions. As a consequence, article 35 
para. 4b (ii) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC can, in principle, be regarded as 
compatible with Austrian constitutional law.  
3.2.3.2.2 The requirements of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG 
Since the constitutional reform in 2008, administrative organs that have been 
released from their obligation to comply with governmental instructions need to be 
subject to some other form of governmental control. In this regard, article 20 para. 2 
sent. 3 of the B-VG stipulates that the Federal or Federal State legislator shall provide 
the highest administrative organs “with a right of supervision that is adequate in 
relation to the task of the administrative organ being released from governmental 
instructions” (ein der Aufgabe des weisungsfreien Organs angemessenes 
Aufsichtsrecht der obersten Organe). 
3.2.3.2.2.1 The minimum set of supervisory rights  
The adequate rights of supervision must, according to article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 
of the B-VG, contain “at least the right to be informed about all activities of the 
administrative organs released from governmental instructions as well as - except in 
the cases of no.  2, 3 and 8 - the right to revoke the appointment of the administrative 
organs released from governmental instructions on important grounds”. Article 20 
para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG therefore contains a minimum set of supervisory rights, 
consisting of a right of information and a right of revocation on important grounds. 
These rights must principally be attributed in a cumulative way (“and”). Exempted are 
only those administrative organs, which have been released from their obligation to 
comply with governmental instructions upon article 20 para. 2 no. 2, 3 and 8 of the B-
VG. In this case, the right of revocation on important grounds does not apply. Due to 
the exception being inserted within the second part of the sentence (“… and – except in 
                                                                                                                                            
is a judge (section 17 para. 1 sent. 1 and 2 E-RBG). Its decision are final and not subject to repeal or 
alteration by administrative ruling (section 20 para. 2 E-RBG). 
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the cases stipulated in no. 2, 3 and 8”), the right of information remains, in any way, 
applicable. Principally, these supervisory rights are, in my view, able to act as an 
adequate substitute. The mere possibility of the highest organ to require information at 
any time about any issue related to the exercise of office of the administrative organ in 
question has the effect that the administrative organs feels continuously under the 
responsibility to document its activities in a correct and transparent manner. The same 
is valid for the right of revocation on important grounds. The mere possibility to be 
revoked urges the administrative organ in question to carry out its activities in 
compliance with the laws.  
3.2.3.2.2.2 Further “adequate” rights of supervision  
Requiring adequate rights of supervision in relation to the task of the 
administrative organ being released from governmental instructions, the scope and 
meaning of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG is vague. First of all, article 20 para. 
2 sent. 3 of the B-VG does not stipulate in which cases further rights of supervision 
than the minimum set of supervisory rights need to be established. Secondly, it does 
not define what is meant through the term “adequate” rights of supervision. It does 
finally not determine in what kind of relation the right of supervision and the 
administrative task in question needs to be put. 
As to the question in which cases further rights of supervision become necessary, I 
believe that no general answer can be given but that it rather depends on the specific 
circumstances of the case. Decisive factor is, in my view, which specific area of 
administration is concerned. Reason is that, since the intensity of state power varies in 
dependence of the specific administrative area concerned, also the constitutionally 
required level of democratic legitimation varies. Where, for instance, areas of 
services of general interests are concerned, the constitutionally required level of 
democratic legitimation is higher than in economic competitive areas where the state 
assumes  the role of a mere market participant (Teilnahme des Staates am 
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wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb).351  This is, in my view, expressed through the term 
“adequate” right of supervision of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG, which 
requires a determination in relation to the task of the administrative organ released 
from governmental instructions. The term “adequate” leaves room for own judgment 
and power of discretion to the ordinary legislator in that it allows a gradation 
(Abstufung) in relation to the intensity of state power involved, which again relates to 
the specific administrative task in question.  
As a result, where services of general interests are involved, the right of supervision 
needs to be exercised in a stricter way than in open market areas where competition 
exists. Where services of general interests are concerned, the term “adequate” needs to 
be determined as narrow as possible in order to secure a lien of responsibility between 
the people and public administration that is as strong as possible. Where, however, 
economical competitive areas are involved, the minimum set of supervisory rights of 
article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG is, in my view, sufficient.  
3.2.3.2.2.3 The application of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG in the area of 
energy regulation  
In the area of energy regulation, several inconsistencies exist with regard to 
the application of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG, in particular with regard to 
the E-control GmbH.352
3.2.3.2.2.3.1 The inapplicability of the right of revocation on important grounds 
As to the relationship between Austrian constitutional law and European law, 
an inconsistency becomes apparent between no. 5 and no. 8 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1. 
of the B-VG.  Indeed, where the E-control GmbH is released from its obligation to 
                                                 
351 See e.g. G. Kühne, in: M. Bartsch/ A. Röhling/ P. Salje/ U. Scholz, Stromwirtschaft: Ein 
Praxishandbuch, 2. Auflage, Köln 2008, p. 248. 
352 As to the E-control Kommission, art. 20, para. 2 no. 3, sent. 2 and 3 B-VG clearly states that the 
right of revocation does not apply. 
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comply with governmental instructions by virtue of no. 5 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 of 
the B-VG, the legislator must provide for at least the right of information and the right 
of revocation on important grounds (article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG). Where, 
however, the E-control GmbH is released from its obligation to comply with 
governmental instructions by virtue of no. 8 of article 20 para. 2, sent. 1 of the B-VG, 
i.e. because of European requirements, the right of revocation on important grounds 
does not apply.353 Hence, what is the situation if the E-control GmbH is released from 
its obligation to comply with governmental instructions by virtue of both no. 5 and no. 
8 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 of the B-VG? Does the right of revocation on important 
grounds remain applicable? 
Another inconsistency exists between Austrian constitutional law and Austrian energy 
laws. Section 21 of the E-RBG entitles the Federal Minister of Economics and Labour 
to revoke the appointment of the Managing Director of the E-control GmbH, if the 
Managing Director fails to comply with its instructions or fails to furnish the required 
information. The right of revocation contained in section 21 of the E-RBG is, thus, 
incompatible with article 20 para. 2, sent. 1 no. 8 B-VG, which stipulates that, where 
required by European law, the right of revocation on important grounds does not apply.  
In my view, due to the supremacy of European Law, article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 B-VG 
should in any case be interpreted in the sense that, wherever European law requires 
administrative organs to be released from governmental instructions, the right of 
revocation on important grounds does not apply.  
Regarding article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC this has the 
consequence that the right of revocation on important grounds does not apply (article 
20 para. 2 sent. 1 no. 8 in connection with article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 B-VG). Hence, 
where the E-control GmbH is released from its obligation to comply with 
governmental instructions, either by virtue of no. 5 or no. 8 of article 20 para. 2 sent. 1 
                                                 
353 According to T. Öhlinger, the scope of application of art. 20, para. 2, sent. 3 B-VG should be 
limited to cases, which require a release merely from governmental instructions, see T. Öhlinger, 
Weisungfreie Verwaltungsbehörden nach der B-VG Novelle, BGBl I 2008/2, JRP 2008, p. 85 at p. 88. 
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B-VG, its members may not be revoked by the Government on the basis of important 
grounds.  
3.2.3.2.2.3.2 The right of information as an adequate right of supervision  
Upon article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG, the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Labour as the supervising authority (section 21 of the E-RBG) has merely the right 
to be informed about all activities of the E-control GmbH. Section 21 para. 3 of the E-
RBG entitles the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour in addition to require any 
documents in order to discharge his functions. I believe that, on its own, the right of 
information as the sole remaining compulsory right of supervision is not able to act as 
an adequate substitute for the obligation of administrative organs to comply with 
governmental instructions. Although the right of information establishes a certain lien 
of responsibility between the E-control GmbH and the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Labour, the latter has no possibility of enforcement in case of its violation. The 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour is thus unable to exert a sufficient influence 
and control on the E-control GmbH, lacking in particular, the power of threat of 
removal from office in case of violation. 
3.2.3.2.2.4 Section 20 of the GmbHG as an adequate right of supervision 
Whereas paragraph 1 of section 20 of the GmbHG lays down the internal 
restrictions that the managing director (Geschäftsführer) has to comply with when 
representing the company, paragraph 2 of the same section establishes the restrictions 
of his power of representation towards third parties. Section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG 
stipulates, in particular, that the managing director is obliged to comply with any 
restrictions that have been laid down in the articles of association, in a resolution of the 
shareholders or “an instruction of the supervisory board that is binding upon the 
managing director as to his scope of representation of the company” (verbindliche 
Anordnung des Ausfsichtsrates gegenüber dem Geschäftsführer für den Umfang seiner 
Befugnis). Section 21 para. 2 of the E-RBG requires additionally that the instructions 
are set out in writing and are followed by reasons.  
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The question, which arises is whether the right of the supervisory board to issue 
binding instructions upon the managing director constitutes an adequate right of 
supervision in the sense of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG. Here, the question of 
whether the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG represents an adequate right of 
supervision and the question of whether the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG 
(privat-rechtliches Weisungsrecht) constitutes an adequate substitute for the right of 
article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG (öffentlich-rechtliches Weisungsrecht) needs to 
be distinguished. 
The question whether the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG constitutes an 
adequate substitute for the right of article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG relates to the 
debate of whether the outsourcing of administrative tasks to entities established outside 
of the hierarchical structure of administration can be regarded as legitimate, if the 
outsourced entity is merely subject to section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG. In other 
words, the question in this regard is whether the right to issue governmental 
instructions is a mandatory prerequisite of the legitimacy to outsource administrative 
tasks. It is considered that only in case of equality of these rights (Gleichwertigkeit von 
Weisungen), the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG provides a sufficient 
compensation (Ingerenz) and the right laid down in article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-
VG becomes dispensable (entbehrlich). The prevailing view in Austria denies the 
equality of these rights with the argument that the right to refuse compliance with an 
instruction is more far-reaching in the case of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG than in 
the case of article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG. It is argued that, whereas article 20 
para. 1 sent. 3 of the B-VG allows administrative organs to refuse compliance with an 
instruction only, if the instruction has been given through an authority, which was not 
competent in the matter or if compliance with the instruction would infringe provisions 
of the criminal code, section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG permits such a refuse already, if 
the managing director, upon compliance with the instruction of the supervisory board, 
would render himself liable in terms of civil or criminal public law. 354
                                                 
354 See B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsmodell, Wien 201l, p. 182 et seq. 
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The question whether the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG constitutes an 
adequate right of supervision must rather not be answered through a comparison of 
article 20 para. 1 sent. 2 of the B-VG with section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG. On the 
contrary, the right of supervision may under no circumstances be determined in a way 
that it reverts back into a governmental control that is equivalent to the one established 
through the subjection of administrative organs to governmental instructions. 
Otherwise, article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG would be deprived of its purpose.355 The 
difference between these rights is, in my view, merely their different level of liability. 
However, the argument of the prevailing Austrian view that the administrative organs, 
by reason of their different level of liability, are bound in a more direct and 
comprehensive way to the instructions of their superiors than the managing directors of 
a limited liability company, does not necessarily prove that section 20 para. 1 of the 
GmbHG is no adequate right of supervision.356  
As to the content of the instructions that may be given by the supervisory board to the 
managing director, they can take the form of specific orders (einzelfallbezogene 
Anordnungen) or general instructions, such as rules of procedure 
(Geschäftsordnungen) and may relate to any lawful matter. 357
The power of the supervisory board to issue binding instructions upon the managing 
director undoubtedly constitutes an adequate instrument of supervision. 
3.2.3.2.2.5 The supervisory instruments available under civil and company law 
Even if the right of section 20 para. 1 of the GmbHG was on itself considered 
as an inadequate right of supervision over the managing director of the E-control 
GmbH, the supervisory instruments available under civil and company law in their 
                                                 
355 In this sense T. Öhlinger, Weisungfreie Verwaltungsbehörden nach der B-VG Novelle, BGBl I 
2008/2, JRP 2008, p. 85 at p. 88. 
356 See K. Korinek, ÖZW 2000, p. 52 in: B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsmodell, Wien 
201l, p. 183. 
357 See e.g. H.-G. Koppensteiner/ F. Rüffler, GmbHG Kommentar, 3. Auflage, Wien 2007, § 16, p. 274 
– p. 275. 
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totality constitute undoubtedly adequate rights of supervision.358 The lien of control 
between the managing director of the E-control GmbH and the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour as the highest organ of the E-control GmbH359 is thereby 
established via the attribution of various supervisory instruments to the organs of the 
E-control GmbH, which are composed of representatives of the highest organ being 
and which are again subject to the instructions of the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Labour.  
Supervisory rights of the organs of the E-control GmbH include the right of revocation 
of the managing director of the E-control GmbH by way of shareholders’ resolution 
(section 16 para. 1 of the GmbHG). 360
As to the applicability of section 16 para. 1 of the GmbGH, section 16 para. 4 of the 
GmbHG states that section 16 para. 1 GmbHG does not apply to managing directors, 
which have been appointed by means of shareholder resolution through the Federation, 
a Federal State or another institution of public law. Hence, since section 1 of the E-
RBG as a constitutional provision provides that the issue, repeal and execution of the 
provisions contained in the E-RBG lie with the Federation and that the matters 
regulated in the E-RBG may directly be discharged by the authorities provided for in 
the E-RBG, section 16 para. 1 of the GmbHG would normally not be applicable. 
However, section 21 para. 4 sent. 2 of the E-RBG explicitly allows the application of 
section 16 para. 1 of the GmbH to the E-control GmbH, stating that the regulation of 
section 21 of the E-RBG shall be “without prejudice to the provisions of section 16 of 
the Law on Limited Liability Companies”. As to the scope of section 16 para. 1 of the 
GmbHG, the revocation of the managing director can be exercise at any time 
(“jederzeit”), which means that establishment of the existence of an important ground 
is not prerequisite. In contrast, section 21 para. 4 sent.1 of the E-RBG allows the 
                                                 
358 See B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsmodell, Wien 201l, p. 183 et seq. 
359 See Website of the E-control GmbH, Company, Institutional Framework, http://www.e-
control.at/en/econtrol_en/company/institutional-framework (03.02.11). 
360 See e.g. C. Fritz, Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensformen in Österreich, 3. Auflage, Wien 2007, 
para. 2871 et seq.  
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revocation of the managing director only, if the managing director fails to comply with 
the instructions of the Ministry of Economics and Labour or if he does not furnish the 
required information.361 Which provision is thus applicable? Does the provision of 
section 21 para. 4 sent. 1 of the GmbHG needs to be considered as “redundant” 362 or 
does section 21 para. 4 sent. 1 of the E-RBG constitute a provision that is lex specialis? 
Or does section 21 para. 4 sent. 2 of the E-RBG, which refers to section 16 of the 
GmbHG, in general, only apply to the paragraphs other than paragraph 1? I believe that 
section 21 para. 4 sent. 1 of the GmbHG should be considered as lex specialis due to 
the fact that the E-control GmbH, although established as a company of private law, 
does not representative a typical company of private law, but rather an entity, which 
has been outsourced from the hierarchical structure of administration and which carries 
out administrative tasks. The consideration of section 21 para. 4 sent. 1 of the GmbHG 
as lex specialis with the consequence that the managing director may only be revoked 
upon failure to comply with governmental instructions or failure to furnish the required 
information, is similar to the regulation contained in section 20 para. 1 no. 3 in 
connection with section 92 para. 1 no. 4 of the Austrian Public Services Law on Civil 
Servants (österreichisches Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz, hence BDG363), which 
stipulates that a civil servant may only be revoked, if he culpably violates one of his 
official duties (schuldhafte Verletzung seiner Dienstpflicht) (section 91 of the BDG). 
Since the disciplinary measure to be taken depends upon the severity of violation 
(section 93 para. 1 of the BDG), the revocation of a civil servant as the most severe 
measure among those stipulated in section 20 para. 1 of the BDG, may only be taken in 
case the existence of an important ground can be established. These provisions 
correspond to those laid down in the German BBG and BDG364, which equally require 
the establishment of an important ground in order to revoke a civil servant.  However, 
                                                 
361 For more details, see section 3.2.2.2.2 (Governmental control over the E-control GmbH). 
362 In this sense, B. Müller, Das österreichische Regulierungsmodell, Wien 201l, p. 184. 
363 See österreichisches Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz, 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundesnormen/10008470/BDG%201979%2c%20
Fassung%20vom%2002.03.2011.pdf (02.03.2011). 
364 See section 3.2.3.1.2.3.1 (The right of removal of the members of the BNetzA). 
 
131
 
 
whereas the decision of whether an important ground can be established to revoke the 
President of the BNetzA is taken according to one’s best judgement (nach 
pflichtgemäßem Ermessen), the decision to revoke the managing director of the E-
control GmbH is restricted to the failure to comply with governmental instructions and 
the failure to furnish the required information. 
As to the grounds for revocation, article 16 para. 1 of the GmbHG stipulates that 
principally the managing director may be revoked by shareholder’s resolution at “any 
time”.365 It is, however, possible upon article 16 para. 3 of the GmbHG to restrict the 
revocation of the managing director to the establishment of important grounds 
provided that the managing director has been appointed in the articles of 
association.366
Another supervisory right includes the obligation of the managing director to inform 
the company about any activities of the company and its assets for a period of five 
years after his term of office (section 24a of the GmbHG). In accordance herewith 
section 21 para. 3 of the E-RBG enables the Ministry of Economics and Labour to ask 
the managing director for any information and documents in order to discharge his 
functions. Generally the supervisory board, consisting of three members (section 30 of 
the GmbHG),367 supervises the activities of the managing director (section 30 j para.1 
of the GmbHG), which includes the right to require, at any time, the preparation of a 
report on the activities of the company (section 30 j para. 2 of the GmbHG). The 
supervisory board may, in particular, require the managing director to provide a yearly 
report on questions of principle on of the future business policy and financial 
development of the company (Jahresbericht), a quaterly report on the ordinary 
business and the actual status of the company (Quartalsbericht) as well as a report if 
                                                 
365 For more details, see M. Umfahrer, Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, 6. Auflage, Wien 
2008, p. 95 – 100. 
366 Another exception is laid down in art. 50  para. 4 GmbHG, see e.g. C. Fritz, Gesellschafts- und 
Unternehmensformen in Österreich, 3. Auflage, Wien, 2007, paras. 2390, 2873; see also M. Umfahrer, 
Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, 6. Auflage, Wien 2008, p. 96; see furthermore H.-G. 
Koppensteiner/ F. Rüffler, GmbHG Kommentar, 3. Auflage, Wien, 2007, § 16, p. 224 et seq. 
367 See website of the E-control GmbH, http://www.e-control.at (03.02.2011). 
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there is an important cause (wichtiger Anlass) or if circumstances of significant reason 
(Umstände von erheblicher Bedeutung) so require (Sonderbericht) (section 28a para. 1 
of the GmbHG). The supervisory board may furthermore look at and examine the 
accounts of the company (section 30 j para. 3 of the GmbHG). 
Section 21 para. 1 of the E-RBG provides that the supervisory powers of the Ministry 
of Economics and Labour are without prejudice to the rights of the General Assembly 
pursuant to the Law on the Limited Liability Companies. Shareholders’ resolutions are 
principally taken in the general assembly (Generalversammlung) pursuant to section 34 
para. 1 of the GmbHG, which decides, inter alia, on the measures of examination and 
supervision of the managing director (section 35 para. 1 no. 5 of the E-RBG). 
As a result, the managing director is strictly supervised by the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour, either directly through the Federal minister or indirectly 
through the organs of the E-control GmbH. 
3.2.3.2.3 Article 52 para. 1a of the B-VG  
In addition to the requirement of article 20 para. 2 sent. 3 of the B-VG, article 
52 para. 1a of the B-VG, which has also been introduced in the course of the revision 
of the B-VG, entitles the competent committees of the National and Federal Council 
to require the presence of the director of an organ released from the instructions of its 
superior according to article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG in the sessions of the committees 
and to interrogate him on all activities related to the exercise of his office. Such a 
direct right of parliamentary control has so far only been accorded to the National 
Council and Federal Council towards the Government and its members. By virtue of 
article 52 para. 1a of the B-VG, such direct right of parliamentary control has been 
extended to organs that are released from governmental instructions by virtue of 
article 20 para. 2 of the B-VG. The conferral of such a direct right of parliamentary 
control shows the importance that is increasingly attached to the principle of 
democracy through Austrian constitutional law. It constitutes the most powerful tool 
for Parliament to exert an influence on public administration and may, thus, 
undoubtedly act as an adequate substitute for the obligation of administrative organs 
to comply with governmental instructions. 
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3.3 Analysis 
Contrary to German constitutional law, Austrian constitutional law codifies in 
writing the principle, according to which administrative organs are subject to the 
instructions of their superiors. Equally contrary to German constitutional law, Austrian 
constitutional law lays down the exceptions allowed thereof in a very detailed way. On 
one side, the solution taken by Austrian constitutional law entails the risk that specific 
cases not foreseen by law fall outside of the scope of application. On the other side, the 
solution of German constitutional law, which does not even mention the principle, 
leads to legal uncertainty. Although the German Constitutional Court has developed 
specific categories, there is still wide room of interpretation. With a view to the 
principle of democracy as an ever changing principle of constitutional law, a principle 
that depends to such extent upon the actual political and social circumstances, the 
release of administrative organs from their obligation to comply with governmental 
instructions should, in my view, however be codified as flexible as possible.  
3.4 Conclusion  
Compared to former regime of Directive 2003/54/EC, national energy 
regulators’ independence has further been strengthened in granting them independence 
in also political terms. The strengthening of national energy regulators’ independence 
leads to the result that Member States lose considerable power and control over their 
own national energy regulators. This effect is particularly triggered through article 35 
par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC, which prohibits Member States from 
giving instructions to their national energy regulators. The release of national energy 
regulators from governmental instructions stands thereby in strong contrast to the 
hierarchical model of administration as prevalent in Austria and Germany. Indeed, 
based upon the principle of democracy, both constitutional systems subject the 
administrative organs principally to the instructions of their superiors and allow for 
their release in only exceptional, limited cases. The examination of whether article 35 
par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC can be regarded as such an exception 
recognised by Austrian and German constitutional law leads to a different result, 
which is due to the fact that the supervision of the energy sector in Austria and 
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Germany is organised in an entirely different way. The BNetzA, established as an 
autonomous higher Federal authority, remains under the tight control of the 
Government and its release would not be justifiable upon the cases developed by 
German law doctrine and administrative practice. The release of the E-control GmbH, 
established as an entity of private law outside of the hierarchical structure of 
administration, and the E-control Commission, on the contrary, is compatible with 
Austrian constitutional law. Whereas in Austria, the constitutional laws have been 
adjusted to European legislation through the constitutional reform in 2008, in Germany 
the contradiction between national and European legislation subsists. As a 
consequence, whereas article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC can be 
regarded as compatible with Austrian constitutional laws, it is incompatible with the 
German Basic Law. 
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4 The gain of power of the European Commission over the national 
energy regulators of the Member States 
Whereas Member States, triggered through article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 b (ii) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC lose power over their own national energy regulators, the 
European Commission gains power over them. Under the regime of Directive 
2009/72/EC, the European Commission may exercise its power either in a direct way, 
in particular through the issuance of binding guidelines (4.1) or in an indirect way via 
newly established institutions, such as the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators or the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (4.2). 
4.1 The direct powers of control of the European Commission over the national 
energy regulators  
The European Commission disposes of direct powers of control over Member 
States’ national energy regulators. These powers are exercised either in form of 
binding guidelines within areas that are of the responsibility of the national energy 
regulators (4.1.1) or in form of an ex post veto right against individual decisions taken 
by national energy regulators (4.1.2). 
4.1.1 The power to issue binding guidelines in areas of responsibility of the 
national energy regulators 
Directive 2009//72/EC empowers the European Commission to issue binding 
guidelines in various areas that fall within the responsibility of the national energy 
regulators. Upon examining the provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC, the European 
Commission’s power is, at first sight, not obvious. Indeed, compared to the European 
Commission’s Proposal, which empowered the European Commission explicitly to 
“adopt guidelines on the implementation by the regulatory authorities of the powers 
described in this Article” (article 22c para. 14 of the European Commission’s 
Proposal), no such provision can be found in Directive 2009/72/EC. This does, 
however, not signify that the European Commission has abandoned its aim of 
controlling the national energy regulators via the issuance of binding guidelines. Its 
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power is just more difficult to detect. Indeed, whereas in the European Commission’s 
Proposal the European Commission’s power to issue binding guidelines was directly 
listed under the section “duties and powers of the regulatory authority”, it is now 
spread all over Directive 2009/72/EC. It is inserted within provisions, where one would 
not expect it to be. It is, for instance, contained in provisions, which determine the 
areas of responsibility of the national energy regulators, rather than of the European 
Commission; and it is, most of the time, hidden somewhere in one of the last 
paragraphs of the relevant provisions. 
As to the legal effect of the European Commission’s guidelines, they constitute 
“binding implementing measures”.368 Their character as legally binding measures can 
be deduced either from the explicit wording of the respective provisions (“binding 
guidelines”) or from the procedure to be followed for their adoption, i.e. the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny (“Regelungsverfahren mit Kontrolle") pursuant to article 5a of 
Decision 1999/468/EC.369 Decisions taken by national energy regulators must comply 
with the European Commission’s guidelines referred to in Directive 2009/72/EC and in 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 (article 39 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC). The 
European Commission may decide to require national energy regulators to withdraw 
their decisions on the basis that the guidelines have not been complied with (article 39 
para. 6 (b) of Directive 2009/72/EC). In this case, national energy regulators have the 
duty of “complying with, and implementing” the decision of the European Commission 
(article 37 para. 1 (d) of Directive 2009/72/EC). As a consequence, the guidelines 
issued by the European Commission in areas that fall within the responsibility of the 
national energy regulators prevail over the decisions taken by the latter.  
The European Commission’s power to issue binding guidelines reaches deep into the 
area of national networks (4.1.1.1) and extends far to areas involving cross-border 
issues (4.1.1.2).  
                                                 
368 See Recital (63) sent. 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
369 Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the European Commission, OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p.23; see also 
Recital (64) and (65) as well as art. 46 para. 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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4.1.1.1 In the areas of national electricity networks  
In the areas of national electricity networks Directive 2009/72/EC370 provides 
in Recital (65) sent. 1 that “the European Commission should be empowered to adopt 
the Guidelines necessary for providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required 
to achieve the aim of this Directive”. For this purpose, the European Commission may, 
for instance, issue binding guidelines as to the procedures to be followed for 
certification requests of transmission system owners or operators controlled by third 
countries (article 11 para. 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC).371 The European Commission 
may furthermore issue guidelines to ensure that the transmission system owners’ 
independence is guaranteed (article 14 para. 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC) or to define 
the methods and arrangements of record keeping and the form and the content of the 
data relating to activities of supply undertakings (article 40 para. 4 and 5 of Directive 
2009/72/EC).372 The European Commission is finally empowered to issue binding 
guidelines as to the procedure to be followed to require energy regulators to adhere to 
the provisions of the Regulation, the Directive and the guidelines (article 39 para. 9 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC).373  
4.1.1.2 In areas involving cross-border issues  
In areas involving cross-border issues, it is mainly Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
                                                 
370 See the European Commission’s Proposal, 2007/195 (COD) at Recital (27). 
371 Art. 11 para. 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC is based upon art. 8b para. 13 of the European 
Commission’s Proposal, 2007/ 0195 (COD). 
372 Not retained in Directive 2009/72/EC has been the European Commission’s power to issue binding 
guidelines on Member States and national energy regulators in order to implement public service 
obligations, to protect customers (art. 3 para. 10 of the European Commission’s Proposal), to ensure 
compliance of transmission and distribution systems (art. 10a para. 3 and art. 15 para. 4 of the 
European Commission’s Proposal) and to ensure confidentiality issues (art. 12 para. 4 of the European 
Commission’s Proposal). 
373 See e.g. H. Lecheler, Ungereimtheiten bei den Handlungsformen des Gemeinschaftsrechts - 
dargestellt anhand der Einordnung von “Leitlinien”, DVBl 2008, p. 873 at p. 879. 
 
139
 
 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity374 (“Regulation (EC) 
No 714/ 2009”) and Directive 2009/72/EC, which empowers the European 
Commission to issue binding guidelines.375 Central provision in this regard constitutes 
article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. The European Commission has, upon 
paragraph 3 in connection with paragraph 5 sent. 1 of the same article, the general 
power to adopt those guidelines that are necessary for providing the minimum degree 
of harmonisation required to achieve the aims of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009.376 
Areas that shall be covered in these guidelines are listed in paragraph 3 of article 18 of 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. These areas constitute thereby the minimum of what the 
European Commission shall determine. This becomes apparent upon examining the 
wording of article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, which refers to “also”, rather 
than to “in particular”.377 It is thus within the discretion of the European Commission 
to determine the necessary degree of harmonisation. Areas, in which the European 
Commission may issue binding guidelines concern, for instance, inter-transmission 
system operator compensation mechanisms (article 18 para. 1 of Directive 
2009/72/EC), network charges (article 18 para. 2 of Directive 2009/72/EC) or the 
management and allocation of transmission capacities between interconnectors (article 
18 para. 4 of Directive 2009/72/EC). The European Commission may furthermore 
adopt guidelines with regard to the cooperation of national energy regulators with each 
other and with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (article 38 para. 5 
of Directive 2009/72/EC). In addition, the European Commission may adopt guidelines 
                                                 
374 OJEU L 211/55, p. 15. 
375 As to the European Commission’s plans of restructuring cross-border trade in energy, including 
regulatory competences, see e.g. G. Hermeier, Die Zuständigkeitsverteilung bei der Regulierung des 
grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandels – Mehr Binnenmarkt durch mehr Zentralisierung?, RdE 9/ 2007, 
p. 249 et seq. Regarding the problem of congestion management (“Engpassmanagement”) encountered 
with regards to cross- border trade in electricity, see e.g. K. Pritzsche/ M. Stephan/ S. Pooschke, 
Engpassmanagement durch marktorientiertes Redispatching, RdE 2/ 2007, p. 36 et seq; see also J. 
Kühling, Die neuen Engpass-Leitlinien der Kommission im grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel – 
Freie Fahrt für das Open Market Coupling in Deutschland?, RdE 7/ 2006, p. 173 et seq.  
376 See also Recital (63) of Directive 2009/72/EC and Recital (29) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009. 
377 See H. Lecheler, Ungereimtheiten bei den Handlungsformen des Gemeinschaftsrechts dargestellt 
anhand der Einordnung von “Leitlinien”, DVBl 2008, p. 873 at p. 879; see also H. Lecheler, Die 
Verschärfung des Regulierungsregimes durch die drei neuen Verordnungs-Entwürfe im Paket vom 
19.09.2007, RdE 6/2008, p. 167 at p. 171. 
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relating to “tarification and capacity allocation” (Recital (24) of Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009), to the procedure to be followed for certification requests of transmission 
system operators (art. 3 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009) or to the 
establishment of network codes (art. 6 para. 12 in connection with article 18 of 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). The European Commission may also adopt binding 
guidelines with regard to compensation mechanisms of inter-transmission system 
operators (article 13 para. 3 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 in connection with article 18 
of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009) or to the application of the conditions and the 
procedure to be followed for the exemption of new interconnectors (article 17 para. 9 
of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). 378
4.1.2 The power of veto against individual decisions of the national energy 
regulators 
Article 39 of Directive 2009/72/EC confers upon the European Commission 
the power of veto against individual decisions taken by Member States’ national 
energy regulators. The proceedings may be initiated in three different ways (article 39 
para. 5 of Directive 2009/72/EC). 379
The first way is codified in article 39 para. 5 in connection with para. 4 of Directive 
2009/72/EC (Anrufungsverfahren). It stipulates that “any regulatory authority may 
inform the European Commission where it considers that a decision relevant for cross-
border trade taken by another regulatory authority does not comply with the Guidelines 
referred to in this Directive or in Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 within two months 
from the date of that decision.”  
The second way is contained in article 39 para. 5 in connection with para. 3 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC (Agenturverfahren). It codifies the duty of the Agency for the 
                                                 
378 Ibid. 
379 See J. Kühling, Die Vorschläge zur institutionellen Neuorganisation des grenzüberschreitenden 
Stromhandels im 3. Energiebinnenmarkt-Paket - Defizite und Verbesserungsoptionen, IR 5/ 2008, p. 98 
at p. 99. 
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Cooperation of Energy Regulators ”to inform the European Commission” if it 
considers that the “regulatory authority, which has taken the decision does not comply 
with the Agency’s opinion within four months from the date of receipt of that opinion.”  
The third way is codified in article 39 para. 5 of Directive 2009/72/EC 
(Autoinitiativverfahren). It gives the European Commission the power to start the 
proceedings “on its own initiative”, where it “finds that the decision of a regulatory 
authority raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the Guidelines referred to in 
this Directive or in Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 […].” 
Where, following the initiation of proceedings, the European Commission takes the 
decision to examine the case further, it is empowered, upon article 39 para. 6 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, to take a final decision. In this case, the European Commission 
may require the regulatory authority concerned “to withdraw its decision on the basis 
that the Guidelines have not been complied with” (article 39 para. 6 (b) of Directive 
2009/72/EC). National energy regulators must thereby respect a period of two months 
(article 39 para. 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC). Hence, as a result, the national energy 
regulators have no other means than to comply with and implement the decision of the 
European Commission (article 37 para. 1(d) of Directive 2009/72/EC). 
4.1.3 Analysis 
The European Commission’s power to issue binding guidelines penetrates 
almost every area of the electricity market of the Member States.380 The European 
Commission’s guidelines are not only far-reaching in terms of their scope of 
application, extending to areas of national networks as well as to areas involving cross-
border issues; they are also far-reaching in terms of their legal consequences, 
prevailing over the decisions taken by the national energy regulators. The European 
Commission may “adopt” and “amend” guidelines whenever it judges “appropriate”, 
having only to respect that they “do not go beyond what is necessary” to achieve their 
                                                 
380 Ibid at p. 100. 
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aim (article 39 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). The European Commission is 
thus, de facto, elevated to a decision-making body.381  
4.2 The indirect powers of control of the European Commission over the national 
energy regulators via European intermediaries 
In addition to the European Commission’s direct powers of control over 
Member States’ national energy regulators, the European Commission disposes also of 
indirect powers of control. These powers are indirect, because they are not exercised 
directly through the European Commission itself, but rather through its institutions, 
such as the European Network of Transmission System Operators (4.2.1) or the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (4.2.2). In order to retain its 
influence on national energy regulators, the European Commission secures, at the same 
time, control over these institutions.  
4.2.1 The European Network of transmission system operators  
Article 5 of Regulation (EC) 714/2009 establishes the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (“ENTSO for Electricity”) to “ensure 
the optimal management of the electricity transmission network and to allow trading 
and supplying electricity across borders in the Community”.382 Its establishment has, 
according to the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003383, become necessary because the voluntary 
                                                 
381 See in this sense H. Lecheler, Ungereimtheiten bei den Handlungsformen des Gemeinschaftsrechts 
dargestellt anhand der Einordnung von “Leitlinien”, DVBl 2008, p. 873 at p. 879 and p. 880. 
382 See Recital (7) and art. 4 of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003; see also W. Koster/ C. Filippitsch, Die 
neue Europäische Kommission und Kernelemente ihrer Energiepolitik, e/m/w, 1/10, p. 10. 
383 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 
presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM (2007) 531 final, 2007/0198 (COD). 
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cooperation that existed between transmission system operators via the European 
Transmission System Operators (“ETSO”)384 “has shown its limits”.385  
4.2.1.1 The conferral of extensive tasks on the European Network of 
transmission system operators 
The ENTSO for Electricity, in order to “strengthen the cooperation between 
transmission system operators”386, has been vested with extensive tasks through 
Regulation (EC) 714/2009. Its main task constitutes the development of detailed 
market and technical codes, which shall cover various key areas of cooperation (article 
8 para. 1 and 2 in connection with para. 6 of Regulation (EC) 714/2009). As to the 
control of these network codes, the European Commission stressed that “strong 
regulatory oversight on the content and on monitoring of compliance and enforcement 
of these rules by national regulators authorities, the Agency and/ or the European 
Commission (…)” must be guaranteed.387 Upon examination of Regulation (EC) 
714/2009, it becomes apparent that, whereas it is, indeed, the European Commission, 
which controls the “content” and “enforcement” of these rules, the national energy 
regulators merely “monitor” compliance with these rules. Just as under former article 9 
of Regulation (EC) 1228/2003, the national energy regulators have merely the power to 
                                                 
384 As to the ETSO, see e.g. ETSO former website, What is ETSO, www.etso-
net.org/association/about us/ (23.06.2008); see also Cross-border Tariffs for the Internal Market of 
Electricity in Europe (IEM), see also ETSO, ITC Agreement 2008 – 2009, Explanatory draft, 3 
October 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/doc/2009_02_28_tso_explanatory_no
te.pdf (02.07.2009); ETSO, press release, Inter-TSO Compensation Mechanism for 2007, 22 
December 2006, 
https://www.entsoe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/_library/ntc/archive/Press%20Release%20in%2
0ITC%2020075-final.pdf (02.07.2009). 
385 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 
presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM (2007) 531 final at 4.1.  
386 Ibid at 4.1; see also F. J. Säcker, Netzausbau- und Kooperationsverpflichtungen der 
Übertragungsnetzbetreiber nach Inkrafttreten des EnLAF und der Dritten StromRL 2009/72 EG vom 
13.7.2009, RdE 10-11/ 2009, 305 et seq. 
387 Ibid at 4.1. 
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“ensure compliance with this Regulation and the Guidelines” of the European 
Commission (article 19 of Regulation /EC) 714/2009). 
4.2.1.2 The control of the European Commission over the European Network of 
transmission system operators 
The European Commission secures control over the ENTSO for Electricity in 
two ways. It may, firstly, request the ENTSO for Electricity to draw up technical and 
market codes in those areas that are listed in article 8 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009 (article 6 para. 6 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). These network codes 
must thereby comply with the “framework guideline” adopted by the Agency upon 
request of the European Commission (article 6 para. 2 and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009). The framework guideline may also be elaborated by the European 
Commission itself, if it “considers that the framework guideline does not contribute to 
non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market” 
(article 6 para. 4 and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). Where the ENTSO for 
Electricity fails to develop the network codes within the period set by the European 
Commission, the network codes are prepared by the Agency under control of the 
European Commission (article 6 para. 10 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009).388 The 
European Commission may also, “upon its own initiative”, decide to adopt the network 
codes itself, if it considers that the ENTSO for Electricity or the Agency have failed to 
develop appropriate network codes (article 6 para. 11 of Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009). The European Commission may, secondly, adopt binding guidelines for the 
development of network codes, either upon its own initiative or upon recommendation 
of the Agency (article 6 para. 12 of Regulation (EC) No 724/2009).  
Hence, whereas the European Commission disposes of real decision-making powers 
with regard to the activities of the ENTSO for Electricity, the national energy regulators 
                                                 
388 Art. 6 para. 10 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 is in line with the European Parliament’s demand to 
give to the Agency “the final say over the approval and adoption of the gird access and market rules 
laid out by the ENTSO’s”; see e.g. art. “MEPs: Strong EU regulators key to energy market puzzle”, 
29.05.2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/meps-strong-eu-regulator-key-energy-market-
puzzle/art.-172804 (14.08.2010). 
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play merely a supervisory role. The European Commission does not only control the 
procedure for the development of network codes, it also determines the contents of 
these codes.389
Here, a similar tactic as the one used with regard to national energy regulators’ powers 
is employed by the European Commission: it strengthens, in a first step, the powers of 
the ENTSO for Electricity and secures, in a second step, its power over the electricity 
market through a control over the ENTSO for Electricity. 
4.2.2. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators as intermediary 
controlling body 
Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (“Regulation (EC) No 713/2009”) establishes the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (“the Agency”)390 (4.2.2.1). The legal basis upon 
                                                 
389 See H. Lecheler, Die Verschärfung des Regulierungsregimes durch die drei neuen Verordnungs-
Entwürfe im Paket vom 19.09.2007, RdE 6/2008, p. 167 at p. 170; critical also J. Kühling, Die 
Vorschläge zur institutionellen Neuorganisation des grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandels im 3. 
Energiebinnenmarkt-Paket - Defizite und Verbesserungsoptionen, IR 5/ 2008, p. 98 at p. 101. 
390 Initially the European Commission put forward in its Proposal three options for establishing an EU 
regulatory function: gradually evolving the current approach by reinforcing collaboration between 
national regulators; ERGEG taking on greater independent decision-making and coordinating powers 
(ERGEG +); and the creation of an independent single European regulator; for further details, see 
ERGEG; ERGEG’s response to the European European Commission’s Communication “An Energy 
Policy for Europe”, Ref. C06-BM-09-05, 6 February 2007 at p. 25 et seq; see also 2007 Annual Report 
of the European Energy Regulators, website European Energy Regulators CEER & ERGEG, 
publications & press, annual reports, p. 7 et 
seq,http://www.energyregulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/
ANNUAL%20REPORTS/2007/4732CDA067DEE73DE040A8C03C2F2F45 (25.09.2010). 
On the establishment of European Agencies in general, see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 
Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Europäische Agenturen, 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/analysen/2007/Europaeische_Agenturen.pdf 
(19.09.2010); on the establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators in 
particular, including the procedural steps, news and events, see European Energy Forum, Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators, http://www.europeanenergyforum.eu/archives/european-union/eu-general-topic-
file/eu-competition-and-economic-matters/third-legislative-package-on-eu-electricity-gas-
markets/establishment-of-an-agency-for-the-cooperation-of-energy-regulators (19.09.2010). 
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which it has been established (4.2.2.2), the way it is composed (4.2.2.3), the tasks that 
have been conferred upon it (4.2.2.4), in particular with regard to the exercise of 
executive powers (4.2.2.5), prove that the European Commission aims, first and 
foremost, at giving the Agency control over Member States’ national energy regulators 
(4.2.2.6).391 The European Commission itself secures its influence over the national 
energy regulators through various means, including its influence on the composition of 
the Agency or the enactment of legally binding guidelines (4.2.2.7).  
4.2.2.1 Introduction: ERGEGplus or a European agency? 
The creation of a single European energy market requires the national energy 
regulatory authorities of the Member States to carry out their regulatory tasks 
according to uniform principles. The coordination of the implementation of these 
principles, which are determined in current energy laws, such as in Directive 
2009/72/EC, has been conferred upon the European Regulators Group for Electricity 
and Gas (hence ERGEG), an institution established by European Commission 
Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas (hence ERGEG European Commission Decision).392 Generally, 
the ERGEG, which is composed of the heads of the national regulatory authorities or 
their representatives (article 2 para. 1 of ERGEG European Commission Decision), is 
entrusted with advising and assisting the European Commission in consolidating the 
internal energy market, in particular, with respect to the preparation of draft 
implementing measures on matters related to the internal energy market, and thereby 
                                                 
391 For details as to the European Union’s competence to establish European agencies, see W. Kilb, 
Europäische Agenturen und ihr Personal – die großen Unbekannten?, EuZW 9/2006, p. 268 et seq. 
According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on “Meroni”, the establishment of the 
Agency, including of its extensive powers, is legitimate as long as a sufficient judiciary protection and 
sufficient participation rights of the European Parliament is guaranteed; for details, see J. Kühling, 
Vorschläge zur institutionellen Neuorganisation des grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandels im 3. 
Energiebinnenmarkt – Paket- Defizite und Verbesserungsoptionen, IR 5/ 2008, p. 98 at p. 101; see also 
J. Kühling, Die Zukunft des Europäischen Agentur(un)wesens – oder: Wer hat Angst vor Meroni?, 
EuZW 5/2008, p. 129 et seq.; see furthermore S. Neveling, Europäisierung der Energieaufsicht? – 
Vorschläge von Kommission und ERGEG zur Neuordnung (Teil 1), IR 8/2007, p. 173 at p. 175. 
392 See European Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas (2003/96/EC), OJEU L 296, 14.11.2003, p. 34 – p. 35. 
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ensuring its creation and smooth functioning (article 1 para. 2 of ERGEG European 
Commission Decision).393Its tasks include the facilitating and promoting of 
consultation, coordination and cooperation between the national energy regulatory 
authorities in the Member States, and between these bodies and the European 
Commission, and contributing to a consistent application in all Member States of 
Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 (article 1 
para. 2 of ERGEG European Commission Decision). It furthermore acts as a link 
between the national energy regulators, the European Commission and market 
participants, consumers and end-users, with which it shall consult extensively and at 
an early stage in an open and transparent manner (article 1 para. 2 of ERGEG 
European Commission Decision).394 The activities of the ERGEG resulted in the 
development of different non-binding codes, such as the Guidelines of Good Practice 
(hence, GGPs), aimed at giving directions to the national energy regulators within the 
exercise of their office.395 Although these codes and common approaches lead to a 
“gradual convergence” of the activities of the national energy regulators, as the 
European Commission claims, they were unable to lead to real decisions on the 
difficult issues that need to be taken in the area of energy regulation.396 It was 
proposed by the ERGEG itself that the voluntary cooperation between the national 
energy regulators should now take place within a Community structure with clear 
                                                 
393 For more details, see ERGEG, CEER, 2009 Annual Report of the European Energy Regulators, p. 2 
– 4, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/ANNUAL%20REPOR
TS/Tab/ergeg_%20ceer%20annual%20report%2009.pdf (06.01.2011). 
394 See CEER & ERGEG, Annual Report of the European Energy Regulators, 2009, p. 4, 
http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/ANNUAL%20REPOR
TS/Tab/ergeg_%20ceer%20annual%20report%2009.pdf (06.01.2011). 
395 The ERGEG’s Guidelines of Good Practice are voluntary guidelines that are legally not enforceable, 
see homepage of the European Energy Regulators, CEER & ERGEG, Papers, Guidelines of Good 
Practice, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_ERGEG_PAPE
RS/Guidelines%20of%20Good%20Practice/Electricity (06.01.2011). 
396 See e.g. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
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competences and with the power to adopt individual regulatory decisions in a number 
of specific cases.397
In its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (European 
Commission’s Proposal on establishing an Agency)398 the European Commission 
stated that, although the activities of the ERGEG “made a very positive contribution 
to the completion to the internal energy markets”, they had not “resulted in the real 
push towards the development of common standards and approaches necessary to 
make cross-border trade and (…) a European energy market a reality”.399 This was, 
in the European Commission’s view, particularly true as to the technical rules and 
standards for electricity operators, which “differ enormously between Member States 
and often even within a single Member State”, making cross-border trade difficult and 
often impossible.  
As a consequence, the European Commission, after having examined, if it was be able 
to pursue the required tasks itself, opted for the establishment of a “separate entity, 
independent and outside the European Commission” and evaluated three different 
options. 400
The first option that the European Commission examined was to promote the creation 
of a more powerful network of national energy regulators, by intensifying the 
cooperation between them and introducing specific notification obligations towards 
                                                 
397 See e.g. Recital (3) of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
398 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM 
(2007) 530 final, 2007/0197 (COD). 
399 Ibid at 3.1; see also Recital (3) of Directive 2009/72/EC. 
400 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM 
(2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
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the European Commission.401 However, the creation of such a “self-organisation of 
the national regulatory authorities” would, in the European Commission’s view, not 
prove effective, because it would only be able to adopt national administrative 
regulations (Verwaltungsvorschriften), which had no legally binding effects vis-à-vis 
third parties (unmittelbare Außenwirkung). In addition, this would necessitate the 
creation of autonomous powers for the European Commission in the energy sector.402 
Moreover, as purely national entities, they would not be able to carry out the 
necessary European supervision on energy related issues.  Finally, the European 
progress would continue to be based upon voluntary agreements between the national 
energy regulators, which often pursue different and purely national interests. 403
The second option considered was to elevate and strengthen the ERGEG, by 
conferring upon it greater independent decision-making and coordinating powers 
(ERGEGplus) for regulators and relevant market players on certain precisely defined 
technical issues and mechanisms relating to cross border issues .404 In the European 
Commission’s view, this option would, however, equally not be effective, given that 
the ERGEG represents a purely advisory body and does not dispose of its own 
administrative structure. 405   
                                                 
401 See e.g. B. Holznagel/ P. Schumacher, ERGEGplus – Wieder der Versuch der Einführung eines 
Europäischen Regulierers durch die Hintertür, RdE 8/2007, p. 225 at p. 229. 
402 See S. Neveling, Europäisierung der Energieaufsicht? – Vorschläge von Kommission und ERGEG 
zur Neuordnung (Teil 2), IR, Heft 9/2007, p. 194 at p. 195. 
403 See e.g. B. Holznagel/ P. Schumacher, ERGEGplus – Wieder der Versuch der Einführung eines 
Europäischen Regulierers durch die Hintertür, RdE 8/2007 at p. 225; see also Communication from the 
European Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, An Energy Policy for 
Europe, COM (2007) 1 final, p. 8. 
404 For a detailed overview on the tasks of the ERGEG+ developed through the European Commission 
and the ERGEG, ibid at p. 226 et seq. 
405 See e.g. S. Neveling, Europäisierung der Energieaufsicht? – Vorschläge von Kommission und 
ERGEG zur Neuordnung (Teil 1), IR, Heft 8/2007, p. 173 at p. 174. 
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The third option evaluated through the European Commission related to the creation 
of an independent single European energy regulator.406 The European Commission 
considered that an independent central entity offered a number of long-term 
advantages over the other options. 407 It concluded that if an independent body should 
be established to make proposals to the European Commission regarding decisions, 
which involve substantive decisions and to take individual regulatory decisions, 
which are binding on market participants with regard to technical issues, the only 
solution was the creation of an independent energy regulator.408
Hence, based upon the European Commission’s Proposal on establishing an Agency, 
article 1 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (“Regulation (EC) No 713/2009”) set up the Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (“the Agency”). 
4.2.2.2 The legitimacy of the European Union to establish the Agency as a 
European regulatory agency 
Generally, European agencies emerged completely outside of European 
primary law, bearing no reference within the framework of the treaties of the 
European Union. 409  
                                                 
406 For further details, see e.g. the Communications of the European Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market, COM (2006) 841 final at p. 
15 et seq, ERGEG’s response to the European European Commission’s Communication, An Energy 
Policy for Europe, Ref. C06-BM-09-05, 6 February 2007 at p. 25 et seq. 
407 See Recital (5) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJEU, L 211/1. 
408 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM 
(2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
409 See e.g. J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 431; see also W. Kilb, Europäische Agenturen und ihr Personal – die 
großen Unbekannten?, EuZW, Heft 9/2006, p. 268 at p. 269. 
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Within European primary law, article 13 para. 1 TEU determines seven institutions as 
organs that share between them the constitutional powers necessary to carry out the 
legislative, executive and judicial functions of the European Union. These are the 
European Commission410 as the “guardian of the Treaties”, the European 
Parliament411 and the Council (of the European Union)412 as legislative and budgetary 
organs, the European Council as organ defining the general political direction and 
priorities of the European Union413, the Court of Justice 414 as judicial control organ, 
the European Central Bank415 and the Court of Auditors416 as examining organ of the 
budget. Equally established through European primary law are “other bodies”, such as 
the Economic and Social Committee417, the Committee of the Regions418 as well as 
further “miscellaneous bodies”, such as the Economic and Financial Committee419 or 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 420
                                                 
410 See art. 244 to 250 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art. 211 to 219 TEC. 
411 See art. 223 to 234 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art. 189 to 201 TEC. 
412 See art. 237 to 243 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art. 202 to 210 TEC. 
413 See art. 235 to 236 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art. 204 to 205 TEC; see furthermore website of the 
European Council, the institution, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/the-
institution.aspx?lang=en (10.03.2011). 
414 See art. 251 to 281 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art.s 220 to 245TEC. 
415 See art.s 282 to 284 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art.s 112 to 113 TEC; The ECB’s main task is to 
maintain the euro's purchasing power and thus price stability in the euro area. For more details, see 
website of the ECB, the European Central Bank, http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/index.en.html 
(10.03.2011). 
416 See art. 285 to 287 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 1 and art. 246 to 248 TEC. 
417 See art. 301 to 304 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 2 and art. 257 to 262 TEC. 
418 See art. 305 to 307 TFEU, ex-art. 7 para. 2 and art. 263 to 265 TEC. 
419 See art. 134 TFEU, ex-art. 114 para. 2 TEC. 
420 See art. 240 TFEU. Primary tasks of the Economic and Social Committee and of the Committee of 
the Regions is to assist the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission in 
advisory capacity (art. 300 and art. 304 TFEU); the European Central Bank and the European 
Investment Bank have mainly advisory and regulatory functions (art. 127 para. 2 and art. 309 para. 1 
TFEU). 
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Over the years the European Commission, responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of an ever-expanding European Union policy, created further bodies, 
such as European agencies, through European secondary legislation. This was 
considered necessary due to the concentration of time-consuming tasks and extensive 
functions in the European Commission, thereby putting pressure on its resources.421
These agencies were established with the aim of supporting the European 
Commission with the implementation of specific technical and scientific aspects of 
policy, where specialist skills were required. Examples of European agencies are the 
European Aviation Safety Agency, European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, the European Chemicals Agency, the European Environment Agency, the 
European Food Safety Authority or the European Maritime Safety Agency. 
4.2.2.2.1 The legal basis of the Agency 
Principally, since European agencies are an instrument for implementing a 
particular European Union policy, the legal instrument creating them must be based 
upon the provisions of the TFEU, which constitutes the specific legal basis for the 
policy in question. In exceptional cases European agencies may, however, also be 
established by means of European secondary legislation on the basis of article 352 
TFEU (ex-article 308 TEC) and article 114 TFEU (ex-article 95 TEC).422 Whereas in 
the 1970s and 1980s European agencies were mostly established under article 308 
TEC423, in recent years they have particularly been based upon article 95 TEC.424 The 
                                                 
421 See D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, Euroepan Union Law, Text and 
Materials, Cambridge 2006, p 99. 
422 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 3; see also R. Bieber/ A. Epiney/ M. Haag, Die 
Europäische Union, Europarecht und Politik, 8. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, p. 148 –  p. 149. 
423 See R. Streinz, § 308 EGV, paras. 34, 43, in: R. Streinz, EUV/EGV, Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Kommentar, 1. Auflage, 
München 2003. 
424 See e.g. J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 442 et seq: see also R. Bieber/ A. Epiney/ M. Haag, Die Europäische 
Union, Europarecht und Politik, 8. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, p. 148; see furthermore E. Lenski, in: 
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use of article 95 TEC as a legal basis for the establishment of European agencies was 
confirmed in the ENISA case, where the European Court of Justice held that, if these 
agencies contributed to the smooth functioning of the single European market, as it 
was the case with the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), 
they could be built upon article 95 TEC.425
In line with the jurisprudence of the ENISA case, the Agency has been established 
upon Article 1 (1) of Regulation (EC) 713/2009, which was adopted on the basis of 
Article 95 TEC.  However, although article 95 TEC was confirmed in the ENISA case 
as the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the ENISA, the arguments 
brought forward in this case can, in my view, not directly be applied to the Agency. 
Main reason is that the ENISA and the Agency assume different functions: whereas 
the ENISA is entrusted with mere coordination and advisory functions, the Agency 
has been vested with real decision-making powers.426 It needs therefore to be 
examined whether article 95 TEC provides indeed the appropriate legal basis for the 
adoption of that regulation. 
Generally, article 95 TEC was introduced to enable the European Union to adopt the 
legislation necessary to complete the internal market by using qualified majority 
voting in the Council, rather than unanimity as required by article 94 TEC. Article 95 
                                                                                                                                            
C. O. Lenz/ K.-D. Borchardt, EU-Verträge, Kommentar nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 5. Auflage, 
Köln 2010, art. 13, para. 21 et seq. 
425ECJ, OJEU, C-217/04, 02.05.2006, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0217:EN:PDF (08.01.11) : in the 
ENISA case, the United Kingdom had challenged the legality of ENISA, which was established in 
Regulation (EC) No. 460/2004 on the basis of art. 95 EC Treaty. The United Kingdom argued that 
there was no connection between the establishment and the functioning of the internal market as 
required by art. 95 EC Treaty. The European Court of Justice dismissed the action and held that 
Regulation (EC) No. 460/2004 was lawfully based upon art. 95 EC Treaty; see also Report N. Ahner, 
ERGEG Workshop on Unbundling and Corporate Governance in the Third Package, Florence School 
of Regulation, 25.10.2009, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/CEER-
ERGEG%20EVENTS/CROSS-SECTORAL/Corporate_Governance_Workshop/WD/C09-
URB-24-03_CorporateGovernance_AX-Programme.pdf (13.01.2010). 
426 See ENISA Website, our activities, http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act (08.01.2011). 
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para. 1 sent. 2 TEC (article 114 TFEU) stipulates that the Council shall, acting in 
accordance with procedure referred to in Article 251 and, after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, “adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” 
The scope of powers conferred upon the European Union through article 95 TEC has 
controversially been discussed.  
In the case Germany v Parliament and Council regarding the Tobacco Advertising 
Directive 98/94427, the Court held that article 95 TEC could not be construed as 
conferring upon the Community legislator a general power to regulate the internal 
market. It ruled that the measures adopted under this article had to have the specific 
object of improving the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market and had to be designed to remove genuine obstacles to free movement 
or distortions of competition and not merely abstract risks.428 However, in the case 
Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health, the 
Court considered that the European Union was authorised to intervene by adopting 
“appropriate measures” in compliance with article 95 para. 3 TEC and with the legal 
principles mentioned in the Treaty or identified in the case-law, in particular the 
principle of proportionality in order to deal with actual or potential obstacles to 
trade.429
Against the application of article 95 TEC to the Agency’s establishment as 
appropriate legal basis speaks that the power conferred upon the Community 
legislature by article 95 TEC is the power to harmonise national laws and not one that 
is aimed at setting up the Agency and conferring tasks upon it. On the contrary, it has 
                                                 
427 OJEU L213/9. 
428 ECJ, case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (2000) E.C.R. I-8419; see also Case C-
74/99 Imperial Tobacco (2000) E.C.R. I-8599. 
429 ECJ, case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health,  
(2004) E.C.R. I- 11893, paras. 33, 39 and 42. 
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always been emphasised by the European Commission in its Proposal and found its 
way in Regulation (EC) 713/2009 that the Agency would only complement at 
European level the regulatory tasks performed at national level by the regulatory 
authorities in assisting them and, where necessary coordinate their actions. 430 Apart 
from their individual decision making powers on certain technical issues, the Agency 
is therefore even expressly precluded from interfering with the competences of the 
national energy regulators. In addition, one could argue that even if the Agency’s 
establishment was beneficial to the functioning of the internal market due to the fact 
that it supports the European Commission, this does not mean that it constitutes a 
harmonisation measure within the meaning of article 95 TEC.  
In favour of the application of article 95 TEC as legitimate basis for the Agency’s 
establishment speaks that its competences reach further than those of the ENISA, 
which is only allowed to give non-binding advice and that, as a result of it, the powers 
conferred upon the Agency could in their entirety amount to an “approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member 
States” within the meaning of article 95 TEC. Moreover, on could argue that article 
95 TEC does not define the degree to which the European measure must approximate 
the legal orders of the Member States with the consequence that it would not be 
necessary for the measure to approximate substantive rules of national legislation. 
One could say that, given the technical complexity of the energy sector and its rapidly 
evolving character, Regulation (EC) 713/2009 had the objective to prevent further 
obstacles to the energy sector as well as to eliminate the loss of efficiency arising 
from an uncoordinated adoption by the Member States of technical codes, from the 
heterogeneous development of national energy laws and of the differing practices of 
the Member States. One could therefore argue that the Agency, by assisting the 
European Commission by means of non-binding advice and individual decision-
making powers, provides a decisive contribution to the harmonisation of national laws 
in the area of energy regulation.  
                                                 
430 See European Commission’s Proposal at 3.2; see art. 1 of Regulation (EC) 713/2009 
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Article 95 TEC constitutes, in my view, the appropriate legal basis for the adoption of 
Regulation (EC) 713/2009 establishing the Agency. 
First of all, regarding the expression “measures for the approximation” within the 
meaning of article 95 TEC, the Court ruled that it is aimed at conferring upon the 
institutions of the European Union “a discretion, depending on the general context 
and the specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonised” and that, as a result of 
it, the institutions of European Union could chose “the method of approximation the 
most appropriate for achieving the desired result.”431  It held that nothing in the 
wording of article 95 TEC implied that addressees of the measures adopted by the 
Community legislature could only be the individual Member States.432 As a 
consequence, it was legitimate to provide for the establishment of the Agency as a 
European body, which is responsible for contributing to the implementation of a 
process of harmonisation for the regulation of the energy market.
In addition, the objectives and tasks laid down for the Agency in Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009 must thereby closely be linked to the subject-matter of the acts 
approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States. 433 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 must be seen in connection with the entire 
framework adopted in the area of energy regulation, in particular in connection with 
Directive 2009/72/EC. This becomes apparent upon article 1 para. 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009, which links the purpose of the Agency to article 35 of Directive 
2009/72/EC. Hence, the objectives of the Agency as laid down in article 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 and the tasks of the Agency as laid down in articles 5 
et seq. of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 must be closely linked to the objectives 
pursued by Directive 2009/72/EC, which is to “the establishment of common rules for 
the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity, together with 
                                                 
431 Ibid at para. 45; see also ENISA case, para. 43 (n. 427). 
432 See ENISA case, para. 44 (n. 427). 
433 See ENISA case, paras. 45 and 47 (n. 427). 
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consumer protection provisions, with a view to improving and integrating competitive 
electricity markets in the Community” (article 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC). The 
objectives of the Agency is to assist the regulatory authorities referred to in article 35 
of Directive 2009/72/EC in exercising, at Community level, the regulatory tasks 
performed in the Member States and, where necessary, to coordinate their action 
(article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). This shall enhance the cooperation of the 
national energy regulators at Community level and the participation, on a mutual 
basis, in the exercise of Community related functions (Recital 5 and Recital 29 of 
Regulation (EC) 713/2009). In order to achieve this, the Agency has been vested with 
extensive advisory, coordinative and decision-making powers. As a result, by 
enhancing the participation and cooperation of national energy regulators at European 
level, the objectives and tasks of the Agency are closely linked to the establishment of 
common rules in the energy sector and thereby help to unify the competitive European 
electricity markets. In providing assistance to the national energy regulators and 
operators, which affect the homogenous implementation of harmonising instruments 
in the energy sector and which are likely to affect their application, the Agency’s 
tasks are closely linked to the subject-matter of Regulation (EC) 713/2009 and 
Directive 2009/72/EC. 
Finally, article 95 TEC can only be used as a legal basis where it is actually and 
objectively apparent from the legal act that its purpose is to “improve the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market”.434 Regulation (EC) 
713/2009 and herewith the establishment of the Agency must therefore improve the 
conditions for the establishment and functioning of the energy market. In the ENISA 
case the Court held that ENISA was an appropriate means of “preventing the 
emergence of disparities likely to create obstacles to the smooth functioning of the 
internal market in the area”.435 Hence, if such was assumed with regard to the ENISA, 
                                                 
434 See e.g. Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (6.12.2005) E.C.R. I-10553, 
para. 44, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0066:EN:HTML (11.03.2011); 
see also the ENISA case, para. 42 (n. 427). 
435 In this sense also the argument of the Court used in the ENISA case, see para. 62 (n. 427). 
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which has only the power of giving non-binding advice, such must a fortiori (Erst-
recht-Schluss) be the case with regard to the Agency, which has even the power to 
adopt individual decisions in technical areas of the energy sector. 
However, it is rather questionable whether the establishment of the Agency is justified 
upon the principle of subsidiarity, which requires the European Union to act “only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States on national level, but can rather be better achieved at 
European level” (article 5 para. 3 Treaty of Lisbon).436 Contrary to former article 5 
para. 2 TEC, which differentiated only between two levels of competences, i.e. the 
European Union and the Member States, article 5 para. 3 TFEU includes the sub-
Federal levels of the Member States, i.e. regions and municipalities as well.437 On the 
one hand, the principle of subsidiarity prohibits the European Union to intervene 
whenever an issue can effectively be regulated through the Member States at central, 
regional or local level. On the other hand, the European Union is permitted to exercise 
its powers, when Member States are unable to achieve the objectives of the Treaties in 
a satisfactory manner. Hence, in accordance with article 5 para. 3 TFEU, the energy 
sector must not be an area that falls within the exclusive competence of the European 
Union. This is the case, since, pursuant to article 4 para. 2 (i) TFEU, the energy sector 
is part of the shared competences of the European Union and the Member States. It is 
furthermore necessary that the objectives of Regulation (EC) 713/2009, namely the 
participation and cooperation of the national energy regulators at European level, 
“cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States”. Although there might be 
disparities between the different Member States as to regulation of the energy sector, 
                                                 
436 See e.g. N. Ahner, ERGEG Workshop on Unbundling and Corporate Governance in the Third 
Package, Florence School of Regulation, 25.10.2009, p. 10, http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/CEER-
ERGEG%20EVENTS/CROSS-SECTORAL/Corporate_Governance_Workshop/WD/C09-
URB-24-03_CorporateGovernance_AX-Programme.pdf (13.01.2010); on the principle of 
subsidiarity in general, see D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, European Union Law, in: A. Arnull, A. Dashwood, 
M. Dougan, M. Ross, E. Spaventa and D. Wyatt, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 97 –  p.110. 
437 See e.g. W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, Neuauflage, 
Berlin 2010, p. 215 – p. 217; see also D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, 
European Union Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 219 et seq. 
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there is no prove that the Member States were not able to establish another form of 
interaction between their national energy regulators than the establishment of a single 
European energy regulator. This requirement relates to the final condition of article 5 
para. 3 TFEU, which is equally not proven, requiring that the participation and 
cooperation of the national energy regulators at European level can, “by reason of its 
scale of effects, be implemented more successfully by the European Union”. 
Regulation (EC) 713/2009 states, in this regard, merely that its objectives “cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at 
Community level” (Recital 29 of Regulation (EC) 713/2009). 438
4.2.2.2.2 The Agency as a European regulatory agency 
Within European law no single model for European agencies exists. They can 
generally be classified into two types of agency, the “regulatory agencies” and the 
“executive agencies”.439 These agencies have in common that they were created in 
order to perform tasks that are clearly set out in their constitutional act, that they 
dispose of legal personality and enjoy a certain degree of organisational and financial 
autonomy.440 Being created at different points in the past in order to meet specific 
requirements at the time, they have, however, many differences as regards their 
internal structure, their relations with the institutions, responsibilities and powers.441 
Indeed, whereas executive agencies carry out tasks of a purely administrative nature, 
relating to the management of Community programs, regulatory agencies are actively 
involved in executive functions by enacting instruments, which help to regulate a 
                                                 
438 For a detailed overview of the definition and the requirements of the principle of subsidiarity, see G. 
Langguth, in: C. O. Lenz/ K.-D. Borchardt, EU-Verträge, Kommentar nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 
5. Auflage, Köln 2010, art. 5, paras. 16 et seq. 
439 For more details, see e.g. E. Lenski, in: C. O. Lenz/ K.-D. Borchardt, Eu-Verträge, Kommentar nach 
dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 5. Auflage, Köln 2010, art. 13, paras. 17 et seq. 
440 See Communication from the European Commission, The Operating Framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies, 11.12.2002, COM (2002) 718 final at p. 3. 
441 See Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
European agencies – The way forward, COM (2008) 135 final, p. 2 et seq; see also W. Kilb, 
Europäische Agenturen und ihr Personal – die großen Unbekannten?, EuZW, Heft 9/2006, p. 268 at p. 
270 et seq. 
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specific sector. Regulatory agencies are thus decision-making bodies, which are 
empowered to enact instruments that are binding on third parties, whereas executive 
agencies, when performing their tasks to assist the European Commission in the 
discharge of its responsibilities, have no real decision-making powers.442 Moreover, 
whereas executive agencies are governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 
19 December 2002, laying down their statute and tasks in the management of 
Community programmes, regulatory agencies are not specifically regulated.443 In 
addition, executive agencies are, contrary to regulatory agencies, usually set up for a 
limited period of time. Moreover, whereas regulatory agencies are spread all over 
Europe, executive agencies are always located close to European Commission 
headquarters.444 Regarding the organisational structure of executive agencies, they are 
legally assigned to the European Commission, which creates them, closely supervises 
their activities and appoints the key staff. Member States do not dispose of any 
participation rights via an administrative council.445
The Agency has been established as a classical European regulatory agency, aimed at 
helping to regulate the energy sector at European level and implement European 
energy policy. By performing its tasks, the Agency shall improve the way in which 
the rules are implemented and applied throughout the European Union. It plays thus 
an active role in exercising executive powers at Community level. 446  
                                                 
442 See e.g. T. Groß, Die Kooperation zwischen europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden, 
EuR, Heft 1/2005, p. 54 at p. 56 et seq; see also Coomission 2002, 718 final, p. 4; see also 
Communication from the European Commission, The Operating Framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies, 11.12.2002, COM (2002) 718 final at p. 3 and p. 4. 
443 O.J. L 11, p. 1. 
444 See Communication from the European Commission, The Operating Framework for the European 
Regulatory Agencies, 11.12.2002, COM (2002) 718 final at p. 7. 
445 For further details, see T. Groß, Die Kooperation zwischen europäischen Agenturen und nationalen 
Behörden, EuR, Heft 1/2005, p. 54 at p. 56 et seq. 
446 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 5; see also Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European agencies – The way forward, 
COM (2008) 135 final at p. 4 et seq. 
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4.2.2.3 The composition of the Agency and the question of independence of its 
organs vis-à-vis the European Commission 
The Agency constitutes a “Community body with legal personality” (article 2 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), which disposes of its own administrative 
structure with a staff of around 50 people and its own budget447. The Agency will 
initially be located in Brussels, Belgium. Since 3 March 2011, the Agency is fully 
operational in its permanent office in Ljubljana, Slovenia.448
4.2.2.3.1 The organs of the Agency  
The Agency has four operating bodies as its management: the Director 
(4.2.2.3.1.1), the Administrative Board (4.2.2.3.1.2), the Board of Regulators 
(4.2.2.3.1.3) and the Board of Appeal (4.2.2.3.1.4). Regarding the independence of 
the Agency’s organs vis-à-vis the European institutions, in particular vis-à-vis the 
European Commission, they have formally been granted a significant degree of 
autonomy through Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. De facto, they are, however, all but 
independent vis-à-vis the European Commission. 
4.2.2.3.1.1 The Director 
4.2.2.3.1.1.1 Appointment 
The Director is appointed by the Administrative Board after consultation and 
approval of the Board of Regulators (article 13 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 
                                                 
447  The budget of the Agency will be in the order of EUR 5 million per year, see website of the 
European European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/Agency/Agency_en.htm (08.01.11). 
448 See Press release of the Agency, New Impetus for Internal Market: Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators takes up operations in Slowenia of 3 March 2011, see website of the Agency, News, 
http://www.energy-
regulator.eu/portal/page/portal/AGENCY_HOME/Communication/News/Press%20release%2
0EN%20FINAL.doc (10.03.2011). 
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713/2009). He represents the Agency (article 2 para. 3 in connection with article 17 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and is responsible of its management 
(article 16 para. 1 and 17 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
4.2.2.3.1.1.2 Tasks of the Director 
The Director assumes mainly administrative tasks in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the Agency (17 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). He prepares 
and participates in the work of the Administrative Board without, however, having a 
right to vote (17 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). He prepares and 
implements the annual work programme (17 para. 4 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009) and the budget of the Agency, for which he draws up the final accounts of 
the Agency, thereby “acting on his own responsibility”  (article 3 (c) in connection 
with article 17 para. 7 and article 24 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). In 
order to be able to exercise his functions efficiently, the Director may adopt internal 
administrative instructions (interne Verwaltungsanweisungen) and issue publish 
notices (Mitteilungen) pursuant to article 17 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 
The Director is furthermore  responsible to “adopt and publish” the opinions, 
recommendations and decisions referred to in article 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 (17 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). However, 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 does not specify which particular organ shall carry out 
these tasks, but merely entrusts “the Agency”. The Director, when considering the 
tasks conferred upon him through article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, is not 
responsible for them. The Administrative Board, which is supposed to meet only 
twice a year in ordinary session (article 12 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), 
can equally not be regarded as responsible to carry out such such ordinary, daily 
tasks. The same applies to the Board of Regulators, which assumes merely advisory 
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functions. As a consequence, Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 lacks provisions, which 
specifically determine the internal organisational structure of the Agency.449
4.2.2.3.1.1.3 The question of independence towards the European Commission 
Article 16 para. 1 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 stipulates that 
“without prejudice to the respective roles of the Administrative Board and the Board 
of Regulators, the Director shall neither seek nor follow any instruction from any 
Government, from the European Commission, or from any other public or private 
entity”. This provision aims to guarantee that the Director is able to exercise its 
functions free from influence and control of any of the European institutions, of the 
national Governments, including the national energy regulators. 
It is, in particular, the Director’s independence towards the European Commission, 
which is questionable. The wording of article 16 para. 1 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009 is clear. Indeed, contrary to article 13 para. 1 sent 2 of the European 
Commission’s Proposal on establishing an Agency, the requirement of the Director’s 
independence is clearly stated. In article 13 para. 1 sent 2 of the Proposal on 
establishing an Agency, the European Commission proposed to guarantee the 
Director’s independence “without prejudice to the respective powers of the European 
Commission”. One could thus follow that the European Commission wanted to 
remain in the position of enforcing the powers conferred upon it towards the Director. 
This would have had the consequence that the independence of the Director would, at 
least to a certain extent, have been restricted.450 The wording of article 13 para. 1 sent 
2 of the European Commission’s Proposal has, however, not been retained through 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, but has been replaced by the term “without prejudice 
to the respective roles of the Administrative Board and the Board of Regulators” 
(article 16 para. 1 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). In addition, article 16 
                                                 
449 In this sense, see U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 1), IR, Heft 6/2008, p. 122 at p. 125 and p. 126. 
450 Ibid at p. 123. 
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para. 1 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 now explicitly states that the Director 
shall not seek or follow any instruction “from the European Commission”.  
However, the European Commission retains indirect influence and control over the 
Director. First of all, the European Commission participates in the Director’s 
appointment. Indeed, pursuant to article16 para. 2 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009, the Director is appointed from a list proposed by the European 
Commission. The European Commission is therefore in the position of choosing the 
director of the Agency and thus of appointing a person that matches its expectations 
of a leadership of the Agency. In addition, the European Commission is also involved 
in the Director’s removal from office. Article 16 para. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 regulates that the Director may be removed from office only upon a 
decision of the Administrative Board on the basis of a three-quarters majority and 
only after having obtained a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators. 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 does, however, not specify, under which circumstances 
the Director of the Agency may be removed from his office. Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 does, however, prescribe that his appointment shall be effectuated by the 
Administrative Board following a favourable opinion of the Board of Regulators on 
the basis of merit as well as skills and experience relevant to the energy sector (article 
13 para. 1 in connection with article 15 para. 2 and article 16 para. 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). By argumentum e contrario it can thus be concluded that the 
Director may be removed from office only upon a gross violation of the qualifications 
appointing him and only after consultation of the Board of Regulators and the 
European Commission. Moreover, the European Commission retains influence as to 
the extension of the term of the Director’s office. The Director, which is basically 
appointed for a five-year term (article 16 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), 
can be reappointed for another period of three years, if the European Commission so 
proposes (article 16 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The European 
Commission is, finally, involved in the future setup of the Director’s duties. Indeed, 
according to article 16 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 the European 
Commission undertakes, within the course of the nine months preceding the end of 
that period, an assessment of the performance of the Director and the Agency’s duties 
and requirements for the coming years. In being empowered to judge the Director’s 
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past performance and determining the Agency’s future duties and requirements, it 
indirectly defines the duties of the future Director too.  
As a result, although the Director’s independence from the European Commission is 
formally stated in article 16 para. 1 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, it is in 
fact not guaranteed.  
4.2.2.3.1.2 The Administrative Board 
4.2.2.3.1.2.1 Appointment 
Pursuant to article 12 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, the 
Administrative Board comprises nine members and nine alternate members. Members 
and alternates have four-year terms, except for the first mandate, where half of the 
member of the Administrative Board will be granted six-year terms in order to 
guarantee a continual and smooth operation of the Agency. The European Parliament 
and the European Commission each nominate two members and their alternates. The 
European Council nominates the five other members and their alternates. The 
Administrative Board shall meet at least twice a year in ordinary session (article 12 
para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) for the adoption of decisions, which require 
a two-thirds majority (article 12 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
4.2.2.3.1.2.2 Tasks of the Administrative Board  
The Administrative Board assumes administrative, executive as well as 
supervisory functions. It formally appoints the Director (article 13 para. 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), the Board of Regulators (article 13 para. 2 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and the members of the Board of Appeal (article 13 
para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and adopts the work programme and multi-
annual programme of the Agency (article 13 para. 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009).  In addition, it exercises the disciplinary authority over the Director 
(article 13 para. 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and adopts the implementing 
rules of staff regulations and conditions of employment applicable to the staff of the 
Agency, including the Director (article 13 para. 10 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
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in connection with article 28 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Moreover, it 
ensures that the Agency carries out its mission and performs the tasks assigned to it 
(article 13 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. The Administrative Board is 
finally responsible for the establishment of the budget of the Agency (article 13 para. 
9 in connection with article 23 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and is involved in its 
implementation (article 24 para. 4 and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). It makes 
an estimate of revenue and expenditure of the Agency for each financial year on the 
basis of the preliminary draft budget drawn up by the Director and transmits it to the 
European Commission. It finally delivers an opinion on the final accounts of the 
Agency transmitted to it by the Director for the final implementation of the accounts 
of the Agency (article 24 para. 4 and 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.3.1.2.3 The question of independence towards the European Commission 
Article 12 para. 7 sent. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 requires the 
Administrative Board to “act independently and objectively in the public interest, 
without seeking or following any political instructions”. The term, which prescribes 
the independence of the Administrative Board is different from the one used with 
regards to the independence of the Director. On one side, it is more general in that it 
does not specifically name the entity towards which such independence shall apply 
and in that it generally requires a “political” independence. On the other side, it is 
more precise in that it lays down in detail how the independence of the 
Administrative Board has to be ensured. Indeed, article 12 para. 7 sent. 2 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 requires the members of the Administrative Board to 
make a “written declaration of commitments and a written declaration of interests”. 
In these written declarations, which must be published annually, the members must 
indicate whether they see an interest that could be considered prejudicial to their 
independence. The European Commission does, however, also with regards to the 
Administrative Board retain an indirect influence on the composition of the 
Administrative Board, in that it is entitled to appoint two members and two alternate 
members out of nine members. However, due to the small number of members being 
appointed by the European Commission, its influence is less significant than it is in 
the case of the Director. 
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4.2.2.3.1.3 The Board of Regulators 
4.2.2.3.1.3.1 Appointment 
The Board of Regulators is composed of a representative of each Member 
State’s national regulatory authority as well as of one non-voting representative of the 
European Commission (article 14 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The 
Board of Regulators may adopt decisions by a two-thirds majority of its members 
present (article 14 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Contrary to the ERGEG, 
each member and alternate has one vote, independently of the population or the size 
of the Member State (article 14 para. 3 sent. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.3.1.3.2 Tasks of the Board of Regulators 
The Board of Regulators assumes mainly advisory functions. It is, for 
example, entrusted to provide opinions on opinions, recommendations and decisions 
referred to in article 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, has, however, 
no power to draft opinions and recommendations itself. It provides furthermore 
guidance to the Director in the execution of his tasks (article 15 para. 1 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). The Administrative Board also advises on the candidate to be 
appointed as Director (article 15 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). It finally 
approves the work programme of the Agency (article 15 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009) and the independent section on regulatory activities of the annual report 
(article 15 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.3.1.3.3 The question of independence towards the European Commission 
Article 14 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 stipulates that the Board of 
Regulators shall “act independently and shall not seek or follow instructions from any 
Government of a Member State, from the European Commission, or from another 
public or private entity”. The guarantee of independence of the Board of Regulators 
towards the European Commission is stronger than in the case of the Director and the 
Administrative Board due to the fact that the European Commission is merely entitled 
to place a non-voting member. The independence of the Board of Regulators towards 
 
168
 
 
national Governments of the Member States is explicitly required through article 14 
para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. It is, however, questionable whether it is 
desirable, given that the Board of Regulators is the only means by which Member 
States are able to exert a certain influence on the Agency. 
4.2.2.3.1.4 The Board of Appeal 
4.2.2.3.1.4.1 Appointment 
The Board of Appeal comprises six members and six alternate members 
(article 18 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Its members are selected from 
among current or former senior staff of the national regulatory authorities, 
competition authorities or other national or Community institutions with relevant 
experience in the energy sector. The members are nominated by the Administrative 
Board upon proposal of the European Commission and after consultation of the Board 
of Regulators (article 18 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The experience of 
its members shall ensure that the Board of Appeal disposes of significant know-how 
in energy related issues. They are appointed for a five-year term, whereby the term is 
renewable. The removal of a member of the Board of Appeal is only legitimate, if it 
as been found guilty of misconduct and only upon decision of the Administrative 
Board after consultation of the Board of Regulators.  
4.2.2.3.1.4.2 Tasks of the Board of Appeal 
The Board of Appeal is responsible for handling appeals against decisions 
referred to in articles 7, 8 or 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, which are either 
directly addressed to the natural or legal person concerned or which, although in the 
form of a decision addressed to another person, are of direct and individual concern 
to that person (articles 19 para 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Article 19 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 allows thus to appeal against decisions, which directly 
affect the person in question (unmittelbare Entscheidungen) as well as against 
decisions, which produce third party effect (Entscheidungen mit Drittbetroffenheit). 
Appeals need to be filed in writing within two months of the day of notification of the 
decision to the person concerned, upon which the Board of Appeal decides equally 
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within two months of the lodging of the appeal (articles 19 para 2 of Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009). The appeal has no suspensory effect (aufschiebende Wirkung). 
However, the Board of Appeal may suspend the application of the contested decision, 
if it considers that circumstances so require (articles 19 para 3 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009). The Board of Appeal examines whether the appeal is admissible 
(Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde) and well founded (Begründetheit der Beschwerde). 
The parties may be invited by the Board of Appeal to file observations or to make oral 
presentations. The Board of Appeal may either exercise any of the powers conferred 
upon the Agency or to remit the case to the competent body of the Agency, which is 
bound to the decision taken by the Board of Appeal (articles 19 para 5 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). Here again, Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 does not specify, 
which body shall be the “competent body” of the Agency.451
4.2.2.3.1.4.3 The question of independence towards the European Commission 
Pursuant to article 18 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, the members 
of the Board of Appeal “shall be independent in making their decisions”, “shall not be 
bound by any instructions” and “shall not perform any other duties in the Agency, in 
its Administrative Board or in its Board of Regulators”. In addition, they shall “act 
independently and in the public interest”. As in the case of the Administrative Board, 
its members are required to make written declarations of commitments and of 
interests, which are published annually (article 18 para. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009). The independence of the Board of Appeal is the most comprehensive. It 
requires independence with regard to “any” instruction and is thus addressed to any 
public or private entity. However, although article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 guarantees an overall independence towards the national regulatory 
authorities, it does not guarantee independence towards the European Commission, 
which retains a right of proposal of the members of the Board of Appeal. 
                                                 
451 See furthermore U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 1), IR, Heft 6/2008, p. 122 at p. 126. 
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4.2.2.3.2 In-depth analysis: legal protection against decisions of the Board of 
Appeal and the Agency: article 263 TFEU (ex article 230 TEC) 
The legal protection against decisions of the Board of Appeal is laid down in 
article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, which foresees two ways of actions. 
4.2.2.3.2.1 Article 20 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with 
article 263 TFEU (ex-article 230 TEC) 
Article 20 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with article 
263 TFEU (ex-article 230 TEC) allows an action to be brought before the General 
Court (former Court of First Instance) or the Court of Justice, contesting a decision 
taken by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where no right lies before the Board of 
Appeal, by the Agency (Nichtigkeitsklage). Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 thereby requires that the conditions of article 263 TFEU (ex-article 230 
TEC) are fulfilled (“in accordance with Article 230 of the Treaty”). In particular with 
regard to actions brought against acts of European agencies, article 263 TFEU 
contains the additional paragraph 5, which provides that specific conditions and 
arrangements can be laid down in the founding statutes of the European agencies. 
The possibility of specifying further conditions and arrangements does, however, not 
mean that the scope of protection of article 263 TFEU may be altered; it merely 
allows the concretisation of conditions that are specific to agencies.  
4.2.2.3.2.1.1 The jurisdiction of the General Court  
Article 263 para. 1 TFEU generally declares “the Court of Justice of the 
European Union” as the competent court. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
includes, according to article 19 TEU, the Court of Justice, the General Court and the 
specialised courts (together hereinafter referred to as the European Courts). The 
Court of First Instance, although established as a separate decision-making body, did 
not result in the creation of new heads of jurisdiction, but simply in a redistribution of 
responsibility for dealing at first instance with regard to certain cases brought under 
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the existing heads.452 The establishment of the Court of First Instance According to 
article 256 no. 1 para. 1 TFEU (ex-article 225 TEC), the decisions taken by the Board 
of Appeal or the Agency are principally reviewed through the General Court, which 
has jurisdiction to “hear and determine at first instance actions or proceedings 
referred to in Articles 263,…”. The Court of Justice is only competent where 
explicitly provided for  (“with the exception of those… reserved in the Statute for the 
Court of Justice”), (article 256 para. 1 TFEU). The decisions of the General Court are 
subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only (article 256 
no. 1 para. 2 TFEU).  
4.2.2.3.2.1.2 The subject matter of the action (Klagegegenstand) 
Article 263 TFEU, in comparison to former article 230 para. 1 of the TEC, 
brought major changes with regard to the possibility of reviewing acts taken by 
European agencies.  
4.2.2.3.2.1.2.1 Reviewable acts of agencies prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, former article 230 para. 1 of the TEC stipulated 
that the Court of Justice shall review the legality of “acts adopted jointly by the 
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the European 
Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of 
the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.” 
Other European bodies, including European agencies, were not mentioned in article 
230 para. 1 TEC. The question arose, therefore, whether acts of European agencies 
could nevertheless be reviewed under article 230 para. 1 TEC although they did 
                                                 
452 For more details on the allocation of competences within the Corut of Justice, see e.g. W. Frenz, 
Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, Neuauflage, Berlin 2010, p. 672 – p. 
683; see furthermore D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. 
Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 397. 
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principally not take the form of any of the binding acts referred to in article 249 TEC 
(article 288 TFEU).453  
The Court of Justice, in several cases, considered former article 230 TEC as 
applicable.  
In the case Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament”, the applicant, a 
French political group sought, upon article 173 para. 2 EEC Treaty (former 230 TEC, 
now article 263 TFEU), the annulment of a decision of the Bureau of the European 
Parliament concerning the allocation and the use of appropriations for reimbursement 
of expenditure. 454 At the material time, the European Parliament was not mentioned 
in article 230 para. 1 TEC. The Court of Justice held that an act of the European 
Parliament could be subject to judicial review and that neither the Member States nor 
the European institutions could avoid judicial review of measures that were adopted 
by them. It ruled that it would be inconsistent with the sprit of the Treaty to exclude 
measures adopted by the European Parliament, which were intended to have legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties, even though Article 173 TEC referred only to acts of the 
Council and the European Commission. The Court concluded that an interpretation of 
that article, which excluded measures adopted by the European Parliament from those 
which could be contested, would lead to a result that was contrary both to the spirit of 
the Treaty as expressed in Article 164 of the ECC Treaty (former article 220 TEC, 
replaced in substance by article 19 TEU) and to its system. 455
                                                 
453 See e.g. T. Groß, Die Kooperation zwischen europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden, 
EuR, Heft 1/2005, p. 54 at p. 65 et seq; see also D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ 
M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 
444. 
454 ECJ, case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament (23.04.1986) E.C.R., p. 
01339, grounds, para. 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61983J0294:EN:HTML (11.03.2011). 
455 Ibid at paras. 21, 23 – 25. 
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In the case Sogelma - Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v European 
Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the applicant sought the annulment of a decision of 
the EAR that cancelled a tender procedure.456 The EAR claimed that this decision was 
not an act the legality of which could be reviewed by the Court under Article 
230 TEC. It argued that the review of the Court of Justice was limited to acts adopted 
jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, acts of the Council, of the 
European Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions, and to acts of the European Parliament intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.457 The Court of First Instance ruled that 
the European Community was a community based on the rule of law and that the 
Treaty had established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed 
to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the 
institutions. 458 It held that the general scheme of the Treaty was to make a direct 
action available against “any act of a Community body intended to produce legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties had to be open to judicial review”.459 Hence, although 
article 230 para. 1 TEC referred only to Community institutions and the EAR 
established on the basis of secondary legislation was not among the institutions listed 
in article 7 TEC, its acts had to be subject to review as long as such body was 
“endowed with the power to take measures intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties”.460 It concluded that accordingly it could not be acceptable that 
measures intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, which were adopted 
                                                 
456 ECJ, case T-411/06, Sogelma - Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl v European Agency 
for Reconstruction (AER), 8.10.2008 E.C.R., p. II-02771 (Sogelma case), paras 22 – 26, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006A0411:EN:HTML (12.03.2011). 
457 Ibid at paras. 28 – 32. 
458 Ibid at paras.36, 37. 
459 Ibid at paras. 33 and 37. 
460 For a detailed overview of the institutions of the European Union, see e.g. D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, 
in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth 
Edition, London 2006, p. 27 – p. 54. 
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by bodies established on the basis of secondary legislation such as the EAR escape 
judicial review. 461
In the case Nancy Fern Olivieri v European Commission of the European 
Communities and European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, the 
applicants argued that article 230 TEC did not contain an exhaustive list of the 
institutions whose acts were amenable for review and that the EMEA was an auxiliary 
body vested with specific administrative powers whose acts had to be capable of 
being the subject of an action for annulment.462 The European Commission, based on 
wording of article 230 TEC, argued that this article did not include the EMEA in the 
list of bodies whose acts were subject to review.463 The Court of First Instance, not 
considering whether the EMEA was listed under article 230 TEC, rejected the 
application for annulment of the revised opinion as inadmissible on the grounds that 
the negative opinion issued by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) and the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) upon article 10 para. 1 of 
Regulation No 2309/93, constituted an “intermediate measure whose purpose was to 
prepare for the final decision”. As such it did not definitely lay down the European 
Commission’s position with the consequence that it was not a challengeable act under 
article 230 TEC.464   
Within literature some considered to apply former article 230 TEC in analogy to the 
acts of European agencies upon general principles of legal protection (allgemeine 
Rechtsschutzgründe).465Others raised the issue if and to what extent the European 
                                                 
461 Sogelma case, para. 37 (n. 458). 
462 Ibid at para. 28. 
463 Ibid at para. 50. 
464 Ibid at paras. 51, 53. 
465 See U. Ehricke, in: R. Streinz, EUV/EGV, Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur 
Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Kommentar, 1. Auflage, München 2003, § 230, para. 13 
– 17; see also W. Cremer, in: C. Calliess/ M. Ruffert, Kommentar des Vertrages über die Europäische 
Union und des Vertrages zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft - EUV/ EGV, 2. Auflage, 
Neuwied u. Kriftel 2002, art. 230 TEC, paras. 9 – 11; see furthermore J. Schwarze, EU-Kommentar, 2. 
Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, art. 230 TEC, para. 13 – 16. 
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Commission could be held accountable for decisions taken by agencies. They opted to 
legally attributing these acts to the European Commission with the consequence of 
bringing an action directly against the European Commission. 466 If the European 
Commission were held to be accountable for acts taken by European agencies, it 
would, on the one hand, need to be ensured that its degree of accountability does not 
exceed its degree of influence on these agencies’ activities. The European 
Commission would, on the other hand, need to be put in the position to exert a 
sufficient influence on these agencies in order to be able to carry out the actions 
requested through the Court of Justice. Regarding the Agency, it is doubtful whether 
its acts could legally be attributed to the European Commission. Indeed, although the 
European Commission is involved in the Agency’s work by proposing a list of names 
for the Director of the agency, being consulted on work programmes and conducting 
evaluations, its involvement is not substantial and could thus not been judged as 
having a sufficient influence on the Agency.467 Moreover, such approach would be 
contradictory to article 18 para. 3 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, which 
requires the Board of Appeal to act independently and without any instructions also 
from the European Commission.468
4.2.2.3.2.1.2.2 Reviewable acts of agencies since the Lisbon Treaty 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the issue of whether acts of European agencies are 
reviewable (Klagegegenstand) under article 263 TFEU has been resolved. Agencies 
still have not been granted a position that is comparable to the Council, the European 
Commission or the European Parliament. Indeed, they are not included in the 
catalogue of the Union’s institutions of article 1 para. 14 TEU. They are, however, 
now indirectly constitutionalised in that they are referred to in various provisions of 
                                                 
466 See U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 2), IR, Heft 7/2008 at p. 146. 
467 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
European agencies – The way forward, COM (2008) 135 final, p. 5 et seq. 
468 In this sense, see U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 2), IR, Heft 7/2008, p 146 at p. 147. 
 
176
 
 
the European treaties. As to the judicial review of their actions, article 263 para. 1 
sent. 2 TFEU provides that the Court of Justice shall “review the legality of acts of 
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties”. 
4.2.2.3.2.1.2.3 Definition of “acts of … agencies of the Union” 
The definition of “acts” of agencies referred to under article 263 para. 1 sent. 
2 TFEU is difficult to establish since the European treaties refer to various forms of 
acts. Article 288 TFEC (ex-article 249 TEC), for example, defines the legal acts of 
the European Union. It thereby establishes a hierarchy of legal instruments, by 
distinguishing between “legislative acts”, i.e. European laws and European 
framework laws (article 289 TFEU), “non-legislative acts”, i.e. European regulations 
and European decisions (article 290 TFEU) and “non-binding acts”, i.e. 
recommendations and opinions. In addition, article 290 TFEU refers to “delegated 
acts”. Moreover, article 291 TFEU determines “implementing acts”. Finally, article 
263 paragraph 4 TFEU allows to institute proceedings against an “act addressed to 
that person or which is of direct and individual concern to him or her” as well as 
against a “regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures”. 
4.2.2.3.2.1.2.4 Definition of “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties” 
Article 263 TFEU provides that open for review by the Court of Justice are 
only those acts, which are “intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties”. 
Acts producing binding legal effects vis-à-vis third parties are, according to article 
288 TFEC (ex-article 249 TEC), regulations, which are binding in their entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States (article 288 para. 2 TFEU), directives, which 
are binding as to the result to be achieved (article 288 para. 3 TFEU) as well as 
decisions, which are binding in their entirety (article 288 para. 4 TFEU). Of no 
binding legal effects are recommendations and opinions (article 288 para. 5 TFEU). 
This becomes, for example, also apparent by virtue of article 263 para. 1 sent 1 TFEU 
(ex article 230 para. 1 TEC), which explicitly excludes these acts (“other than 
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recommendations and opinions”). In addition to these acts included within the scope 
of protection of article 263 para. 1 TFEU, consistent case-law of the European Courts 
allow an action can also be brought against measures, which, irrespective of their 
chosen form, are “capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about 
a distinct change in his legal position”.469
Regarding European agencies, a distinction needs to be made between regulatory 
activities and the adoption of legal acts, i.e. the adoption of non-legislative acts in 
form of binding rules or binding legal norms.  The power to carry out “regulatory 
activities” does not necessarily include the power to enact legal acts. They may also 
involve measures of a more incentive nature, such as co-regulation, self-regulation, 
opinions, recommendations, evaluating the application and implementation of rules or 
networking and good practices. 470   
As to the Agency, article 20 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 specifies, in 
accordance with article 263 para. 5 TFEU, that reviewable acts are “decisions taken 
by the Board of Appeal or, in cases where no right lies before the Board of Appeal, by 
the Agency”. It specifies furthermore that reviewable decisions are only those, which 
are referred to in articles 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 (article 20 para. 
1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Pursuant to article 263 paras. 1 and 5 TFEU, 
these decisions must be intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
4.2.2.3.2.1.3 Capacity to bring an action and period for bringing the action 
As to the capacity to bring an action (Klageberechtigung), article 263 TFEU 
requires the applicant to show that he satisfies the conditions regarding standing or 
                                                 
469 See e.g. ECJ, case- 60/81 International Business Machines Corporation v European Commission of 
the European Communities (1981) E.C.R. 2639, para. 9. 
470 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 4 et seq. 
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locus standi laid down in the Treaty.471 Article 263 TFEU distinguishes between three 
categories of applicant: the privileged applicants (privilegierte Klagebefugte, the 
semi-privileged applicants (teilprivilegierte Klagebefugte and the non-privileged 
applicants (nicht-privilegierte Klagebefugte).472 The privileged applicants have 
automatically standing to bring an action without having to establish a particular 
interest, since their interest is assumed. They include the Member States, the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission (article 263 para. 2 
TFEU). The semi-privileged applicants comprise the Court of Auditors, the European 
Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions (article 263 para. 3 TFEU). The 
standing of natural or legal persons to institute proceedings is limited and that is the 
reason why they are referred to as non-privileged applicants (article 263 para. 4 
TFEU). Non-privileged persons are those who are directly and individually concerned 
by that act or who are directly concerned by a regulatory act, which does not entail 
implementing measures. Regarding the requirements of direct and individual concern, 
they must be established in a cumulative way.473 The definition of individual concern 
has been laid down by the Court of Justice in the Plaumann case, where it held that 
persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be 
individually concerned, if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed.474 Article 19 of Regulation 
                                                 
471 See e.g. P. Kent, European Union Law, fourth Edition, London 2006, p. 53 et seq. (locus standi: the 
right to challenge). 
472 See e.g. W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, Neuauflage, 
Berlin 2010, p. 812 – p. 813; see also K.-D. Borchardt, in: C. O. Lenz/ K.-D. Borchardt, Eu-Verträge, 
Kommentar nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 5. Auflage, Köln 2010, art. 263 AEUV, paras. 23 et seq. 
473 See e.g. ECJ, case C-50/00P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union 
(25.07.2002) E.C.R. I-06677, where the Court of Justice held that “a natural or legal person can bring 
an action challenging a regulation only if it is concerned both directly and individually“, paras. 44 – 45; 
see also D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and 
Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 429 - 433 et seq. 
474ECJ, case 25/62, Plaumann & Co v European Commission of the European Economic Community, 
(15 July 1963) E.C.R., p. 00126. In this case, Plaumann and Co, a German corporation, sought the 
annulment of a decision of the European Commission in which the latter refused to authorise the 
Federal Republic of Germany to suspend customs duties applicable to fresh mandarins and clementines 
imported from third countries. In order to determine whether Plaumann had standing, the ECJ had to 
 
179
 
 
(EC) No 713/2009 refers to the first two options of article 263 para. 4 TFEU and 
grants thus standing to direct addressees of acts of the Agency as well as those 
directly and individually concerned. The action must be instituted within two months 
of the publication of the measure or its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence 
thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the plaintiff (Klagefrist) 
pursuant to article 263 para. 6 TFEU. 
4.2.2.3.2.1.4 Grounds for review  
The grounds for review (Klagegrund) include lack of competence, 
infringement of essential procedural requirements, infringement of the Treaties or any 
rule of law relating to their application or misuse of powers (article 263 para. 2 
TFEU). As to the acts of the Agency, the grounds for their review must relate to the 
decisions referred to in articles 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 
4.2.2.3.2.1.5 Legal effects of annulment  
Where the Court finds an action well founded, it “shall declare the act 
concerned to be void”.  Principally, the declaration of the Court that an act is void 
takes effect ex tunc and erga omens, which means with regard to the whole world and 
with retrospective effect. However, if the Court considers this necessary, it may state 
which of the effects of the act declared to be void shall be considered as definitive 
pursuant to article 264 TFEU. This enables the Court to minimise any disruption, 
which might be caused by the gap left by the disappearance of the act that has been 
quashed. 475 The Court has no power to order the institution concerned to take any 
                                                                                                                                            
decide whether the company was individually concerned by the European Commission’s decision (so-
called Plaumann test), see p. 96 at p. 107; for more details, see D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. 
Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 420 et seq. 
 
475 See D. Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. Spaventa/ D. 
Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 453 and p. 454. 
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particular steps.476 The institution is, however, required upon article 266 para. 1 
TFEU to take the measures necessary to comply with the Court’s judgement. Article 
20 no. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, by referring to article 266 para. 1 TFEU, 
requires the Agency to take the necessary measures in order to comply with the 
judgment taken by the Court of Justice. This may take the form of the Board of 
Appeal exercising any of the powers that lie within the competence of the Agency or 
remitting the case to the competent body of the Agency (Article 219 para. 5 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).477
4.2.2.3.2.2 Article 20 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with 
article 265 TFEU (ex-article 232 TEC) 
The second possibility of action is contained in article 20 para. 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009. It provides for the event that the Agency failed to take a decision 
(Untätigkeitsklage). In this case, the conditions of article 265 TEU (ex-article 232 
TEC) must be fulfilled. Contrary to former article 232 TEC, article 265 para. 1 TFEU 
now explicitly stipulates that it is applicable “under the same conditions, to bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union, which fail to act”. Regarding legal standing (article 
265 para. 1 and 3 TFEU) and the period of bringing the action (article 265 para. 2 
TFEU) the same conditions apply as those with regard to article 263 TFEU. Article 
265 para. 2 TFEU clearly states that the action is only admissible, if the institution, 
body, office or agency concerned has first been called upon to act.  
4.2.2.4 Tasks devolved on the Agency  
The tasks devolved on European agencies in general are various, including the 
adoption of individual decisions that are legally binding on third parties, the providing 
                                                 
476 See e.g. ECJ, C-15/85, Consorzio Cooperative d’Abbruzzo v European Commission (1987) E.C.R. 
1005, para. 18; ECJ, C-5/93 P DSM v European Commission (1999) E.C.R. I-4695, para. 36, in D. 
Wyatt/ A.Dashwood, European Union Law, in: A. Arnull/ A. Dashwood/ M. Dougan/ M. Ross/ E. 
Spaventa/ D. Wyatt, European Union Law, Fifth Edition, London 2006, p. 452. 
477 See also U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 2), IR, Heft 7/2008, p. 146 at p. 147. 
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of assistance to the European Commission and the Member States in form of technical 
or scientific advice or the creating a network of national competent authorities and 
cooperation between them with a view to gathering, comparing and exchanging 
information and good practices. 478
4.2.2.4.1 Types of acts of the Agency 
Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 empowers the Agency to adopt four 
different types of acts. These are opinions, recommendations, individual decisions and 
non-binding framework guidelines.  
Opinions and recommendations may be addressed by the Agency to transmission 
system operators (article 4 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), to the national 
regulatory authorities (article 4 (b) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and to the 
European Parliament, the Council or the European Commission (article 4 (c) of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
Individual decision-making powers may be exercised by the Agency on specific 
cross-border issues (article 4 (d) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with 
articles 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), such as on the terms and 
conditions for access to and operational security of electricity and gas cross-border 
infrastructure (article 7 para. 7 in connection with article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009). The Agency takes decisions on exemption requests concerning new 
interconnectors for electricity (article 9 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in 
connection with article 17 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and new cross-
border gas infrastructures (article 9 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in 
connection with article 36 para. 4 of Directive 2009/73/EC). The Agency takes thus 
an active part in exercising executive powers at Community level in that it is given the 
                                                 
478 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 4 et seq; see also e.g. Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
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power to implement European laws. It is, however, limited to applying the rules of 
secondary legislation to specific cases, in accordance with the institutional system 
and the case law of the European Court of Justice. 479
Non-binding framework guidelines may be issued by the Agency with regards to the 
establishment of network codes of the ENTSO for Electricity (article 4 (e) of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with article 6 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) 
No 714/2009). 
4.2.2.4.2 General tasks 
The Agency assumes general advisory functions vis-à-vis the European 
Parliament, the Council or the European Commission. For this purpose, it issues, 
upon request of the European Parliament, the Council or the European Commission or 
on its own initiative, opinions and recommendations on any market regulation issues 
(article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with article 4 (c) of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
As to the Agency’s advisory role vis-à-vis the European Commission, it provides 
opinions and recommendations on matters relating to tasks of the cooperation of 
transmission system operators and the national regulatory authorities. It issues, for 
example, opinions on the draft statutes, list of members and draft rules of procedures 
of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO 
for Electricity), (article 6 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and on the 
implementation of the ENTSO for Electricity on network codes (article 6 para. 5 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). It furthermore reviews and (re-) submits within a 
maximum period of six months non-binding framework guidelines setting out clear 
and objective principles on issues relating to the network access for cross-border 
                                                 
479 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 4 et seq. 
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exchanges in electricity (article 6 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009480) and gas 
(article 6 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009481). Additionally, the Agency 
makes recommendations to publicise good practices among national energy regulators 
and other market players (article 7 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
Moreover, it provides opinions on compliance of regulatory authorities with the 
Guidelines referred to in provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC and Directive 
2009/73/EC and Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 
(article 7 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The Agency finally issues 
opinions on decisions of national regulatory authorities on certification of 
transmission system operators for cross-border exchanges in electricity (second sub-
paragraph of article 3 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009482) and gas (second 
sub-paragraph of article 3 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009483).  
These tasks are all carried out upon request of the European Commission. Since the 
European Commission is not obliged to follow the Agency’s opinions and 
recommendations, the Agency' assumes a real advisory role. It keeps the European 
Commission informed about any market regulatory issues, the appropriate steps vis-à-
vis third market participants are, however, taken through the European Commission 
itself.484
                                                 
480Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1228/2003, (Regulation (EC) No 714/2009), p. 19, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0015:0035:EN:PDF 
(25.01.2011). 
481Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1775/2005 (Regulation (EC) No 715/2009), p. 41, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0036:0054:EN:PDF 
(25.01.2011). 
482Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, p. 18. 
483Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, p. 41. 
484 See in this sense U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 1), IR, Heft 6/2008, p. 122 at p. 125. 
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4.2.2.4.3 Tasks as regards the cooperation of transmission system operators 
The Agency is responsible for advising, monitoring, analyzing and reviewing 
the activities of the ENTSO for Electricity (article 6 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 and article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009). It is in particular involved 
in the drafting and monitoring of implementation of the Community wide network 
development plan (article 6 paras. 3 (b), 4 and 8 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), in 
the development and implementation of network codes (article 6 paras. 3 (a), 4, 5 and 
6 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and the monitoring of the regional cooperation of 
transmission system operators established within the ENTSO for Electricity (article 6 
paras. 9 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).485
4.2.2.4.4 Tasks as regards the national regulatory authorities 
The Agency assumes advisory functions in providing opinions and 
recommendations on market regulation issues (article 7 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009), on the cooperation between national regulatory authorities (article 7 para. 
3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) and on compliance with and application of the 
guidelines of the European Commission (article 7 para. 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009).  
It has furthermore real decision-making powers on specific technical issues (article 7 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), on the regulatory regime applicable to 
infrastructures within the territory of at least two Member States (article 7 para. 7 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 in connection with article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009) as well as on exemption requests from internal market rules for new 
electricity interconnectors and new infrastructures located in more than one Member 
State (article 8 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). It finally provides a 
                                                 
485 See e.g. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
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framework for national regulators to cooperate in order to improve the handling of 
cross-border situations (article 7 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.4.5 Other tasks 
In addition to the Agency’s power to decide on exemption requests of new 
interconnectors and infrastructure (article 9 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), 
to advise national energy regulators on certification of transmission system operators 
(article 9 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009), it may be charged through the 
European Commission with any “additional tasks which do not involve decision-
making powers” under the condition, however, that the circumstances are clearly 
defined in the European Commission’s Guidelines (article 9 para. 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.5 In-depth analysis: the legitimacy of delegation of executive powers to the 
Agency 
The delegation of executive powers to the Agency as a body, which is not 
foreseen through European primary law, gives rise to two issues: firstly, the issue of 
maintaining the regulative balance between executives, legislatives and judiciaries 
powers established between the European Union and, secondly, the issue of 
accountability of the Agency, exercising its powers distant from the control by the 
European citizens. 
4.2.2.5.1 The possibility of a delegation of powers  
The principle of conferral provides that the European Union is empowered to 
act only where the power to do so has been conferred upon it by the Member States. 
Since they have not conferred power on the European Union to delegate powers to 
institutional bodies other than those provided for by the Treaty, the question arises as 
to whether a delegation of executive powers on the Agency by virtue of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 complies with European law.  
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On one side, one could argue that a delegation of powers has the inherent risk that the 
European Union gives more power to institutional bodies than it has itself, thereby 
extending its field of activity further than conferred on it by the Member States. In 
addition, the European Union is required to ensure that the objectives set out in the 
European treaties are attained in accordance with the provisions thereof (see e.g. 
article 5 TEU), which does not include any powers to delegate. Moreover, the balance 
of powers assigned to the European institutions is an essential characteristic of the 
structure of the European Union and a fundamental guarantee attributed to the 
Member States. One could therefore conclude that, if the European institutions intend 
to delegate certain of their powers that have been conferred upon them by the 
European treaties to bodies, which dispose of their own legal personality, such a 
delegation of powers should clearly be provided for by the Treaties.  
On the other side, however, one could assume that with a view to the ever increasing 
tasks, which have to be handled through the European institutions, particularly the 
European Commission as the primary executive organ, it is principally necessary to 
delegate specific powers to European agencies. In addition, the Treaty, although it 
dose not provide for it, does not exclude it either.  
The Court of Justice, in the absence of provisions contained in the Treaty, has been 
called upon to define the conditions under which the European Union may 
legitimately delegate powers to European agencies established through secondary 
European legislation. The Court of Justice acknowledged that it was principally 
possible to delegate (executive) powers to subordinate agencies, set, however, strict 
limits for such delegation.486 The distinctions of the Court of Justice were, in 
particular, established in the cases of Meroni487, Köster488 and Romano489. 
                                                 
486 For details, see e.g. E. Lenski, in: C. O. Lenz/ K.-D. Borchardt, Eu-Verträge, Kommentar nach dem 
Vertrag von Lissabon, 5. Auflage, Köln 2010, art. 13, para. 23 et seq. 
487 ECJ, C-9/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v. High. Authority of the Coal and Steel 
Community (1958) E.C.R. 133 (Meroni case), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61956J0009:EN:PDF (16.01.2011). 
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4.2.2.5.1.1 The Meroni case of 1958 and the subsequent cases of Romano and 
Köster (the Meroni doctrine) 
In the Meroni case, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) had created a special obligatory system for the regulation of the 
ferrous scrap market. This system was administered under Brussels based agencies 
under the responsibility of the High Authority. The High Authority issued a demand 
of payment to the Italian Steel Company Meroni payable to the Imported Ferrous 
Scrap Equalisation Fund, which the company Meroni refused to pay. Meroni filed an 
action to the Court of Justice for annulment of the High Authority’s demand for 
payment. Meroni considered that a delegation of powers from the High Authority to 
the Brussels agencies was illegitimate.490 The Court of Justice ruled that, although 
article 8 of the Treaty required the High Authority to ensure that the objectives set out 
in this Treaty are attained in accordance with the provisions thereof and did not 
provide any power to delegate, the possibility of delegating powers to “bodies 
established under private law, having a distinct legal personality and possessing 
powers of their own (…) cannot be excluded”. 491
In a number of subsequent judgements, such as the Romano case and the Köster case, 
the Court of Justice upheld the distinctions outlined in the Meroni doctrine. 
In the Romano case, the Administrative European Commission for the Social Security 
of Migrant Workers, an auxiliary body of the European Commission, was charged 
with the establishment of certain criteria that the national authorities would have to 
                                                                                                                                            
488 ECJ, C-25/70,  Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster and Berodt & Co 
(17.12.1970) 01161 (Köster case), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=19627:cs&lang=en&list=19627:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=1&pg
s=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte (18.01.2011).  
489 ECJ, C- 98/80, Guiseppe Romano v Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité (1981) E.C.R 
1241 (Romano case) , http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61980J0098:EN:PDF (18.01.2011). 
490 Meroni case, p. 133 at p.138 (n. 489). 
491 Ibid, p. 133 at p.151 (n. 489). 
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take into account. For this purpose, the Administrative European Commission was 
vested with comprehensive law-making powers, including, inter alia, the power to 
deal with questions of interpretation arising from a European Regulation. The Court 
of Justice held that “…it follows both from article 155 of the Treaty and by the 
judicial system created by the Treaty, and in particular by Articles 173 and 177 
thereof, that a body such as the Administrative European Commission may not be 
empowered by the Council to adopt acts having the force of law”.492  
In the Köster case, the Court of Justice, by order of 21 April 1970, was asked by the 
Hessischer Verwaltungsgsgerichtshof by virtue of article 177 of the EEC Treaty on 
the validity of Regulation No 102/64/EEC of the European Commission of 28 July 
1964 on import and Export Licenses for Cereals and Processed Cereal Products, Rice, 
Broken Rice and Processed Rice Products493 and, in particular, on the role of the 
Management Committee that had been established by the Council to assist the 
European Commission in the implementation of the common organization of the 
market in cereals. It was alleged that the Management Committee Procedure 
interfered in the European Commission’s right of decision to such an extent as to put 
its independence in question and that the interposition of the Management Committee 
between the Council and the European Commission distorted the relationships 
between these institutions. 494 The Council and the European Commission were of the 
opinion that the rules of procedure of the Management Committee did not have the 
effect of putting the European Commission’s powers in question. They considered 
that the European Commission remained master of its own decision in that it was 
never obliged to follow the opinion of the Management Committee. The Court of 
Justice decided that the Management Committee had not “the power to take a 
decision in place of the European Commission or the Council” and that 
“consequently, without distorting the Community structure and the institutional 
balance”, the Council was able to “delegate to the European Commission an 
                                                 
492 Romano case, para. 20 (n. 491). 
493 OJEU 1964, p.2125. 
494 Köster case para. 8 (n. 490). 
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implementing power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the decision 
itself if necessary”. 495
In an Opinion given pursuant to article 228 (1) of the EEC Treaty on 26 April 1977, 
the Court of Justice confirmed the possibility of delegating powers, stating that the 
powers expressly given to the European Union imply the exercise of those powers, 
which are needed to give proper effect to the Treaty “including, if necessary, a certain 
delegation of powers”. 496  
The Court made, however, also clear that “the power of delegation (…) is not 
unlimited” and referred thereby explicitly to the Meroni and the Köster case.497 
According to the Court, the “institutional balance” or “balance of powers, which is a 
characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community”, constitutes a 
“fundamental guarantee granted by the Treaty” which must not be rendered 
ineffective. 498 As a result, “a body which is not provided for by the Treaty”, must not 
“have the effect of distorting the relationships between the institutions” established by 
the Treaty. 499
As a conclusion it can be said that the Meroni doctrine and its subsequent judgements 
aim at safeguarding the basic legitimacy of the European Union, in requiring it to be 
founded upon a clear allocation of powers between the institutions and to exercise its 
tasks in a manner that they can be traced back to an accountable institution.   
                                                 
495 Ibid at para. 9 (n. 490). 
496 ECJ, Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 744, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61976V0001:EN:PDF (18.01.2011). 
497 See Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 743 at p. 752. 
498 See Meroni case, p. 133 at p. 152 (n. 489). 
499 See Köster case at paras. 4, 8 and 9 (n. 490). 
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4.2.2.5.1.2 The Meroni doctrine still prevalent today? 
The principles of the Meroni doctrine, despite the extensive use of delegation 
of powers to the European Commission as well as other European institutions and 
agencies, are still prevalent today. 
This has been confirmed by the Court of Justice in 2005. In the case Queen v. 
Secretary of Health and National Assembly for Wales of 12 July 2005500, the Court of 
Justice considered that a delegation of powers from the Council to the European 
Commission to amend a legislative act had to ensure that “the power is clearly 
defined and that the exercise of the power is subject to strict review in the light of 
objective criteria”.501 Moreover, in the case Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European 
Central Bank of 26 May 2005, the Court of Justice explicitly referred to the Meroni 
case, considering a delegation of powers to one of the organs of the European Central 
Bank as legitimate. 502 It recalled that the powers conferred on an institution included 
“the right to delegate … a certain number of powers which fall under those powers, 
subject to conditions to be determined by the institution”.503 It pointed furthermore out 
that, regarding the delegation of powers to bodies established under private law, 
having a distinct legal personality, “a Community institution or body must be entitled 
to lay down a body of measures of an organisational nature, delegating powers to its 
own internal decisionmaking bodies, in particular as regards the management of its 
own staff.”504
                                                 
500 ECJ, joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural 
Health and Others v. SE.C.R.etary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales (12 July 2005) 
E.C.R. 1-6451, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J0154:EN:HTML (11.02.2011). 
501 Ibid at para. 90. 
502ECJ, case C-301/02 P, Carmine Salvatore Tralli v European Central Bank, E.C.R. (2005) I-4071 
(Carmine Salvatore Tralli case), paras. 41 - 44, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002J0301:EN:HTM (11.02.2011). 
503 Ibid at para. 41. 
504 Ibid at para. 42. 
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The principles of the Meroni doctrine have also been confirmed through the 
European Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council on “European agencies – The way forward” in 2008. The European 
Commission emphasised that „there are clear and strict limits to the autonomous 
power of regulatory agencies in the current Community legal order. Agencies cannot 
be given the power to adopt general regulatory measures. They are limited to taking 
individual decisions in specific areas where a defined technical expertise is required, 
under clearly and precisely defined conditions and without genuine discretionary 
power.“505  
4.2.2.5.2 The conditions to be complied with in the context of a delegation of 
powers 
The conditions that must be complied with in the context of a delegation of 
powers were particularly established through the Court of Justice in the decisions of 
Meroni and Romano. 
A delegation of powers can, first of all, not “confer upon the authority receiving the 
delegation powers different from those which the delegating authority itself received 
under the Treaty”.506 The exercise of powers conferred upon the body to which the 
powers are delegated must thereby be subject to the “same conditions to which it 
would have been subject if the (High Authority) delegating authority had exercised 
them directly”.507 Second, a delegation of power must be based upon an express 
decision taken by the delegating authority transferring the powers.508 Third, a 
delegation of powers can only relate to “clearly defined executive powers”.509 Forth, 
                                                 
505 See Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
European agencies – The way forward, COM (2008) 135 final, p. 5.  
506See Meroni case, p. 133 at p. 150 (n. 489). 
507 Ibid; see also case Carmine Salvatore Tralli case, para. 43 (n. 504). 
508 Ibid. 
509 Meroni case, p. 133, at p.150, 152 (n. 489); see also Carmine Salvatore Tralli case, para. 43 (n. 
504). 
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a delegation of powers must ”be entirely subject to the supervision” of the delegating 
institution510, which means that the “organ to which the powers are transferred must 
remain under the control and the supervision of the authority in which the original 
power was vested.511 Fifth, a delegation of powers “may not concern discretionary 
powers leaving room of political judgement”, because a delegation of powers that 
implied a wide margin of discretion would “make possible the execution of actual 
economic policy”.512 The Court of Justice held that such a delegation would 
considerably alter the consequences involved in the exercise of powers in that it 
“replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate” and therefore 
“brings about an actual transfer of responsibility”.513 The Court concluded that, “to 
delegate a discretionary power, by entrusting it to bodies other than those which the 
Treaty has established to effect and supervise the exercise of such power within the 
limits of its own authority, would render the guarantee of balance of powers 
ineffective.”514 Sixth, the exercise of executive powers must be “subject to strict 
review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority” so as 
to make judicial review possible.515 The Court of Justice finally held, in accordance 
with the Romano case, that a delegation of powers “to adopt acts having the force of 
law” to bodies other than the European Commission was illegitimate.516  
4.2.2.5.3 The application of the Meroni doctrine to the Agency 
In the light of the above-mentioned criteria, the question arises whether the 
delegation of executive powers to the Agency by virtue of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 satisfies the requirements of the Treaty.  
                                                 
510 See Meroni case, p 150, p. 152 (n. 489). 
511 See e.g. ECJ, Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 744 at p. 752. 
512 Meroni case, p 150, p. 152 (n. 489). 
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid. 
516See Romano case, para. 20 (n. 491). 
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As to the first requirement, one could argue that prior to the Lisbon Treaty the 
European treaties did not confer upon the European Union the power to regulate the 
energy sector with the consequence that it was not permitted to delegate powers in 
this sector to the Agency. However, although no specific provision of competence 
conferred upon the European Union powers such powers, they could nevertheless be 
drawn from the general provisions of competence, i.e. of article 308 TEC and article 
95 TEC. One could furthermore deny compliance with the Meroni doctrine with the 
argument that the European Commission, in fact, did never carry out regulatory 
oversight over the energy sector with the consequence that it was not entitled to 
delegate such powers to the Agency.517 However, in the ENISA case the Court of 
Justice held that decisive factor was that the Treaty did, in principle, entitle the 
European Commission to exercise these powers.518  
The second, third and fourth requirement of the Meroni-doctrine have equally been 
respected. The delegation of powers to the Agency is based upon an express decision 
of the European Commission in form of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, which clearly 
sets out the executive powers of the Agency.519 In addition, Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009 ensures that any additionally tasks conferred upon the Agency are “clearly 
defined by the European Commission in Guidelines” (article 9 para. 3 Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). It furthermore ensures that the European Commission keeps 
regulatory oversight and control over the Agency through important co-decision 
rights (Mitbestimmungsrechte), such as the proposal of a list of candidates for the 
position as Director (article 16 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) or the 
appointment of two members and alternates of the Administrative Board (article 12 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
                                                 
517See e.g. Regulierungsbehörden zweifeln an EU-Energieagentur, Artikel EurActiv v. 25.01.2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/de/energie/regulierungsbehrden-zweifeln-eu-energieagentur/art.-
169855 (11.02.2011). 
518 See S. Neveling, Europäisierung der Energieaufsicht? – Vorschläge von Kommission und ERGEG 
zur Neuordnung (Teil 1), IR, Heft 8/2007, p. 173 at p. 175, p. 176. 
519 Ibid at p. 175. 
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As to the fifth requirement, i.e. the prohibition to delegate discretionary powers, 
certain provisions of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 are problematic. Indeed, article 7 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 empowers the Agency “to adopt individual 
decisions on technical issues”, such as on network development plans and investment 
decisions (articles 5 and 22 of Directive 2009/72/EC), which usually implies a certain 
margin of discretion. The question is, however, whether the principle of institutional 
balance contained in article 13 TEU (ex-article 4 TEC) and developed in the Meroni 
doctrine in 1958 can be applied today without the need of adopting it to the actual 
circumstances. The principle of institutional balance represents a constitutive 
principle is open to interpretation, depending on the needs of the European Union 
being constantly refined and developed.520 As such, it cannot be applied today without 
the need of being reassessed and “appraised in the light of the system actually 
contemplated”.521 Applying the principle of institutional balance of powers in a static 
and unchangeable way would hinder the European Union to evolve. 522  
One could furthermore argue that the establishment of the Agency even supports the 
institutional balance of powers in that it fortifies the principle of separation of powers. 
Through the Agency’s establishment, the exercise of power is spread among further 
institutions, which contributes to a better fragmentation of powers. This in return 
supports the prevention of abuse of power as the underlying aim of the separation of 
powers.523  
In addition, in comparison to 1958, the fields of activities of the European 
Commission have considerably been increased. Without the support of further created 
                                                 
520 See in this sense, M. Everson/ G. Majone/ L. Metcalfe/ A. Schout, The Role of Specialised Agencies 
in Decentralising EU Governance, Report presented to the European Commission, 1999, p. 12, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf (20.02.2011). 
521 See ECJ, Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 744 at p. 752. 
522 See Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Delegation of 
Regulatory Authority in the European Union, p.12, 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/01/010301-04.html (20.02.2011). 
523 Ibid, p.12 and p. 37. 
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European bodies the European Commission would in various areas have difficulties to 
carry out its tasks in an efficient manner and thus to satisfy its obligations under the 
Treaty.  
Moreover, particularly as regards the energy sector, the application of the Meroni 
doctrine in a strict sense would ignore the highly technical nature of energy related 
measures. Indeed, over the years, the energy sector has become more and more 
complex and detailed and involves to a greater extent various financial interests. 
Various technical rules have been established that electricity companies must operate 
under (grid-codes), which need to be harmonised.  
Additionally, constant progress needs to be made on new infrastructure. The European 
Commission had itself admitted that it was not able to pursue these tasks itself, given 
that it had never carried out such activities. It claimed that activities of such highly 
technical nature required the specialist expertise of the national regulatory authorities 
of the Member States to cooperate with each other and to work together. In the 
European Commission’s view, only a body emanating from the national energy 
regulators could catalyse all the necessary resources of national regulators.524 As a 
result, the delegation of powers to the Agency contributes to simplification and 
clarification in that it frees the European Commission from dealing with complex 
technical regulations.525  
Moreover, in the Köster case the European Court of Justice prohibited only a 
delegation of power that enabled the body to “take a decision in place of the 
European Commission or the Council”.526 It concluded as a consequence that the 
delegation of a mere “implementing power of appreciable scope”, which remained 
                                                 
524 See in this sense Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European 
Commission on 19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
525 See Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Delegation of 
Regulatory Authority in the European Union, p.12. 
526 See Köster case, para. 9 (n. 490). 
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subject to the power of the delegating body to take the decision itself, if necessary, did 
“not distort the community structure and the institutional balance” and therefore was 
legitimate.527 Similarly, in Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977 the Court of Justice held 
that a grant of power was justified, if the delegated body was entrusted with 
“implementing measures and not with decisions of principle of a political nature”.528  
Regarding Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, it does not confer upon the Agency the 
power to take decisions in the place of the European Commission. Although the 
Agency is able to take legally binding decisions, these apply only to specific technical 
situations that are foreseen in Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 or that are provided on a 
case-by-case basis through binding Guidelines. The Agency has no political discretion 
outside this framework. In addition, the Agency has no power to take discretionary 
substantive decisions. These are reserved to the European Commission, in which case 
the Agency plays merely a preparatory and advisory role. Hence, although the 
Agency has the power to implement laws through the adoption of individual 
decisions, its power is limited to applying the rules of secondary legislation to 
specific cases. An additional point that the Court of Justice considered was “the direct 
effect which decisions taken under the delegation might produce”.529 This is 
particularly important due to the fact that most of the Member States dispose of an 
express constitutional basis for the transfer to an international institution of the power 
to take decisions, which are directly applicable with the national legal system. From 
this follows that the transfer from the European Union to other international bodies of 
powers to take actions that have an immediate effect within the national legal 
systems, can be acknowledged only to a very limited extent.530
                                                 
527 Ibid. 
528 See ECJ, Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 744 at p. 752. 
529 Ibid. 
530 See ECJ, Opinion 1/ 76, OF 26.4.1977, p. 744 at p. 752 
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As to the sixth requirement, demanding for judicial review, article 19 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 enables any natural or legal person, including national regulatory 
authorities to appeal against decisions taken by the Agency. Moreover, article 20 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 opens the review of decision taken by the Board of 
Appeal or the Agency through the European Court of Justice itself. Finally, as to the 
prohibition of conferring the power “to adopt acts having the force of law” (Rechtsakt 
mit normativem Charakter) to other institutions than the European Commission, the 
question is how such acts should be defined. If they included any abstract-general 
legal norm producing legal effect vis-à-vis third parties (abstrakt-generelle Regelung 
mit rechtsverbindlicher Außenwirkung)531, the Agency would have been conferred 
upon the power to adopt acts having the force of law, allowing it to determine 
technical safety standards and operative network regulations, which constitute 
abstract-general legal norms. However, in the Romano case, the Court of Justice did 
not require such an extensive definition of “acts having the force of law”. In this case, 
it considered it already as illegitimate that the Administrative European Commission 
autonomously determined the point of time at which the regulation in question should 
enter into effect. It held that this could not be considered as an implementing measure 
anymore but constituted an act having the force of law. One can thus conclude that it 
is prohibited for the delegated body to determine rules in an autonomous way, if these 
have not been defined in the act of the authority delegating the powers.532 As to 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, the Agency is not allowed to independently take 
decisions; the circumstances under which it may act are explicitly laid down. As a 
result, under consideration of the Meroni doctrine, the delegation of executive powers 
of the European Commission to the Agency through Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
complies with European law.  
                                                 
531 An abstract-general legal norm can be defined as one that applies to an undefined number of cases 
(unbestimmte Vielzahl von Fällen) as well as addressees (unbestimmte Vielzahl von Adressaten), 
contrary to an individual-concrete legal norm, such as an administrative act, which applies only to a 
specific case (konkret) as well as to a specific person (individuell). 
532 S. Neveling, Europäisierung der Energieaufsicht? – Vorschläge von Kommission und ERGEG zur 
Neuordnung (Teil 1), IR, Heft 8/2007, p. 173 at p. 176. 
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4.2.2.5.4 The accountability of European agencies  
There are no general rules governing the creation and operation of European 
regulatory agencies. Their role, structure and profile differ enormously, which raises 
doubts as to their accountability. As a public body of European law they must be 
organised in a way to respect the principles of democratic accountability. 533  
4.2.2.5.4.1 The principle of democratic accountability  
As in national law, the principle of democratic accountability must also be 
ensured on European level. Whereas in the beginnings of the European Communities 
the principle of democracy was indirectly deduced from the constitutions of the 
Member States, today it is directly codified in European primary law.534 Indeed, in the 
Third Recital of the Preamble of the European treaties, the European Union declares 
drawing inspirations inter alia from the “inalienable rights of the human person, 
freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.” In addition, in the Eighth Recital 
of the Preamble of the European treaties, the European Union states desiring to 
“enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions…” 
Moreover, article 2 TEU explicitly states that the European Union is “founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights…”. The competences of the European institutions derive 
therefore as well from the Member States on national level as well from the European 
Union on European level (duale Legitimationsbasis).535 As a result, if powers are 
delegated to European bodies, it must be guaranteed that these can be held 
                                                 
533 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
European agencies – The way forward, COM (2008) 135 final, p. 4, 6 et seq. 
534 See e.g. B. Holznagel/ P. Schumacher, ERGEGplus – Wieder der Versuch der Einführung eines 
Europäischen Regulierers durch die Hintertür, RdE 8/2007, p. 225 at p. 230. 
535 Ibid at p. 231. 
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accountable before the European institutions, the Member States and the European 
citizens.536  
That European Union aims to ensure the democratic accountability of European 
bodies is well illustrated in the Meroni doctrine, where it was held that any delegation 
of powers must be strictly executive in nature and immediately traceable to the 
responsibility of named institutions of the European Union. Additionally, in the 
Romano case it was held that any delegation of legislative functions from Parliament 
to other decision-making institutions constituted a violation of this democratic 
principle.537  
Hence, on the one hand, it must be ensured that the Agency, by exercising 
autonomous responsibilities in the executive sphere, can be held accountable to the 
institutions, the Member States and the European citizens. On the other hand, 
however, in order to meet today’s operating needs and administrative capacities of the 
European Union, the Agency must also be organised in a way enabling it to perform 
its tasks effectively. This includes the granting of a certain degree of autonomy in 
organisational, legal and financial terms.538 As a result, the organisation of the 
Agency must be based upon a balance between the need for autonomy, on one side, 
and the need for control, on the other side.  
The need for autonomy takes several forms, such as the granting of legal personality, 
budgetary autonomy, collective responsibility, the conferral of own powers to the 
Administrative Board as well as the guarantee of independence of the Director and the 
other organs of the Agency. The autonomy of the Agency goes thereby hand in hand 
with the obligation to meet its responsibilities, which must be established and 
                                                 
536 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 470 et seq. 
537 See Meroni case, para. 20 (n. 489). 
538 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 2. 
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delimited in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the European Union.539 The 
principle of strict accountability as established through the Meroni doctrine in 1958, 
may today be ensured through other, more flexible mechanisms of control.540 In the 
judgment of 30 June 2009, the German Constitutional Court held that with increasing 
competences and further independence of the European institutions, it is necessary to 
establish safeguards that keep up with such development in order to preserve the 
fundamental principle of conferral exercised in a restricted and controlled manner by 
the Member States.541 Through the interaction and complementation of these different 
mechanisms of control, an overall system of control mechanism can be created.542 
Such control mechanisms include well-drawn up founding statutes (4.2.2.5.4.2), the 
Agency’s independence (4.2.2.5.4.3), judicial review of decisions (4.2.2.5.4.3), 
financial accountability (4.2.2.5.4.5), administrative accountability (4.2.2.5.4.6), 
political accountability (4.2.2.5.4.72), public accountability (4.2.2.5.4.8) and yearly 
reports of activities and reviews to be delivered to the institutions of the European 
Union (4.2.2.5.4.9).543
4.2.2.5.4.2 Founding statutes 
Generally, founding statutes contribute to ensuring the accountability of 
European agencies in that they lay down the general policy goals and the level of 
performance that agencies must achieve.544 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 determines 
                                                 
539 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 2, 5 et seq. 
540 See Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Delegation of 
Regulatory Authority in the European Union, p.12; see furthermore B. Holznagel/ P. Schumacher, 
ERGEGplus – Wieder der Versuch der Einführung eines Europäischen Regulierers durch die Hintertür, 
RdE 8/2007, p. 225 at p. 230 et seq. 
541 See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paras. 235, 237 – 241. 
542 See Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Delegation of 
Regulatory Authority in the European Union, p.12. 
543 See M. Everson/ G. Majone/ L. Metcalfe/ A. Schout, The Role of Specialised Agencies in 
Decentralising EU Governance, Report presented to the European Commission, 1999, p. 12, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf (20.02.2011). 
544 Ibid at p. 39. 
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as general policy goals of the Agency the assistance to the national energy regulators 
in their regulatory tasks, in providing a framework to cooperate, a regulatory review 
of the cooperation between transmission system operators and a scope for taking 
specific individual decisions (article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).545 It 
furthermore establishes the level of performance of the Agency, setting out in detail 
the scope and extent of the tasks to be performed (articles 4 et seq. of Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009). 
4.2.2.5.4.3 Independence 
Generally, the possibility of attributing to European bodies a certain degree of 
independence by, for instance, releasing them from political instructions, is well 
recognised in European law (ministerialfreie Räume auf europäischer Ebene).546 Such 
guarantee of independence can contribute to democratic transparency in that it 
interrupts the close linkage that often exists between politics and administration. 
However, in order to satisfy the European principle of democracy, the deficit of 
democratic legitimation hereby occurred, must be compensated through other means 
of adequate control mechanisms. If, for example, a European body is released from 
the instructions of the European Commission and has the power to autonomously take 
decisions in last instance (letztinstanzliche Entscheidungsgewalt), adequate control 
mechanisms exercised through the other European institutions must be put in place.547 
The organs of the Agency are formally released from seeking or following political 
instructions (article 12 para. 7 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 for the Administrative 
Board, article 14 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 for the Board of Regulators, 
article 16 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 for the Director and article 18 para. 
3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 for the Board of Appeal). In addition, the Agency 
                                                 
545 See e.g. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
546 See e.g. B. Holznagel/ P. Schumacher, ERGEGplus – Wieder der Versuch der Einführung eines 
Europäischen Regulierers durch die Hintertür, RdE 8/2007, p. 225 at p 230. 
547 Ibid at p 231. 
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has the power to adopt individual decisions on technical issues (article 7 para. 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). However, these decisions are limited to applying the 
rules of secondary legislation to specific cases determined through the European 
Commission.548  
4.2.2.5.4.4 Judicial review: the legal accountability  
Judicial review is guaranteed through a two-step system, establishing a direct 
lien of responsibility between the Agency and the European citizens.549 An internal 
Board of Appeal within the Agency grants any natural or legal person, including 
national regulators, to appeal against decisions taken by the Agency (article 19 para. 1 
of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). A negative decision of the Board of Appeal or its 
failure to take a decision is appealable to the Court of Justice, however only after the 
internal remedies have been exhausted (article 20 para. 1, 2 of Regulation (EC) No 
713/2009).550 This system allows interested parties to directly challenge decisions of 
the Agency, which have personally affected their rights; where procedures have been 
incorrectly followed, or decisions do not contain sufficient reasoning, they may be 
overturned. 551  
4.2.2.5.4.5 Financial accountability 
On one side, the concession to the Agency of a certain degree of financial 
autonomy is crucial to the concept of regulatory agencies. Articles 21 et seq. of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 require, in this regard, that the Administrative Board 
                                                 
548 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 5. 
549 For a general overview of the legal accountability of the European institutions, see D. Chalmers/ C. 
Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 
410 et seq. 
550 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 467. 
551 See in this sense M. Everson/ G. Majone/ L. Metcalfe/ A. Schout, The Role of Specialised Agencies 
in Decentralising EU Governance, Report presented to the European Commission, 1999, p. 39, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pdf (20.02.2011). 
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has the necessary power to establish the budget, check its implementation, draw up 
internal rules and adopt financial regulations.  
On the other side, however, the financial accountability of the Agency must be 
guaranteed. This is achieved through the establishment of budgetary principles, such 
as budgetary control, internal audits, financial management and transparency, the 
annual discharge for the execution of the Community budget, investigations 
conducted by European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the establishment of annual 
reports by the Court of Auditors (article 3 of Council Regulation 1605/2002). 552 Of 
particular importance in this regard is the framework Financial Regulation or the 
bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No1605/2002 
on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities,553 which contains essential rules concerning agencies’ establishment 
plan, the application of the framework financial regulation for agencies, the 
consolidation of their accounts with those of the European Commission, and the 
discharge by the European Parliament. In addition, the framework Financial 
Regulation lays down common rules governing the establishment and implementation 
of their budget, including control aspects.  
Moreover, ex ante budgetary control is exercised through the setting up and decision 
of the annual budget of the Agency. The Agency makes an estimate of revenue and 
expenditure of the Agency for the following year, which serves as basis for the overall 
draft general budget of the European Commission (article 23 paras. 1, 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009). The overall budget of the European Union is set up through the 
                                                 
552 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 6; see also J. Saurer, The accountability of 
supranational administration: the case of European Union agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 
473. 
553 OJEU, L 357, 31.12.2002, p.72. 
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European Council and the European Parliament as budget authority (article 23 paras. 
3 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, ex-article 272 TEC).554  
Ex post budgetary control is ensured through the submission of detailed annual 
accounts and financial statements, such as cash flow statements and the report on 
budgetary and financial management over the financial year (article 24 para. 2 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
Additionally, the European Commission has the power to review the budget of the 
Agency, thus contributing to greater accountability, since the European Commission 
may either allow or deny the funding that the Agency has requested.555  
Moreover, financial management and transparency is, inter alia, achieved through 
Council Regulation 1605/2002, which extends the transparency requirements in 
budgetary procedures and financial management. 556Article 185 no. 2 of 1605/2002 
Financial Regulation empowers the European Parliament furthermore to give 
discharge to the agencies for the implementation of their annual budgets on the 
recommendation of the Council.557 Discharge is a formal process that marks the final 
closure of the accounts for the financial year in question.558 Article 23 paras. 1, 2 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 rules that the European Parliament, following a 
recommendation by the Council, grants a discharge to the Director for the 
                                                 
554 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 474. 
555 See M. Everson/ G. Majone/ L. Metcalfe/ A. Schout, The Role of Specialised Agencies in 
Decentralising EU Governance, Report presented to the European Commission, 1999, p. 39, 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/areas/group6/contribution_en.pd (13.03.2011). 
556 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 472. 
557 Ibid. 
558 See D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and 
Materials, Cambridge 2006, p 110. 
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implementation of the budget for the respective financial year (article 24 paras. 10 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009).  
As to the Agency’s accountability to the Court of Auditors, the Court of Auditors 
publishes, for example, detailed reports on the annual account together with a 
statement of the Agency in the Official Journal of the European Union (article 24 
paras. 3, 7, 8 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Moreoever, the Agency is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the OLAF, an independent authority within the European 
Commission, which is entrusted with the task of fighting internal and external 
corruption.559  
Finally, article 287 TFEU requires the Court of Auditors to examine the accounts of 
all revenue and expenditure of the Agency (para. 1) and shall judge whether the 
revenues have been received and the expenditure have been incurred in a “lawful and 
regular manner” and whether “the financial management has been sound” (para. 3). 
4.2.2.5.4.6 Administrative accountability  
Generally, article 15 no. 1 TEU requires agencies to “conduct their work as 
openly as possible”.560  
For this purpose, administrative accountability ensures that a number of procedural 
safeguards are put in place so that the interests of concerned parties and the quality of 
output can be taken into account. 561 Decisions of the Agency must, for example, be 
                                                 
559 See e.g. art. 61 of Regulation 216/2008, O.J. (L 79) 1, 14 – 16 (EC) and art. 69 of Regulation 
726/2004, O.J (L 136) 1, 1 (EC). 
560 For more details on the transparency in the European Union, see W. Kaufmann-Bühler, in: C. O. 
Lenz/ K. - D. Borchardt, EU- und EG-Vertrag, Kommentar zu dem Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union und zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, Köln 2006, art. 
10 TEU, para. 9; see also D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union 
Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 2006, p 317 et seq. 
561 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 6. 
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based on reliable information and expertise, making transparency and scientific 
competence essential requirements.562 For this purpose, article 10 para. 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 requires the Agency “to consult extensively and at an 
early stage” with any interested parties “in an open and transparent manner”. 
Moreover, the Agency must ensure that information is exchanged on a day-to-day 
basis between the Agency, the European Commission and the national regulatory 
authorities. In addition, the public and any interested parties must be given objective 
reliable and easily accessible information with regards to the results of the Agency’s 
work (article 10 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The Agency is thereby 
subject to the general rules regarding public access to documents held by Community 
bodies, which requires that any citizen of the European Union as well as any natural 
or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State must be 
given a right of access to the documents of European agencies, whatever their 
medium. The Agency is thereby not only required that is proceedings are transparent, 
it must also provide for specific provisions in its own Rules of Procedure regarding 
access to its documents pursuant to article 15 no. 3 TEU. 
4.2.2.5.4.7 Political accountability 
Political accountability is exercised through the legislative authority and the 
European Commission.563 The European Parliament and the Council may, for 
example, call upon the Director to submit a report on the performance of his duties 
(article 16 para. 8 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Moreover, the European 
Parliament makes increasingly use of its law-making power, which plays an active 
part in controlling the Agency. Although the European Parliament does not have 
initiative powers, it disposes of relevant participation and veto rights in the process of 
setting up the Agency. In addition, although Parliament has no general right to 
scrutinise the Agency’s activities, it is empowered to summon the Director of the 
                                                 
562 For more details on transparency requirements, see D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. 
Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 317 et seq. 
563 Ibid. 
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Agency before its competent committee and answer questions put by the members of 
that committee (article 16 para. 8 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Finally, the 
European Parliament disposes also of more informal instruments, such as inter-
institutional agreements, which supplements the Agency’s accountability. 564  
The accountability of the Agency to the Member States is, in particular, ensured 
through the participation of Member States’ representatives as agents within the 
Agency. Article 14 para. 1 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 guarantees one seat to 
a nominee of each Member State within the Board of Regulators of the Agency.565
4.2.2.5.4.8 Public accountability 
Agency staff must be suited to the tasks, which they are required to perform. 
They must be experts in their fields. Such expertise can be assured through the 
obligation of taking decisions, allowing external experts to review and judge the work 
of the agencies. In addition, article 28(a), (b) TEU, amending ex-article 233 TEC, 
requires the European institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to “conduct their work 
as openly as possible” in order to “promote good governance and ensure the 
participation of civil society”. In addition, citizen of the European Union is granted 
access to “documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies, 
whatever their medium”.  
                                                 
564 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p.470. 
565 Ibid at p. 475. 
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4.2.2.5.4.9 Yearly report of activities and review  
The European Commission carries out regular evaluations of the Agency’s 
activities, including the results of the Agency and its working methods (article 34 
para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 566  
4.2.2.5.5 Conclusion 
As a conclusion it can be said that the establishment of the Agency complies 
with European law. Although the Agency has no direct legal basis in the European 
treaties, its establishment can nevertheless be regarded as legitimate, if one considers 
that, in accordance with former article 95 TEC (now 114 TFEU), the Agency 
contributes to the participation and cooperation of national energy regulators at 
European level and helps therefore preventing the emergence of disparities likely to 
create obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal energy market. As a 
European regulatory agency, it disposes of its distinct administrative structure, 
consisting of a Director, an Administrative Board, a Board of Regulators as well as a 
Board of Appeal. These organs, although they are formally declared as independent 
bodies, prohibited to seeking or taking instructions from any Government, from the 
European Commission, or from any other public or private entity, are, in fact, 
dependent from the European Commission. Regarding its functions, the Agency has 
been vested, additionally to its general advisory functions vis-à-vis the European 
Parliament, the Council or the European Commission, with the power to adopt 
opinions, recommendations, non-binding framework guidelines and individual 
decisions. The delegation of executive powers to the Agency is thereby consistent 
with the Meroni doctrine, which is still applicable today. The attenuation of 
accountability towards the European institutions, the Member States and the European 
citizens, which is triggered through the attribution of a significant degree of 
independence, has been compensated through other mechanisms of control of 
                                                 
566 See Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 6. 
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Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, such as judicial review of the Agency’s acts as well as 
financial, administrative, political and public accountability.  
4.2.2.6 The control of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators over 
the national energy regulators 
In theory, the task of the Agency is to “assist” the national energy regulators 
with their regulatory tasks “at Community level” and, “where necessary, to coordinate 
their actions” (article 1 para. 2 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). The Agency shall 
furthermore ensure that “regulatory functions performed by the national regulatory 
authorities are properly coordinated” (Recital (6) of Regulation No 713/2009).567 It 
shall, in particular, “provide an integrated framework within which national energy 
regulatory authorities are able to participate and cooperate” (Recital (10) of Regulation 
No 713/2009) in order to ensure “the uniform application of the legislation on the 
internal markets in electricity (…) throughout the Community (Recital (10) of 
Regulation No 713/2009). When examining these provisions, the terms such as 
“assist”, “coordinate” or “providing a framework” give the impression that the role of 
the Agency is one of supporting character.568 The relationship between the Agency and 
the national energy regulators is therefore supposed to be one of co-ordination rather 
than sub-ordination.569 As a consequence, the Agency should have “equal powers” to 
the national energy regulators.570
                                                 
567 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, COM 2007 / 0197 (COD) at Recital (6). 
568 C. Schoser, while explaining the European Commission’s point of view in achieving a single 
European energy market, stresses, that the Agency is not supposed to gain the status of a European 
Energy Regulator, but to promote the cooperation of the national energy regulators; see C. Schoser, in: 
E. Ehlers, Wege zum “echten” Energiebinnenmarkt – Konsens im Ziel, Dissens über die Methoden, 
Bericht zur Fachtagung des Instituts für Berg- und Energierecht der Ruhr-Universität Bochum am 
21.02.2008, RdE 7 /2008, p. 221. 
569 For the cooperation between European agencies and national authorities in general, see T. Groß, Die 
Kooperation zwischen europäischen Agenturen und nationalen Behörden, EuR 1/2005, p. 54 et seq; for 
a detailed overview over the existence of European agencies, including their responsibilities, see 
publication Deutsche Bundestag – Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Europäische Agenturen, No. 9/07 (6. 
März 2007); see also Stellungnahme der Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, 
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De facto, however, the Agency controls the national energy regulators. This becomes 
apparent upon Recital (11) of Regulation No 713/2009, which clearly states: “the 
Agency has an overview of the national regulatory authorities”. And indeed, upon 
article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, the Agency is empowered to exercise 
control over the national energy regulators through the adoption of various acts.571 As 
to the process of adoption, the national regulatory authorities are barely involved. 
Regarding opinions and recommendations issued by the Agency, the national energy 
regulators are not involved at all. The national energy regulators are however not 
bound by these acts. Regarding individual decisions, the influence of the Agency is 
less significant. It may only act where the regulatory authorities concerned have not 
been able to reach an agreement within a certain period of time (six months from the 
date the exemption was requested before the last of those regulatory authorities) or 
upon a joint request from the regulatory authorities concerned (article 8 para. 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). Moreover, before taking such decisions, the Agency 
is required to consult the regulatory authorities concerned as well as the applicants. 
However, once such decisions are taken by the Agency, they prevail over those of the 
national energy regulators.572  
4.2.2.7 The control of the European Commission over the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
The European Commission retains control over the Agency and secures thereby 
indirectly its control over the national energy regulators. The control over the Agency 
                                                                                                                                            
Post und Eisenbahnen für den Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie des 16. Deutschen 
Bundestages zum 3. EU - Energiebinnenmarktpaket, 16(9) 967, 3 April 2008, p. 4 - 7. 
570 See EurActiv, Piebalgs wants EU-wide energy regulator, 3.11.2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/piebalgs-wants-eu-wide-energy-regulator/art.-176880 
(14.08.2010). 
571 See section 4.2.2.6. 
572 See e.g. wording of art. 8 para. 1 of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009: “the Agency shall decide upon 
those regulatory issues that fall within the competence of national regulatory authorities”. See also U. 
Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 1), 
IR 6/2008, p. 122 at p. 149. 
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is, according to the European Commission, necessary in order to secure its “position 
and role as a guardian of the Treaty”.573 For this purpose, the European Commission 
disposes principally of “three different safeguards”.574  The European Commission 
may, firstly, determine the Agency’s decisions on technical issues (article 7 no. 1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009) through the issuance of binding guidelines. The Agency 
has thereby “no political discretion outside this framework”.575 The European 
Commission may, secondly, require the Agency to provide information on whether the 
decisions of the national energy regulators comply with the Guidelines or any other 
provisions of Directives 2009/72/EC and Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 (b), (article 7 
no. 4 and 5 of Regulation No 713/2009). The European Commission may, thirdly, 
require the Agency to take up a preparatory and advisory role with regard to substantive 
decisions that are taken by the European Commission (article 7 no. 2 of Regulation No 
713/2009).576 These powers exist in addition to the European Commission’s general 
power to determine and specify, through binding guidelines, the role of the Agency 
with regard to its cooperation with the national energy regulators (article 38 para. 5 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC).  
4.2.3 Conclusion 
The regulatory regime of Directive 2009/72/EC vests the European 
Commission with indirect powers of control over the national energy regulators. 
                                                 
573 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007), p. 530 final at 3.5.  
574 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007), p. 530 final at 3.5. 
575 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007), p. 530 final at 3.5; see also H. Lecheler, Die Verschärfung des 
Regulierungsregimes durch die drei neuen Verordnungs-Entwürfe im Paket vom 19.09.2007, RdE 
6/2008, p. 167 at p. 171. 
576 See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 
19.09.2007, COM (2007) 530 final at 3.2 and 3.5. 
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These powers are indirect in the sense that they are established via European 
intermediaries, such as the European Network of transmission system operators and 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. It is particularly the creation of 
the Agency, which raises concern.  
On one side, the establishment of the Agency is certainly able to make a significant 
and useful contribution to the effective operation of the European Union. It enables 
the European Commission to concentrate on its core tasks and, thus, helping it to 
effectively carry out the tasks conferred upon it through the Treaty. It furthermore 
represents an institution, which is capable of broadening the scope of cooperation 
between the institutions at national and European level, given that it is placed mid-
way between the national institutions and the bodies provided for by the Treaty. In 
addition, the Agency is able to work in parallel with both, the national and the 
international authorities, and can thus contribute to a better understanding between the 
European institutions and the Member States. In this way, the Agency promotes 
mutual trust of the actors involved within the regulatory process and enhances 
credibility and public confidence.577 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 combined with the 
new provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon significantly enhances the position of 
European agencies.578 Indeed, the Treaty, by unifying the accountability regime of 
European agencies, enhancing the publicity of their actions, granting access to their 
documents and allowing for judicial review against their actions, results therefore 
indirectly in the constitutionalisation of the European agencies.  
On the other side, however, the conferral upon the Agency of such extensive powers 
and competences give, particularly in connection with the Agency’s independence 
vis-à-vis the European Commission, is questionable. The European Commission’s 
requirement to establish the Agency as a “separate entity, independent and outside the 
                                                 
577 See Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, Delegation of 
Regulatory Authority in the European Union, p.37 
578 See J. Saurer, The accountability of supranational administration: the case of European Union 
agencies, Am. U. Int’l L. Rev., p. 429 at p. 479 – p. 481. 
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European Commission”579 fails. Whereas the Agency is, indeed, “independent” from 
the national energy regulators, it is merely “outside” of the European Commission.580 
The Agency’s independence from the national energy regulators has been criticised by 
the Member States. Germany, for instance, claimed that the competences of the 
national energy regulators were not sufficiently taken into account and that the 
European Commission aimed merely to establish a powerful European agency rather 
than finding stable structures in order to resolve the obstacles relating to cross-border 
issues.581 The European Commission justified its control over the Agency with the 
argument that the European treaties did not permit the conferral of general 
autonomous powers to regulatory agencies. It emphasised that agencies could not 
been given the power to adopt general regulatory measures, but that they were limited 
to taking individual decisions in specific areas where defined technical expertise is 
required. Such individual decision-making power had to be attributed under clearly 
and precisely defined conditions and without genuine discretionary power.”582 It 
stressed furthermore that the agencies could not be “entrusted with powers which may 
affect the responsibilities which the Treaty has explicitly conferred on the European 
Commission (for example, acting as the guardian of Community law).”583 In the light 
                                                 
579 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, presented by the European Commission on 19.09.2007, COM 
(2007) 530 final at 3.1. 
580 In this sense also U. Ehricke, Die geplante EU-Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der 
Energieregulierungsbehörden, (Teil 1), IR 6/2008, p. 122 at p. 148; see also art. on EurActiv, EU- 
Energierichtlinie an einem Wendepunkt, 23.02.2009, http://www.euractiv.com/de/energie/eu-
energierichtlinie-wendepunkt/art.-179682 (14.08.2010). 
581 See opinion of the BNetzA, Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Technologie des 16. Deutschen 
Bundestages zum 3. EU - Energiebinnenmarktpaket, 3. April 2008, Ausschuss-Drucksache, 16(9) 967, 
p. 5. 
582 The European Commission’s view that European law does not allow for the establishment of 
independent agencies with wide discretionary powers (institutional balance) is based upon the so-called 
Meroni-doctrine of the European Court of Justice; see decision of 13.06.1958, Rs. 9/56, Slg. 1958, p. 
11. 
583 See Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
European agencies – The way forward, 11.3.2008, COM (2008) 135 final at p. 5; see also Draft 
Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies, 
25.02.2005, COM (2005) 59 final at p. 2; See art. on EurActiv, “Regulierungsbhörden zweifeln an EU-
Energieagentur (DE)”, 25.01.2008, http://www.euractiv.com/de/energie/regulierungsbehrden-
zweifeln-eu-energieagentur/art.-169855 (14.08.2010); see C. Schlosser, in: C. Schimansky, Wege 
 
214
 
 
of these criteria, the Agency, although established as a regulatory agency rather than 
an executive agency, represents merely the “prolonged arm” of the European 
Commission. 584  
                                                                                                                                            
zum “echten” Energiebinnenmarkt – Konsens im Ziel, Dissens über die Methoden, DVBl, 2008, p. 899 
at p. 899 and p. 900. 
584 See U. Ehricke who refers to the Agency as the “verlängerter Arm” of the European Commission; 
see U. Ehricke, in: F. Merkle, Bericht über die Jahrestagung des Instituts für Berg- und Energierecht 
der Ruhr-Universität Bochum, EuZW 18/2008, p. 566 at p. 567; see also M. Koch, Mittelbare 
Gemeinschaftsverwaltung in der Praxis, EuZW, 15/ 2005, p. 455; critical also as to the limited powers 
conferred upon the Agency, see EurActiv, Regulators doubtful over EU energy agency, 25.01.2008, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/regulators-doubtful-eu-energy-agency/art.-169850 
(19.09.2010). 
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5 Final conclusion 
Under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, the powers of control over the 
national energy regulators and, as a result of it, the powers of control over Member 
States’ internal electricity markets shift. They shift away from the Member States to 
the European Union. This shift of regulatory powers is cleverly hidden under the cloak 
of “strengthening energy regulators’ market regulation powers”. Although there is no 
doubt that energy regulators’ powers have been increased, they must not be considered 
in an isolated way. They need to be embedded in the overall context of electricity 
regulation, which consists not only of the regulatory authorities of the Member States, 
but comprises also the European Commission and its institutions. Within this 
regulatory framework, however, a different picture presents itself. Whereas Member 
States lose considerable power over their own national energy regulators, the European 
Commission gains considerable power over them. Member States’ loss of power is 
thereby, in particular, triggered through article 35 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 
2009/72/EC, which requires national energy regulators to be independent in also 
political terms. However, the European Commission, while laying down the 
requirements of national energy regulators’ independence, applies double standards. 
Whereas their independence towards the Member States is reinforced, their 
independence towards the European Commission is restricted. Whereas Member 
States’ powers of control over their own national energy regulators have considerably 
been limited, the European Commission’s powers of control, including those of its 
institutions, have significantly been increased.  
The European Commission’s power reveals itself in different forms. In some cases, it 
is easily apparent and recognisable, conferring to the European Commission direct 
powers of control over the national energy regulators. These powers include the power 
to adopt binding guidelines in crucial areas of Member States’ electricity markets. In 
other cases, it is well hidden and more difficult to detect. They vest the European 
Commission with indirect powers of control in that they empower newly established 
European institutions, such as the ENTSO for Electricity or the Agency, in a first step, 
and secure the European Commission’ control over these institutions, in a second step.  
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One can thus conclude that under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, it is the 
regulatory powers of the European Union, rather than of the national energy regulators 
that have been strengthened. 
In practical terms, the strengthening of regulatory powers on a European level is, in 
my view, a necessary and consequent step of the European Union within its strategy 
called “An Energy Policy for Europe” (Eine Energiepolitik für Europa).585 Within this 
strategy, the European Union focused, in a first phase, on the energy markets within 
the European Union. As part of the third legislative package, the strengthening of 
regulatory powers constitutes thereby, together with the first586 and second legislative 
package587, a powerful tool to complete the harmonisation and liberalisation of the 
internal electricity markets. In a second phase, the European Union has been more 
concerned about the issue of securing energy supply from countries outside of the 
European Union, countries from which the European Union and, in particular 
Germany, are dependent on energy imports. Regarding these extra-European countries, 
I believe that it is crucial to “talk with a single European voice”. 588 This gives the 
European Union a stronger position than if each individual Member State acted 
independently. Harmonising the European energy markets also helps to prevent a 
competitive race for energy supply within the individual Member States, which would 
be contradictory to the principle of loyalty (Gemeinschaftstreue) as laid down in article 
4 para. 2 TEU. Hence, on practical terms, the strengthening of regulatory powers on 
European level constitutes, despite the restrictions that the Member States have to bear 
with regard to their regulatory competences, the right step for the realisation of a single 
European energy market.  
                                                 
585 See e.g. European Commission’s Paper, An Energy Policy for Europe, 10.01.2007, COM (2007) 1 
final; see furthermore the European Council’s Action Plan (2007 – 2009) An Energy Policy for Europe, 
8/9.03.2007, 7224/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 1, annexe 1, p. 16 at p. 19 et seq. 
586 The first legislative package aimed at the opening of the internal energy markets to cross-border 
trade of energy. 
587 The second legislative package aimed at the unbundling of network operation and energy supply. 
588 See the European Council’s Action Plan (2007 – 2009) An Energy Policy for Europe, 8/9.03.2007, 
7224/1/07 REV 1 CONCL 1, annexe 1, p. 16 at p. 19. See also Matthias Schmidt-Preuß, 
Energieversorgung als Aufgabe der Außenpolitik? – Rechtliche Aspekte, RdE 10-11/ 2007, p. 281 at p. 
282 et seq. 
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In legal terms, however, the strengthening of regulatory powers on European level in 
favour of the European Commission evokes various problems: 
Under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, the national concept of democratic 
legitimation of administration of the Member States gets intertwined with the 
constitutional mandate of the Member States (article 23 of the GG and article 23a et 
seq. of the B-VG) to realise a united Europe. As the German Constitutional Court 
stated in its judgment of 30 June 2009, “the Basic Law wants a European integration 
and an international peaceful order: it is thus not only the principle of openness 
towards international law (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), which applies, but also the 
principle of openness towards European law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit)”.589 It 
held, however, also that the authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the 
European Union was granted under the condition that the sovereign statehood of a 
constitutional state is maintained, which included the respect of Member States’ 
constitutional identity. 590 The European Commission interferes with Member States’ 
classical model of a hierarchical administration, which puts the constitutional identity 
at risk: on the lowest level stand the national energy regulators as the administrative 
authorities, which represent the interests of the national citizens in the energy sector, 
such as the smooth functioning of the energy market, security of energy supply, 
energy efficiency or energy.591 These should normally be placed, on the next level, 
under the direction and supervision of their superiors, i.e. the national Governments of 
the Member States as the highest administrative organs of administration. It is on this 
level that the European Commission steps in, empowered upon the framework of 
Directive 2009/72/EC, to exercise powers of control over the national energy 
regulators in either direct or indirect form via intermediary European institutions, 
such as the Agency.  These powers are, in my view, so extensive that one can assume 
                                                 
589 See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 226; see also R. Bieber/ A. Epiney/ M. Haag, Die 
Europäische Union, Europarecht und Politik, 8. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, § 37 Ausblick, para. 1. 
590 See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 227. 
591 See art. 194 TFEU. 
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that the European Commission disposes de facto of a power of instruction 
(Weisungsbefugnis) vis-à-vis the national energy regulators!592  
The power of instruction of the European Commission vis-à-vis the administrative 
authorities of the Member States is not foreseen within European law. European 
primary law entitles the European Commission merely, within the limits and under 
the conditions laid down by the Council acting by a simple majority in accordance 
with the Treaty, “to collect any information and carry out any checks for the 
performance of the task entrusted to it” (article 337 TFEU). It is, however, 
particularly upon European secondary law that the European Commission is able to 
exercise various forms of control over Member States’ administrative authorities, 
which are comparable to a power of instruction. Central provision in this regard 
constitutes article 288 TFEU enabling the European Commission to adopt regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.  
Among these instruments, decisions can be compared to individual instructions due to 
the fact that they may be addressed to a single Member State (288 para. 4 TFEU). 
Under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC, the European Commission decides, 
for example, on the application of Member States of derogations for small isolated 
systems, which encounter substantial problems as to their operation; the decision must 
be published in the Official Journal of the European Union (article 44 para. 1 sent. 2 
and 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC). Upon article 17 para. 7 sent. 2 of Regulation (EC) 
No 714/2009, the European Commission decides on exemption requests of new 
interconnectors. Although in comparison to former article 7 of Regulation (EC) 
1228/2003, the Agency has been integrated into the process as a further decision-
making body, the final decision-making power remains still with the European 
Commission, which shall reach a “well-founded decision” after having received all 
relevant information from the regulatory authorities.  
                                                 
592 See B. Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Wien 2009, para. 389. 
 
220
 
 
In addition to these decision-making powers, the European Commission disposes of 
more general instruments of control, such as directives, regulation or 
recommendations, opinions or guidelines. Being usually addressed to all or at least a 
greater number of Member States and having a more general scope of application, 
these instruments are comparable to general instructions. Examples in the area of 
energy regulation include Directive 2009/72/EC, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, 
recommendations on negotiation of relevant agreements on security of supply of 
energy with third countries (Recital 25 of Directive 2009/72/EC), on measures to 
achieve high public service standards (Recital 45 of Directive 2009/72/EC), on energy 
labelling (Article 47 para. 1 (h) of Directive 2009/72/EC) or various Guidelines, such 
as on the details on procedure to be followed on certification in relation to third 
countries (article 11 para. 10 of Directive 2009/72/EC) or in relation to transmission 
system operators (article 3 para. 5 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009), on compliance 
of transmission system operators with regard to confidentiality requirements (14 para. 
3 of Directive 2009/72/EC), on the extent of the duties of national energy regulators 
to cooperate with each other and with the European Commission (38 para. 5 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC) and on defining record-keeping requirements (40 para. 4 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC). 
The reason of the European Commission’s extensive powers of control can be found 
in its role within the European Union. The European Commission assumes, apart 
from proposing legislation to Parliament and the Council (article 17 para. 2 TFEU), 
managing and implementing EU policies and the budget (article 17 para. 1 sent. 4 
TFEU), representing the European Union on the international stage (article 17 para. 1 
sent. 1 and sent. 5 TFEU), the role of ensuring the application of the Treaties, and of 
measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them (article 17 para. 1 sent. 2 
TFEU) and overseeing the application of Union law under the control of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union” (article 17 para. 1 sent. 3 TFEU). Indeed, if the 
European Commission finds that a Member State is not applying European law and 
therefore does not fulfil its legal obligations, it may launch a so-called infringement 
procedure, which involves sending a reasoned opinion including a statement why it 
considers that this Member State is infringing European law (article 258 para. 1. of 
the TFEU) as well as setting a period for sending the European Commission a 
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detailed reply (article 258 para. 2. of the TFEU). If the Member State does not comply 
with the opinion, the European Commission refers the matter to the Court of Justice, 
which has the power to impose penalties. The Court’s judgment is binding on all the 
Member States and the European institutions. Hence, in being responsible for making 
sure that European law is properly applied in all the Member States, the European 
Commission acts as the Guardian of the Treaties. 593
The integration between the national and European level together with the European 
Commission’s power of instruction has the consequence that the European 
Commission becomes de facto an organ that is comparable to a highest organ of 
administration as defined on national level.  
In taking up such a position, the question of democratic legitimation of the European 
Commission arises. This question needs to be distinguished from the question of 
accountability of the European Commission. The accountability is concerned with 
subjecting decisions and actions of institutions to ex-ante and ex-post examination. It 
requires the institutions to justify what they do, to make themselves politically liable 
for and to take responsibility for what they do. These institutions, being called or held 
to account, need not necessarily be democratic; they might be, but they need not be.  
Hence, the principle of accountability and the principle of democracy may overlap, 
but the securing of accountability of an institution does not necessarily make this 
institution more democratic. As a result, there is not necessarily a link between the 
principle of accountability and the principle of democracy.594  
On national level, the link between the principle of accountability and the principle of 
democracy exists. Indeed, since in most of the Member States the institutions and 
their representatives must themselves be democratically legitimised, the principle of 
                                                 
593 See B. Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Wien 2009, para. 389; see also 
Website of the European Union, Institutions of the EU, European European Commission, 
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (19.03.2011). 
594 See D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and 
Materials, Cambridge 2006, p 312 et seq. 
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accountability constitutes a crucial part of the principle of democracy, requiring a 
connection of legitimation that allows any state activities to be traced back to the will 
of the People.595 The result is the establishment of a hierarchy of administration, 
consisting of the administrative organs under the direction, supervision and 
responsibility (Leitungs- Aufsichts- und Verantwortungszusammenhang) of the 
highest organs of administration, which are democratically accountable to their 
national Parliaments or citizens. 596  
On European level, however, there is, in my opinion, still a gap between the principle 
of accountability and the principle of democracy. Regarding the accountability of the 
European Commission, unsolved issues remain: although article 17 para. 3 TFEU 
states that “the European Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the 
European Parliament”, it remains unclear, how this responsibility is to be defined. 
What should be the consequences in case the European Commission fails to comply 
with its obligations? What should the sanctions be? Who should be empowered to 
implement them?597 Can the accountability of the European Commission equal that of 
the Governments of the Member States?598  
                                                 
595 This becomes, for instance, apparent upon art. 10 para. 2 TEU, which states that “Member States are 
represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their 
Governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their 
citizens”. See furthermore B. Raschauer, who speaks of a “brick within the principle of democracy” 
(Baustein im Demokratieprinzip), in: Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Wien 2009, para. 
389.  
596 See B. Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Wien 2009, para. 389. 
597 Similar questions of accountability were examined by a Committee, which had been appointed by 
the European Parliament in order to examine mismanagement in the European Commission in 1999. 
This Committee of Independent Experts identified in its report a series of allegations of fraud and 
mismanagement, which lead to the resignation of the twenty members of the Santer European 
Commission. For more details, see European European Commission, Report on the implementation of 
the principles in Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Concil and 
European Commission documents, COM (2004) 45, para. 10 to 11, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0045en01.pdf (21.03.2011)); see also A. 
Tomkins, Responsibility and Resignation in the European European Commission, 62 MLR, p. 744; V. 
Mehde, Responsibility and Accountability in the European European Commission (2003), 40 CML 
Rev., p. 423; P. Craig, The Fall and Renewal of the European Commission: Accountability, Contract 
and Administrative Organisation (2000) 6 European Law Journal, p. 98. 
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Regarding the democratic legitimation of the European Commission, as quasi highest 
organ of administration, two questions arise. First, is there a need for the European 
Commission to be legitimised (Legitimationsbedürftigkeit)? And, second, if the 
answer is positive, is there a sufficient connection of legitimation between the 
administrative organs carrying out the specific tasks on national level, here the 
national energy regulators, the European Commission as sort of a “highest 
administrative organ” and the national Parliaments or their citizens?  Or can, with 
today’s progress of the European Union, even a connection of legitimation be 
established to a European People? (Legitimationsfähigkeit).  
As to the first question, the answer is undoubtedly yes, since the European 
Commission is part of the European Union, which constitutes a legal order that has 
direct effect 599 and prevails over the national orders of the Member States (principle 
of supremacy of European law).600
                                                                                                                                            
 
598 See furthemore W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, 
Neuauflage, Berlin 2010, para. 1918; see also BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paras. 297 – 298. 
599 See ECJ, Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tariefcommissie - 
Pays-Bas, E.C.R. (1963) 0001. The Court ruled that „The Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of member states, community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty, but also by 
reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as 
upon the member states and upon the institutions of the community (section B, substance of the case). 
600 See ECJ, Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., Reference for a preliminary ruling: Giudice 
conciliatore di Milano – Italy, E.C.R (1964), 00585. The Court of Justice stated that „By creating a 
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal 
capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus 
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves“ (p. 593). „It follows from all 
these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question“The transfer by the States from their domestic legal 
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries 
 
224
 
 
As to the second question, it needs again to be taken into account that the national and 
European level gets intertwined. Considered separately, each of these levels has 
established institutions that dispose of a sufficient democratic basis of legitimation. 
On national level, we have demonstrated that the national energy regulators as 
administrative organs are themselves sufficiently legitimised, even when executing 
European law. On European level, in order to determine whether the European 
Commission is sufficiently legitimised, it needs to be defined what should be the 
criterion of examination. It is clear that it is not possible to apply the same 
measurements for the European Commission’s democratic legitimation as to the 
nation-states due to the fact that the European Union is not a nation-state at pan-
European level, but a community of states, which consists of nation-states with 
sovereign rights.601  Hence, does the concept of democracy, which has been reached 
on European level with the Lisbon Treaty, constitute a sufficient basis?602 Or does its 
basis still need to be drawn from the democratic legitimation of the Member States 
and the democratic legimatation of the European Union?603 In my view, the concept 
                                                                                                                                            
with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail; see p. 594, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61964J0006:EN:PDF (19.03.2011). For 
more details on the accountability of the European Union, see H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz 
Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, Tübingen 2006, art. 20, para. 46; see also W. Erbguth, 
Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht: mit Verwaltungsprozess- und Staatshaftungsrecht, 3. Auflage, Baden-
Baden 2009, p. 39 – p. 41. 
601 Regarding a model of participatory democracy, D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. 
Tomkin points out three sources of democratic legitimaiton in the European Union: firstly, the 
characteristic of a certain constitutional tolerance, requiring the Member States to recognise the 
independence of each other, to accept their adherence to different values and principles, to respect each 
other’s rights and interests and to recognise that each Member State brings something different but 
equally valuable to the European Union. Secondly, its foundation upon common institutions, requiring 
Member States to come together, decide matters of common interest and realise together common 
projects in the interest of the European Union, rather than to act in a self-interested manner. Thirdly, its 
character of pluralism, spreading power across supranational institutions and national Governments; 
see D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkin, European Union Law, Text and Materials, 
Cambridge 2006, p 171 - 172. 
602 For a historical overview of the European concept of democracy, see H. Dreier, in: H. Dreier, 
Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, Tübingen 2006, art. 20, para. 34 et seq. 
603 For more details, ibid, art. 20, para. 46 et seq.; see also R. Bieber/ A. Epiney/ M. Haag, Die 
Europäische Union, Europarecht und Politik, 8. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, § 37, para. 12 et seq. 
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of (representative) democracy on European level is not yet sufficiently achieved.604 
This is mainly due to the fact that the transfer of powers from the Member States to 
the European Union has resulted in a loss of law-making powers of the national 
Governments, but has not been accompanied by a corresponding transfer to the 
European Parliament.605 The European Parliament does not constitute a unified 
representative organ of the European People, but is still an association of states 
(Staatenversammlung).606 It is more a representative organ of the Member States 
(Staatenvertretung), rather than of the People (Volksvertretung).607 This view has 
recently been confirmed through the German Federal Constitutional Court in the 
judgement of 20 June 2009, considering that the European Union still had “a 
structural democratic deficit”, which could not be resolved in an association of 
sovereign national states.608 It based its assumption, inter alia, on the role of the 
European Parliament. According to the Court, the development of competences of the 
European Parliament could reduce, but not completely fill the gap between the 
decision-making powers of the European institutions and the democratic power of 
action of the citizens within the Member States.609 The European Parliament was not 
prepared, neither from its composition nor its position within the European Union’s 
                                                 
604 In this sense, see e.g. W. Kaufmann-Bühler, in: C. O. Lenz/ K. - D. Borchardt, EU- und EG-Vertrag, 
Kommentar zu dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, Köln 2006, art. 10 TEU, para. 2. 
605 See e.g. D. Chalmers/ C. Hadjiemmanuil/ G. Monti/ A. Tomkins, European Union Law, Text and 
Materials, Cambridge 2006, p. 167 et seq; for details on the participatory democracy, see p. 171 et seq. 
and on the deliberative democracy, p. 175 et seq; see also W. Kaufmann-Bühler, in: C. O. Lenz/ K. - D. 
Borchardt, EU- und EG-Vertrag, Kommentar zu dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zu dem 
Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, Köln 2006, Art. 11 TEU, para. 1 et 
seq. 
606 See BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paras. 279 and 281; for more details on the relationship 
between the European Union and the Member States, see D. Ehlers, in: R. Schulze/ M. Zuleeg/ S. 
Kadelbach, Europarecht, Handbuch für die deutsche Rechtspraxis, 2. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2010, § 
11. 
607 Fore more details on the European Union, its institutions and the principle of democracy, see H. 
Dreier, art. 20, para. 38, in: H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Band II, Art. 20-82, 2. Auflage, 
Tübingen 2006. 
608 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, paras. 264, 277, 290; see furthermore J. Bitterlich, in: C. O. 
Lenz/ K. - D. Borchardt, EU- und EG-Vertrag, Kommentar zu dem Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union und zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, Köln 2006, art. 
1, para. 7. 
609 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para. 281. 
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structure of competences, to take representative decisions in form of uniform 
decisions on political direction. In addition, it was not competent to take decisions on 
political direction in the context of the balancing of interests between the Member 
States. It concluded that the European Parliament could therefore not support the 
parliamentary Government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the 
system of Government and opposition in a way that its decision on political direction 
could have a politically decisive effect.610 The Court based its assumption furthermore 
on the argument that the peoples of the Member States were the holders of the 
constituent power of the European Union. It considered that as long as no uniform 
European people as subject of legitimation existed, the peoples of the Member States 
remained the decisive holders of public authority.611
As a consequence, the democratic legitimation of the European Commission is still to 
be drawn from the democratic legitimation of the Member States and the European 
Union.612 The interaction of these two strings of democratic legitimation becomes 
apparent upon the European Commission’s appointment procedures, its composition 
and its responsibility, which involves European and national institutions. Regarding 
the appointment of the European Commission’s members, they are chosen among 
nationals of Member States’ Governments, which are themselves democratically 
legitimised, being accountable either to their national citizens or Parliaments (article 
10 para. 3 TEU).613 Moreover, Member States’ Governments agree together on whom 
to designate as the new European Commission President (article 17 para. 7 TFEU) as 
well as the members of the European Commission are selected on the suggestions 
                                                 
610 Ibid, paras. 285 – 288; see also Press release no. 72/2009 of 30 June 2009 of the Constitutional 
Court, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html 
(20.03.2011). 
611 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, leading principles, para.1; see also R. Bieber/ A. Epiney/ M. 
Haag, Die Europäische Union, Europarecht und Politik, 8. Auflage, Baden-Baden 2009, § 37 Ausblick, 
para. 13. 
612 See e.g. W. Kaufmann-Bühler, in: C. O. Lenz/ K. - D. Borchardt, EU- und EG-Vertrag, Kommentar 
zu dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union und zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, 4. Auflage, Köln 2006, art. 10 TEU, para. 5. 
613 See W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, Neuauflage, Berlin 
2010, Rn. 1918. 
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made by the Member States (article 17 para. 7, subpara. 2 TFEU). In addition, the 
European Parliament is involved in the appointment procedure of the European 
Commission President and the members of the European Commission. It approves the 
European Commission President-designate (article 14 para. 1 sent. 2 TEU, article 17 
para. 7 TFEU) and elects the President of the European Commission (article 17 para. 
7 sent. 2 in connection with article 14 para. 1 sent. 2 TFEU) and subjects the members 
of the European Commission to its vote of consent (article 17 para. 7, subpara. 3 
TFEU).614  
As a result, considered separately, the national and European level dispose of 
institutions that are sufficiently legitimised. However, due to the fact that these two 
levels interact with each other, the problem remains that the European Commission, 
as the sole administrative organ of the European Union, constitutes an independent 
organ of executive power.615 As article 17 para. 3, subparagraph 2 TFEU states: “in 
carrying out its responsibilities, the European Commission shall be completely 
independent” and its members “shall neither seek nor take instructions from any 
Government or other institution, body, office or entity.” 
                                                 
614 See e.g. Website of the European Union, institutions of the European Union, the European European 
Commission, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (19.03.2011). 
615 See W. Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht, Wirkungen und Rechtsschutz, Band 5, Neuauflage, Berlin 
2010, Rn. 1921. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Abstract in English 
The paper examines the powers of Member States’ national regulatory authorities 
under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJEU L 176/37) and analyses the implications of 
framework of Directive 2009/72/EC on the national laws of the Member States, in 
particular on the Austrian and German constitutional, administrative and energy laws. 
The Introductory Part (1) gives a historical overview of the development of national 
energy regulators under European energy legislation, in particular under the framework 
of Electricity Directive 1996/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
(OJEU L 027, 30/01/1997, p. 0020 – 0029) and of Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJEU L 
211/55). This Part shows that the national regulatory authorities attract increased 
attention and that their regulatory powers are on a constant rise. In order to understand 
the huge impact of the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC on the regulatory regimes 
of the Member States, this Part briefly examines the former and current powers of the 
national energy regulators under Austrian and German law.  
Part Two (2) analyses whether the powers conferred upon national energy regulators 
under the framework of Directive 2009/72/EC have been enhanced in comparison to 
those established under the framework of Directive 2003/54/EC. The main focus lies 
thereby on the propositions made by the European Commission in its Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (COM 
(2007) 528 final, 2.1) and laid down in Directive 2009/72/EC. This includes, firstly, the 
question whether the requirement of article 35 para. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC to 
establish a single national regulatory authority at national level constitutes indeed, as 
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the European Commission claims, an effective tool of enhancing the powers of the 
national regulatory authorities (2.1). An in-depth analysis deals with the conflict that 
arises in this regard between the constitutional laws of the Member States and 
European law, particularly with regard to the constitutionally guaranteed principle of 
Federalism as prevalent in Germany and Austria. It reveals that paragraph 1 of article 
35 of Directive 2009/72/EC interferes deeply with the federal structures of federally 
structured Member States and that paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of article 35 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC contribute few to attenuate its huge impact on these structures. It 
examines, secondly, whether the duties assigned to the national energy regulators in the 
internal electricity markets, including in competitive areas, as well as in areas 
involving cross-border issues have been increased. It elaborates, finally, on the central 
provision of article 37 para. 4 sent. 2 (b) sent. 1 of Directive 2009/72/EC, which vests 
the regulatory authorities with a new set of regulatory powers, including new 
investigation rights, decision-making powers, enforcement powers and information 
rights. Particular attention is thereby paid to the question whether this new set of 
powers is restricted to monopoly areas or whether it extends to competitive areas as 
well and where the delimitation of competences between the national energy regulators 
and the national competition authorities needs to be drawn (2.2). Part Two comes to the 
conclusion that the powers of the national energy regulators under the framework of 
Directive 2009/72/EC have indeed been enhanced in comparison to former regime of 
Directive 2003/54/EC (2.3). 
Part Three (3) demonstrates that the enhancement of national energy regulators’ 
powers does not benefit the Member States. On the contrary, they lose considerable 
powers of control over their own national energy regulators. While comparing national 
energy regulators’ status of independence under the regime of former Directive 
2003/54/EC and Directive 2009/72/EC, it becomes apparent that the loss of powers 
suffered by the Member States is mainly triggered through article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) 
(ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC. This article requires Member States to ensure that the 
national regulatory authorities do not seek or take instructions from any government or 
any other public or private entity (3.1). An in-depth analysis assesses whether this 
required political independence can be regarded as compatible with Austrian and 
German constitutional law. It establishes that article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of 
Directive 2009/72/EC is strongly opposed to the Austrian and German hierarchical 
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model of administration. Since both constitutional systems subject, based upon the 
principle of democracy, their administrative organs principally to the instructions of 
their superiors and allow for their release in only exceptional and limited cases, the 
analysis focuses on the question whether article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 
2009/72/EC can be treated as such an exception. The analysis comes here in view of 
Germany and Austria to a different result. This is due to the fact that the supervision of 
the energy sector in these countries is organised in a different way. Whereas the 
German BNetzA has been established as a separate higher Federal authority within the 
scope of business of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the E-control 
GmbH has (until 1st of March 2011) been established as an entity of private law 
outsourced from the hierarchical structure of administration and the E-control 
Commission as a collegial body having within its membership at least one judge. 
Whereas the release of the German BNetzA would not be justifiable upon the cases 
developed by German law doctrine and administrative practice, the release of the 
Austrian E-control GmbH complies with Austrian constitutional law (3.2). As a result, 
whereas article 35 par. 4 sent. 2 (b) (ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC can be regarded as 
compatible with Austrian constitutional law, the inconsistency with German 
constitutional subsists (3.3). 
Part Four (4) reveals that it is the European Commission, which benefits from 
national energy regulators’ increase of powers. Its gain of powers under the regime of 
Directive 2009/72/EC appears directly, in form of e.g. binding guidelines (4.1), as well 
as indirectly, in form of powers exercised through its European institutions, such as the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators or the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (4.2). It is particularly the creation of the Agency, 
including the determination of its legitimate legal basis and its independence vis-à-vis 
the European Commission, which raises concern within the Member States. An in-
depth analysis deals with the question of legal protection against decisions taken by the 
Board of Appeal or the Agency. This right being explicitly codified in article 263 
TFEU contributes to the Agency’s indirect constitutionalisation within the Treaty on 
European Union. Another in-depth analysis focuses on the question whether European 
institutions may legitimately delegate executive powers to European agencies, such as 
the Agency. Here, the Meroni doctrine, including its subsequent judgments as well as 
the question of the Agency’s accountability towards the Member States becomes 
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relevant again. This Part concludes that the Agency, although established as a separate 
entity, is all but independent from the European Commission. 
This Paper concludes under Part Five (5) that, although the powers of national energy 
regulators have undoubtedly been increased in comparison to former Directive 
2003/54/EC, their position has not been strengthened. It is the European Commission, 
which, equipped with a powerful set of powers, is the real “winner” as to the regulatory 
powers of the energy markets. The new regime of Directive 2009/72/EC leads to a 
drastic shift of energy regulatory powers, shifting away from the Member States on a 
national level towards the European Commission on a European level. Although the 
strengthening of regulatory powers on a European level may, in practical terms, be a 
positive step towards the realisation of a common European energy market, in legal 
terms, it evokes various problems. The powers of control conferred upon the European 
Commission, in particular via the Agency, are so extensive that the European 
Commission disposes de facto of a power of instruction vis-à-vis the regulatory 
authorities of the Member States. This raises the question as to the democratic 
legitimation of the European Commission and its accountability towards the European 
institutions and the Member States. Directive 2009/72/EC illustrates well that in the 
energy sector the national and European level gets more and more intertwined and that 
procedures need to be put in place, which ensure, on the one hand, that Member States’ 
internal orders remain intact and which foster, on the other hand, the process of the 
European integration. 
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7.2 Abstract in German 
Die Arbeit untersucht die Befugnisse der nationalen Regulierungsbehörden der 
Mitgliedstaaten unter dem Regime der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG des Europäischen 
Parlaments und des Rates vom 13. Juli 2009 über gemeinsame Vorschriften für den 
Elektrizitätsbinnenmarkt und zur Aufhebung der Richtlinie 2003/54/EG (Abl. EU L 
211/55) und analysiert ihre Auswirkungen auf die nationalen Rechtsordnungen der 
Mitgliedstaaten, insbesondere auf das österreichische und deutsche Verfassungs-, 
Verwaltungs- und Energierecht. 
Die Einleitung (1) gibt einen historischen Überblick über die Entwicklung der 
nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden unter dem Europäischen Energierecht, 
insbesondere unter der Richtlinie 96/92/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des 
Rates vom 19. Dezember 1996 betreffend gemeinsame Vorschriften für den 
Elektrizitätsbinnenmarkt (Abl. EU L 027, 30/01/1997, S. 0020 – 0029) und der 
Richtlinie 2003/54/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 26. Juni 2003 
über gemeinsame Vorschriften für den Elektrizitätsbinnenmarkt und zur Aufhebung 
der Richtlinie 96/92/EG (Abl. EU L 176/37). Dieser Teil der Arbeit zeigt auf, dass den 
nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden vermehrt Aufmerksamkeit zukommt und dass 
deren Regulierungskompetenzen beständig ausgeweitet werden. Um die Auswirkungen 
der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG auf die Regulierungssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten in ihrem 
ganzen Umfang ermessen zu können, werden die vergangenen und aktuellen 
Befugnisse der nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden unter österreichischem und 
deutschem Recht kurz dargestellt. 
Teil 2 (2) untersucht, ob die Kompetenzen, die den nationalen 
Energieregulierungsbehörden durch das Regime der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG übertragen 
wurden im Vergleich zu den Kompetenzen aus der Richtlinie 2003/54/EG gestärkt 
wurden. Der Schwerpunkt der Untersuchung liegt hierbei auf den Vorschlägen der 
Europäische Kommission zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/54/EG im Rahmen des 
„Dritten Legislativpakets“, welche in das Regelwerk der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG 
übernommen wurden. Dieser Teil geht in einem ersten Abschnitt der Frage nach, ob 
die in Artikel 35 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG grundsätzlich an jeden 
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Mitgliedstaat gerichtete Verpflichtung „auf nationaler Ebene eine einzige nationale 
Regulierungsbehörde“ zu benennen tatsächlich, wie von der Europäischen 
Kommission behauptet, ein wirksames Mittel darstellt, die Kompetenzen der 
nationalen Regulierungsbehörden zu stärken (2.1). Eine Schwerpunktanalyse behandelt 
den Konflikt, der in diesem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Verfassungsrecht der 
Mitgliedstaaten und dem Europäischen Recht entsteht und dies insbesondere im 
Hinblick auf das verfassungsrechtlich garantierte Prinzip des Föderalismus, das in 
Deutschland und Österreich vorherrschend ist. Die Analyse deckt auf, dass Absatz 1 
des Artikel 35 der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG tief in die föderalen Strukturen föderal 
organisierter Mitgliedstaaten eingreift und dass die in den Absätzen 1 und 2 
enthaltenen Abschwächungen nur wenig dazu beitragen, diese Eingriffe abzumildern. 
Ein zweiter Abschnitt untersucht, ob den nationalen Regulierungsbehörden zusätzliche 
Aufgaben übertragen wurden, und zwar innerhalb der Binnenmärkte (einschließlich der 
Wettbewerbsbereiche) und in grenzüberschreitenden Bereichen. Die Untersuchung 
behandelt im letzten Abschnitt die zentrale Vorschrift des Artikel 37 Abs. 4 Satz 2 (b) 
sent. 1 der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG, welche die nationalen Regulierungsbehörden mit 
einem neuen Bündel an Regulierungsbefugnissen ausstattet, einschließlich neuer 
Untersuchungs-, Beschlussfassungs- und Durchsetzungsbefugnisse sowie zusätzlicher 
Informationsrechte. Besonderer Aufmerksamkeit kommt in diesem Zusammenhang der 
Frage zu, ob der Anwendungsbereich dieses neuen Bündels an Eingriffsbefugnissen 
auf den Netzbereich beschränkt ist oder sich auf offene Märkte mit funktionierendem 
Wettbewerb ausdehnt und wo die Kompetenzabgrenzung zwischen den nationalen 
Energieregulierungsbehörden und den Wettbewerbsbehörden zu ziehen ist (2.2). Teil 2 
kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Befugnisse der nationalen 
Energieregulierungsbehörden unter dem Regelwerk der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG im 
Vergleich zu den Befugnissen unter dem Regelwerk der Richtlinie 2003/54/EG 
tatsächlich ausgeweitet wurden (2.3). 
Teil 3 (3) legt dar, dass die Ausweitung der Kompetenzen der nationalen 
Energieregulierungsbehörden nicht den Mitgliedstaaten zugute kommt. Diese verlieren 
im Gegenteil sogar erheblich an Einfluss- und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten gegenüber den 
eigenen nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden. Ein Vergleich des 
Unabhängigkeitsstatus der nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden unter dem 
vorherigen Regime der Richtlinie 2003/54/EG  und dem der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG 
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verdeutlicht, dass der Machtverlust der Mitgliedstaaten im Wesentlichen durch Artikel 
35 Abs. 4 Satz 2 (b) (ii) der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG ausgelöst wird. Diese Vorschrift 
gibt den Mitgliedstaaten nämlich auf, sicherzustellen, dass ihre nationalen 
Regulierungsbehörden bei der Wahrnehmung ihrer Regulierungsaufgaben keine 
Weisungen von Regierungsstellen oder anderen öffentlichen oder privaten 
Einrichtungen einholen oder entgegennehmen (3.1). In einer Schwerpunktanalyse wird 
geprüft, ob diese geforderte politische Unabhängigkeit als mit dem österreichischen 
und deutschen Verfassungsrecht vereinbar angesehen werden kann. Die Analyse stellt 
fest, dass Artikel 35 Abs. 4 Satz 2 (b) (ii) der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG in diametralem 
Gegensatz zum österreichischen und deutschen hierarchischen Verwaltungsmodell 
steht. Da beide Rechtsordnungen als Ausfluss des Demokratieprinzips ihre 
Verwaltungsorgane grundsätzlich den Weisungen ihrer vorgesetzten Organe 
unterwerfen und Ausnahmen hiervon in nur eng begrenzten Fällen zulassen, 
konzentriert sich die Untersuchung auf die Frage, ob Artikel 35 Abs. 4 Satz 2 (b) (ii) 
der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG als eine derartige Ausnahme angesehen werden kann. Die 
Analyse kommt hier im Hinblick auf Deutschland und Österreich zu einem 
unterschiedlichen Ergebnis. Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Aufsicht über den 
Energiesektor  in diesen Ländern unterschiedlich ausgestaltet ist. Während die 
deutsche BNetzA als selbständige Bundesoberbehörde innerhalb des Geschäftsbereichs 
des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie angesiedelt ist, ist die 
österreichische E-control GmbH (bis zum 1. März 2011) als ausgegliederter 
Rechtsträger des privaten Rechts und die E-control Kommission als Kollegialbehörde 
mit richterlichem Einschlag eingerichtet. Die Entlassung der BNetzA aus der 
Weisungsgebundenheit auf Grundlage der von der deutschen Staats- und 
Verwaltungspraxis entwickelten Ausnahmen wäre nicht gerechtfertigt, eine Entlassung 
der E-control GmbH hingegen ist mit österreichischem Recht vereinbar (3.2). Im 
Ergebnis ist also Artikel 35 Abs. 4 Satz 2 (b) (ii) der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG mit 
österreichischem Verfassungsrecht vereinbar, nicht dagegen mit deutschem 
Verfassungsrecht (3.3). 
Teil 4 (4) enthüllt, dass letztlich die Europäische Kommission von der Stärkung der 
Befugnisse der nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden profitiert. Ihr Machtgewinn 
tritt unter dem Regime der Richtlinie 2009/72/EG sowohl unmittelbar in Erscheinung, 
wie beispielsweise in Form der Befugnis, bindende Leitlinien zu erlassen (4.1), also 
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auch mittelbar, in Form von Befugnissen, die durch Europäische Institutionen ausgeübt 
werden, wie das Europäische Netzwerk der Übertragungsnetzbetreiber oder die 
Agentur für die Kooperation nationaler Regulierungsbehörden (4.2). Es ist 
insbesondere die Schaffung der Agentur, einschließlich der Bestimmung ihrer richtigen 
Rechtsgrundlage und ihrer Unabhängigkeit gegenüber der Europäischen Kommission, 
die Bedenken in den Mitgliedstaaten erregt. Eine Schwerpunktanalyse beschäftigt sich 
mit der Frage nach dem gerichtlichen Rechtsschutz gegen die vom Berufungsausschuss 
oder der Agentur erlassenen Entscheidungen. Dieses Recht, nunmehr ausdrücklich in 
Artikel 263 AEUV festgeschrieben, trägt hierbei zur mittelbaren Konstitutionalisierung 
der Agentur im Vertrag über die Europäische Union bei. Eine weitere 
Schwerpunktanalyse dieses Teils widmet sich der Frage, ob Europäische Institutionen 
in rechtmäßiger Weise Ausführungsbefugnisse auf Europäische Agenturen, wie z.B. 
die Agentur, übertragen können. In diesem Zusammenhang lebt die Meroni Doktrin, 
einschließlich der im folgenden ergangenen Entscheidungen, sowie die Frage der 
Verantwortlichkeit der Agentur gegenüber den Mitgliedstaaten wieder auf. Der Teil 
schlussfolgert, dass die Agentur, obwohl sie als Rechtsträger mit eigener 
Rechtspersönlichkeit eingerichtet wurde, alles andere als von der Europäischen 
Kommission unabhängig ist.  
Teil 5 (5) dieser Arbeit stellt abschließend fest, dass die Position der nationalen 
Energieregulierungsbehörden trotz der erfolgten Ausweitung ihrer 
Regulierungsbefugnisse nicht gestärkt wurde. Es ist die Europäische Kommission, die, 
bewaffnet mit einem hochwirksamen Bündel an Befugnissen, zu den tatsächlichen 
Gewinnern des Energieregulierungsmarktes zählt. Das neue Regime unter der 
Richtlinie 2009/72/EG führt zu einer drastischen Machtverschiebung der 
Energieregulierungskompetenzen, weg von den Mitgliedstaaten auf nationaler Ebene 
hin zur Europäischen Kommission auf europäischer Ebene. Auch wenn die Stärkung 
der Regulierungsbefugnisse auf Europäischer Ebene aus praktischer Sicht der richtige 
Schritt sein mag, einen einheitlichen Energiebinnenmarkt zu verwirklichen, so wirft sie 
aus rechtlicher Sicht eine Vielzahl an Problemen auf. In der Tat sind die der 
Europäischen Kommission zugewiesenen Befugnisse so umfangreich, dass ihr de facto 
Weisungsbefugnis gegenüber den nationalen Energieregulierungsbehörden der 
Mitgliedstaaten zukommt. Dies wirft wiederum die Frage nach der demokratischen 
Legitimation der Europäischen Kommission sowie ihrer Verantwortlichkeit gegenüber 
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den Europäischen Institutionen und den Mitgliedstaaten auf. Das Regime der Richtlinie 
2009/72/EG ist ein Beispiel dafür, dass auf dem Energiesektor die nationale und 
Europäische Ebene mehr und mehr  miteinander verflochten sind und dass Verfahrens 
festgelegt werden müssen, die auf der einen Seite sicherstellen, dass die nationalen 
Rechtordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten gewahrt werden, die aber auf der anderen Seite 
die Fortentwicklung der Europäischen Integration ermöglichen. 
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